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This review draws lessons from previous shocks that 
may be relevant to dealing with the consequences of 
COVID-19 for agriculture, food systems, food security 
and rural livelihoods in developing countries and 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the evidence 
comes from reviewing seven viral health crises1 and 
two economic shocks2. 
Few other health crises resemble the COVID-19 
outbreak. Lessons from previous crises may therefore 
not be directly applicable to the current pandemic. It 
remains to be seen (in early May 2020) how the 
disease will develop in rural areas. There is a risk, 
however, that the economic consequences of 
measures to control the disease may be stronger than 
those of disease itself. 
Five such consequences may be seen: 
• Agricultural output may fall, mainly owing to 
reduced demand for perishables and air-freighted 
export crops. 
• Women may face additional work in caring for the 
sick, on top of their often already heavy 
workloads — their daughters may be taken out of 
school to help them. 
• Rural household incomes will fall, particularly for 
households that rely on high-value perishable 
agricultural crops and air-freighted export, on 
rural non-farm business and employment, and on 
remittances from migrants in urban areas — both 
domestic and international. 
• Some business in the food supply chains may go 
bankrupt as demand falls and transport is 
disrupted. 
• Food insecurity may rise, in both rural and urban 
areas, mainly due to lower household incomes 
and possibly from higher agricultural prices. 
 
1 HIV/AIDS; H5N1 (avian influenza); Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS); H1N1 (swine flu); Ebola virus 
disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa and the D. R. Congo. 
 
We need to learn from how previous crises were 
tackled. Dealing with novel crises involves uncertainty 
about: 
• The crisis and its effects on economy and society; 
• Effective responses — aggravated by the lack of 
evaluation of previous responses to similar crises; 
and 
• What can be implemented with the capacity that 
has been developed and the data available — 
primarily in government, but also with private 
enterprise, civil society, international organisation 
and aid partners. 
Remarkably, in responses to medical crises, 
livelihoods have often been ignored, especially when 
it comes to informal activities — as is much 
smallholder farming, trading, and the interactions of 
rural and urban economies. This is particularly costly, 
since most people vulnerable to crises — those on low 
incomes, who lack assets, who may have precarious 
health — work informally. 
Lessons learned 
We also need to learn from the policies, investments 
and assistance that have worked in previous crises. 
Livelihoods need to be maintained as far as 
possible. This is what those most affected prioritise. 
Livelihoods allow people to live, to function, to have 
self-respect and dignity. They thus often matter more 
than safety. Agriculture is central to rural livelihoods, 
food systems and food security. So too are the many 
informal businesses typically found in food supply 
chains, and the remittances from urban workers that 
increasingly support rural incomes. 
Health crises are highly selective. Pathogens select 
epidemiologically, but thereafter their effects are 
determined by incomes, wealth, social class and 





gender. The impacts of health crises can thus be both 
extremely uneven, as well as socially unequal. Not 
everyone needs protection, but those most affected 
certainly do. Women often carry the burden of caring 
for the sick, their workloads can rise, and their 
daughters may be taken out of school to help. 
Agricultural output can be boosted very 
considerably over a season or two. In general, 
economic recovery from crises can be stronger and 
faster than some fear at the height of the crisis. That is 
partly because much physical, human and social  
capital survives crises; partly because recovery 
commonly mobilises extra effort from actors of all 
kinds. 
Recommendations 
These considerations imply the following 
recommendations: 
• To protect livelihoods, ensure as far as possible 
that farmers can maintain, and preferably expand 
production at the next planting season; allow 
rural markets to operate with modest restrictions 
and precautions; devise ways to keep enterprises 
in food supply chains running or, if they have to 
close or operate at reduced capacity, to ensure 
they survive the crisis. Ensure the flow of 
remittances remains unblocked at both ends of 
the sender-receiver pipeline. 
• To maintain unhindered food supply, do all of 
the above, as well as set up green channels for 
agricultural inputs, processing and marketing. 
• To protect those who are hard hit by the crisis, 
protect and scale up existing safety nets to reach 
more people and if necessary, increase payments. 
Where safety nets do not exist, use emergency 
cash transfers. Target broadly to prevent 
exclusion errors: worry less about inclusion 
errors. Prioritise rural women when extending 
safety nets or increasing payments. Ensure that if 
rural girls’ education suffers during the crisis, 
they are provided with opportunities to catch up 
with their peers and supported to return to 
schooling. 
 
General lessons on responding to 
crises 
History shows that initial responses to similar crises 
have often been ineffective, irrelevant or counter-
productive. This is perhaps not surprising -the need to 
deal with novel challenges with considerable 
uncertainty makes it hard to get things right from the 
start. By limiting initial analysis and key 
considerations, important issues are often not 
considered and left under-attended. 
Effective responses invariably rely on the existing 
capacity of organisations and people: their knowledge, 
skills and experience. Most effective responses thus 
involve doing something that is familiar, that involves 
skills that are known. Trying to do completely new 
things in a crisis is rarely possible. 
Last, and not least, most of the responses to crises 
come from the people most affected by it. Their 
immediate resources — individual, household, 
extended households and local community — 
commonly provide the bulk of coping for the most 
vulnerable. 
Recommendations 
These challenges for decision-making and 
implementation imply the need to: 
• Invest in understanding what is happening. 
Rapid data gathering and analysis is needed. Make 
sure that livelihoods are covered, especially 
informal livelihoods. Existing data on livelihoods 
and household economies can help predict and 
project impacts of shocks, including COVID-19, 
where real-time data are lacking. 
• Manage adaptively. Take prompt action but be 
prepared to revise responses in the light of 
incoming information. Engaging with 




it is not to be mere co-opting — not only 
generates critical information, but can also 
generate practical responses that work locally, 
that outsiders may not see. 
• Find and employ those with experience of 
previous crises. Include specialists from across 
the board: avoid privileging the views of any 
group of specialists. 
• Take prompt action and commit to dealing 
with the crisis and its effects. This will allay 
fears and calm those inclined to overreact in 
anxiety. 
• Consider feasible options, recognising capacity 
limits. This may mean responses appear 
insufficient to deal with the crisis. They may be 
modest rather than radical. Do not underestimate 
the contributions of all actors: it is not only what 
government, aid partners and international 
organisations do that matters. The bulk of 
response to crises comes from ordinary people, so 






Purpose of this Rapid Evidence 
Review 
This review was commissioned by DFID to draw 
lessons from previous shocks that may be relevant to 
dealing with the consequences of COVID-19 in 
developing countries and especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The review addresses two questions: 
• What may be the consequences of disease, and 
responses to it, on agriculture, rural livelihoods, 
food systems and food security? 
• What lessons on dealing with those consequences 
may be drawn from previous crises? 
The work for this rapid evidence review began on 03 
April 2020 and a first draft was submitted on 16 April 
2020. 
Most of the evidence comes from reviewing seven 
viral health crises: 
• 1980s–present: HIV/AIDS pandemic; 
• 1997–2010: H5N1 (avian influenza) outbreak, 
mainly in Asia; 
• 2003: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
outbreak in Asia; 
• 2009: Global H1N1 (swine flu) outbreak; 
• 2013–2015: Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak 
in West Africa; 
• 2018–present: EVD outbreak in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo; and, 
• 2019–present: COVID-19 outbreak in China; 
and two economic shocks: 
• 1997: Asian financial crisis; and, 
• 2007/2008: food price spike. 
Reviews were based on existing literature about these 
crises and responses. In addition, nine specialists, 
either researchers or development practitioners, were 
interviewed for their knowledge and insights about 
previous crises and responses. 
The potential impact of COVID-19 on 
agriculture, rural livelihoods, food 
systems and food security 
Economic impacts of COVID-19 
Few other health crises resemble the COVID-19 
outbreak: it is a novel crisis. Lessons from previous 
crises may therefore not apply directly to the current 
pandemic. In seeking to avoid past mistakes, there is a 
risk of committing new ones if undue parallels are 
drawn. 
The virus is more transmissible than Ebola or HIV and 
the onset of disease is rapid, within days. The disease 
appears, however, to be less deadly or debilitating 
than most other viral pandemics. Controlling 
transmission is a major challenge, although measures 
to do so may have a greater economic impact than the 
disease itself. 
For the economies of emerging and developing 
countries, the disease and its control will very 
probably lead to large losses of output and the 
contraction of GDP — by almost 1% in 2020, 
according to the IMF (April 17). Considerable 
uncertainty applies to the size and duration of these 
losses, depending on the epidemiology of the disease 
in specific countries and settings, and the measures 
taken to control its transmission. (Box A) 
How COVID-19 may impact the rural areas of the 
developing world remains to be seen. On the one 
hand, distance from urban centres of infection and 
dispersed rural populations may slow transmission. 
The young age profile of rural populations may also 
mean that most infections do not progress to serious 
disease and death. 
On the other hand, returning migrants from urban 
areas may facilitate transmission. COVID-19 may lead 
to more serious disease and deaths because some of 
the rural population, especially in Africa, are already 
in poor health, have immune systems compromised 
by HIV, or are malnourished. Curative health facilities, 




Effects on agriculture and rural economies from 
disease alone may be quite modest: labour may be lost 
to sickness and caring, but for most infections, illness 
may last no longer than two weeks. Farming is already 
adapted to such contingencies: illness in farming 
households is quite frequent, labour needed at peak 
seasons is typically replaced by the extended family, 
collective self-help and hired labour. Much rural 
business is similarly resilient to short-term illness and 
other small shocks. 
Of greater concern are restrictions on movement and 
gatherings. These are already leading to closure of 
rural and urban food markets, and to restrictions on 
public transport, thereby disrupting marketing of 
crops, reducing demand for farm surpluses and 
increasing food prices in urban areas. 
Rural populations will also be affected by impacts in 
the urban economy. Layoffs of workers in the cities 
may lead to migrants returning home to their villages, 
spreading the disease. The flow of remittances may 
also be affected which, in some villages, contribute 
significantly to rural incomes. Closure of urban 
restaurants, food markets and losses of urban income 
may reduce demand for agricultural produce, 
especially high-value and perishable produce. 
Restrictions on international travel may mean less 
capacity to carry export crops as air freight; while 
increased vigilance at borders may impede 
agricultural trade. 
 
Box A Uncertainties and debates on 
economic impacts of COVID-19 in the 
developing world 
For economies as a whole, worst case scenarios are 
alarming. For example, UNECA (2020) estimates that 
3.3 million people may die from the disease in Africa, 
with economies of the continent contracting by 2.6%. 
Sumner et al. (2020) foresee a worst case scenario of 
 
3 Many smallholders, however, apply relatively few such 
inputs and hence would not be greatly affected.  
as many as 580 million people pushed into poverty 
around the world. 
On the other hand, other observers’ analyses  argue 
that the disease changes few fundamentals, so that if 
capital, labour, and networks that sustain enterprise 
and trade survive the disease, then economies may 
rebound rather quickly when restrictions are lifted. 
(Baldwin 2020, Portes 2020) 
In rural areas, some are concerned that the disease 
and related restrictions to movement may 
exacerbate existing threats — droughts, locusts, 
conflict, leading to serious loss of crops and livestock, 
increasing vulnerability and moving rural households 
into poverty, threatening food supplies, and adding 
considerably to food insecurity.  
On the other hand, agriculture and the rural economy 
are loose-coupled systems, where farmers and 
business operators are accustomed to coping with 
shocks of all kinds. Mild disease and moderate 
restrictions on movement and gatherings, while 
unwelcome, may therefore have only modest 
impacts.  
 
Consequences for agriculture, rural 
livelihoods, food systems and food 
security 
Five main changes are possible: 
Agricultural output may fall, owing mainly to 
reduced demand for high-value perishables and 
export crops, especially those that are air-freighted. 
For other crops, effects may be quite small, so long as 
disruptions to rural markets and supply chains are 
not severe. If input distribution or finance that pays 
for it is disrupted, then farms that depend 





Women may face additional work in caring for the 
sick, on top of their often already heavy workloads. 
Their daughters may be taken out of school to help 
them. 
Rural household incomes will fall, particularly for 
households that rely on high-value perishable 
agricultural crops and air-freighted export, on rural 
non-farm business and employment, and on 
remittances from migrants in urban areas — both 
domestic and international; 
Some supply chain businesses will not be able to 
operate to capacity if they deal with produce for 
which demand has fallen, or transport is disrupted, or 
they are closed down by disease controls. At worst, 
businesses will go out of business — although some 
small, informal enterprises may survive if they have 
few capital costs and overheads and can switch labour 
to other activities; and, 
Food insecurity may rise, in both rural and urban 
areas, mainly due to lower household incomes and 
possibly from higher agricultural prices. If markets 
are closed, then some households may lose access to 
food, or have to buy from more distant centres in 
rural areas, or supermarkets in urban areas, at higher 
cost. Some households, especially those on low 
incomes, will switch to less nutritious food. 
Such impacts are likely to be highly uneven. 
Socially, infections and disease hit some hard, while 
others remain untouched. Economically, some 
households have resources to cope with loss of labour 
and less income while others cannot. Geographically, 
impacts will vary by farming systems — the type of 
crops and livestock produced, their dependence on 
labour and purchased inputs, and by the supply chains 
that link them to markets. 
Lessons from previous crises and 
their relevance to responding to the 
effects of COVID-19 
Lessons specific to responding to COVID-
19 
Lesson #1 Livelihoods and food systems need 
to be maintained as far as possible 
In many crises, those most affected usually prioritise 
their livelihoods: they give them the means to live, 
function, to have self-respect and dignity. They thus 
often matter more than health or safety which often 
are the overwhelming priority of outside responders. 
Food systems similarly have high priority: not being 
able to access food, or only at greatly inflated costs, is 
alarming. 
Agriculture is central to rural livelihoods, to food 
systems and food security. So too are the many 
informal businesses typically found in food supply 
chains. In some areas and for some households, 
remittances from urban migrants increasingly 
support farm household incomes. Rural markets, 
mainly informal, are critical in allowing the trading 
that facilitates agriculture and food systems. 
Recommendation A Ensure farmers can maintain 
output 
Whatever can be done to ensure to maintain farm 
output should be done. This may mean, for example, 
some additional physical provision of inputs such as 
fertiliser. It may mean making additional credit 
available to farmers who have access to banks. It 
could be payments, or vouchers, to farmers, to enable 
them to buy inputs, hire labour, rent tractors, etc. 
Consult with district agricultural officers and local 
communities to devise measures that work in local 
farming systems. 
In some countries, helping farmers to raise production 
at the next harvest would demonstrate the 
government’s commitment to food and agriculture, 
allaying public fears of food shortages and high prices. 
Recommendation B Allow rural markets to operate 
with modest restrictions and precautions. 
Keep rural markets functioning. Medical imperatives 




hand washing facilities with soap, distributing masks 
to traders, spacing out sales pitches, increasing the 
number of small, local markets to avoid overcrowding 
and the need for people to travel, and running 
markets over more days, with a rota of sellers to 
prevent crowding. It may even be possible in some 
places to encourage payments by mobile money 
rather than banknotes. Consult with market leaders 
and local government to find the best way to protect 
traders and customers while keeping markets open. 
Recommendation C Set up green channels for 
agricultural inputs, processing and marketing 
Make it crystal clear to the public and to all those 
engaged in crisis response, and especially those 
implementing controls, that farming and unhindered 
food supply is a priority. This applies above all to 
rules on imports and transport of inputs, and on 
transport of produce. 
This does not require additional public capacity, but 
rather requires giving clear instructions from the 
leadership to civil servants, police and security forces, 
local government, and the general public. Not only 
does help keep farming and food systems functioning, 
but also helps allay fears [Rec. F] 
Recommendation D Keep food supply chain 
enterprises running 
With green channels [Rec. K], businesses in the supply 
chains should be allowed to continue to function. They 
may still face difficulties, however, if demand has 
collapsed — as may apply to some air-freighted 
export crops, for example. They thus may need 
bridging loans or grants to allow them to conserve 
capital, key staff, so that they can recover when the 
crisis passes. 
This requires knowing what difficulties these 
businesses face [see Rec. H], then devising 
appropriate remedies, probably in consultation with 
business associations. 
Recommendation E Facilitate remittances 
While remittances will fall as migrant labour is laid 
off, for those who continue to work and earn, making 
sure that remittances can still be sent is important. 
This may mean reducing or removing charges on 
mobile transactions and keeping shops and post-
offices that handle physical transactions open. 
Keeping international flows going may prove difficult 
in a few countries where counter-terrorism rules 
restrict transactions. This can only be addressed 
globally by leaders and those governing the 
international financial system. 
Lesson #2 Impacts of health crises are highly 
selective 
Pathogens select epidemiologically, but thereafter 
their effects are determined by incomes, wealth, social 
class and gender. The impacts of health crises can thus 
be extremely uneven. 
Gendered effects can be hard to spot, especially by 
men, but are important. Women may be more affected 
than men because they almost always do most of the 
caring for the sick. Their informal enterprises may be 
more vulnerable to disease controls. If health facilities 
come under heavy pressure from a pandemic, their 
access to health care for themselves and their young 
children may be suspended, exposing them to health 
risks and additional work in caring for sick children. 
Teenage daughters may be withdrawn from school to 
help with additional work. 
Not everyone needs protection, but those most 
affected do. If people lose their productive capacity, 
for example, by being forced to sell productive assets, 
it may take them years to escape poverty, with many 
unlikely ever to escape. However, if they can be 
protected from destitution, their economic recovery 
to self-reliance can be swift. [Lesson #3] 
Recommendation F Protect and scale up existing 
safety nets to reach more people and if necessary, 
increase payments. 
In the face of a potentially heavy loss of purchasing 
power and business activity, cash transfers to large 
numbers are indicated. In-kind assistance risks 
exacerbating the problems for markets, where they 




household ability to access the goods and services 
they need, and to maintain business activity. Only cash 
can achieve this. Target broadly to prevent exclusion 
errors; and worry less about inclusion errors. [Box A] 
Prioritise rural women when extending safety nets or 
increasing payments. Ensure that if rural girls are 
withdrawn from school, ways to encourage them to 
return after the crisis are in place. 
Where safety nets do not exist, use emergency cash 
transfers. Although this may be temporary, using 
administration parallel to that of government, it can 
be the base of a future public safety net — so long as 
the emergency systems align where possible with 
public procedures. 
 
Box A Lessons on social protection from 
previous crises 
In the face of a potentially heavy loss of purchasing 
power and business activity, cash transfers to large 
numbers are indicated. In-kind assistance risks loss of 
market for local production, 
Safety nets already in place need expanding. A large 
step-up in people covered and funds distributed can 
only be done by simplifying existing systems. It may 
well be better to focus on supporting larger 
programmes, possibly merging programmes to 
simplify provision and coverage. Work conditions 
should be waived, as these add enormously to costs 
and the labour intensity of running the systems. 
Rather than trying to make targeting precise, when 
registers of some sort already exist, even if imperfect, 
use these when needs are urgent. Where need is 
widespread, targeting may be abandoned in favour of 
a general entitlement, speeding up assistance and 
cutting costs. This may apply especially if disease 
control, impedes movements of field staff. 
Expanding social safety nets can arouse fears about 
creating a sense of entitlement among recipients. 
This resembles a longstanding, but long-disproved, 
fear that emergency cash transfers lead to 
dependency. A limited number of payments over the 
short term can ease unacceptable hardship — such as 
going without food — for vulnerable households. 
Different systems and agencies must coordinate. 
Humanitarian agencies have no time to reinvent 
wheels by re-learning lessons about social protection 
gained over many years. 
No single model for delivering cash transfers can be 
seen. In many cases, emergency systems will need to 
co-exist with state systems: even where the systems 
remain separate, this requires joint planning. 
Finally, social protection can divert both attention 
and funds from equally important social services, 
such as education, health and clean water. While 
delivering food aid and cash transfers satisfies agency 
needs to be seen to be making a difference, the more 
humdrum issues of keeping services running may be 
less appealing. 
Sources: Barca & O’Brien 2018, Cherrier & McCord 
2020, Kidd & Sibun 2020, Slater 2008 
 
Lesson #3 Recovery from crisis can be strong. 
Agricultural output can be boosted very 
considerably over a season or two 
Often at the height of crises, prospects for recovery 
look bleak. Recovery, however, can be more rapid 
than expected: medical controls or treatments for 
pandemics can rapidly end them. Recovery from 
previous epidemics has been largely complete within 
one year; while much recovery can be seen from 
previous economic crises within five years of the 
initial shock. After the food price spike of 2008/09, for 
example, production of cereals expanded much faster 
than before the crisis in countries where smallholders 
dominate farming. 
Recovery did not depend, either, on profound reforms 
to economies or societies. In part that may be because 
the shocks were not necessarily the consequence of 
deep-seated malaise, but were caused by just a few 
perturbations to the system: for example, the 
emergence of potent viruses, the volatility of 




and a perfect storm of low stocks, demands for 
biofuels, harvest failures and export bans that led to a 
spike in food prices. Much of productive capital 
survived these crises, allowing recovery. 
Public measures to support recovery were often quite 
straightforward and well-known: injections of capital, 
variously through bank credit, small business grants, 
community funds, micro-finance, distribution of farm 
inputs; social safety nets to allow coping without loss 
of productive capital; redoubled commitment to 
provision of public goods and services in rural areas, 
etc. These succeed partly because it was not just 
government, aid partners and NGOs who were 
responding, but also those most affected by the shock 
– rural people themselves [Lesson #9]. 
Recommendation G Do not overlook modest 
measures, they can be effective 
Faced by daunting crises, it may be felt that dramatic 
and radical responses are needed, such as 
redistribution of assets and tight controls on some 
markets. Experience, however, shows that more 
modest measures — such as cash transfers, grants 
and micro-finance for business, additional support to 
farmers, etc., are not only within the compass of 
existing capacity and experience, but can be effective 
in alleviating hardship and facilitating recovery. 
General lessons on responding to crises 
Lesson #4 Novel crises involve much 
uncertainty, while previous experiences of 
responses lack evaluation 
Dealing with novel crises involves uncertainty about: 
• the crisis and its effects on economy and society; 
• effective responses, in large part because 
responses to previous crises have not been 
reviewed as critically or in as much detail to 
provide reliable guidelines for future response; 
and, 
• what can be implemented with existing capacity 
— primarily in government, but also with private 
enterprise, civil society, international organisation 
and aid partners. 
Consequently, a priority is to invest in understanding 
what is happening. Data will be needed both on the 
medical aspects of COVID-19 — infection and 
mortality rates, geographical spread, transmission 
routes, etc.; as well as on impacts on livelihoods and 
basic services. 
Dealing with a pandemic may require different data 
and analysis from that normally collected and carried 
out by food security early warning agencies. 
In the absence of formally documented knowledge, 
the tacit knowledge in the form of experience of those 
who have engaged in response to previous similar 
crises becomes especially valuable. 
Recommendation H Invest in rapid data gathering 
and analysis 
Collect data from the field on changes to livelihoods, 
markets for staple foods and other necessities, 
functioning of food and agricultural supply chains, an 
experiences of food insecurity — see Box B for detail. 
Use of mobile phones and digital records can facilitate 
collection, analysis and presentation of information 
promptly — ideally so that decision-makers have 
information on the situation that is not more than two 
weeks’ old. 
 
Box B Information needed to assess impacts 
on food and nutrition security  
Focus information gathering on changes affecting 
populations believed to be vulnerable to food 
insecurity, for example, urban groups in informal 
settlements; rural households that lack land, labour, 
live in areas of poor natural resources or in remote 
locations; disabled and chronically sick; displaced 
groups in some cases, etc. 
Priority information includes: 
• Changes to livelihoods: impacts of disease, 
controls on movements and gatherings on 




access and cost of inputs, labour, freedom to 
move to fields or pasture. Ability to sell surpluses 
and changes to prices paid. 
• Markets for staple foods and other necessities: 
availability of goods, changes in prices. 
• Food and agricultural supply chains. Disruptions 
to markets, transport, and to trading, processing, 
wholesaling, retailing, exporting and other 
businesses in the chains. 
• Experiences of food insecurity: difficulties in 
finding food in markets or paying for it; fear of 
infection when buying food. 
Information may be collected promptly and at low 
cost through: 
• Quantitative monitoring, of the kind usually 
already being done for either market information 
or food security early warning systems. Use 
historic records to control for seasonality; and, 
• Qualitative interviews, by mobile phone, of 
panels of (a) of households sampled to reflect 
vulnerable groups; (b) farmers sampled to reflect 
diverse farming systems; and (c) trusted 
informants, selected to capture the range of 
traders, processors, transporters, wholesalers 
and exporters. Surveys can be repeated to track 
changes. 
Collecting, collating and analysing data, then 
preparing it for decision-makers, requires staff. 
Teams can be formed building on and working with 
existing groups that gather data in ministries, local 
government, chambers of commerce, NGOs, 
FEWSNET in some countries, FAO or WFP in others, 
etc. Additional temporary staff for increased activity 
during the crisis may be seconded from the civil 
service or contracted from local think tanks or market 
research agencies. 
Because new ways of analysing data to generate 
predictions will be needed, both methods and data 
should be made open access, so that other 
researchers can examine, analyse and interpret the 
information and provide peer review. Such 
crowdsourcing of analysis can help guard against 
errors and omissions 
 
Recommendation I Find and employ persons who 
have worked on previous crises, who carry tacit 
understanding in their memory. 
Make sure that these include not only those who are 
specialists on the technical matter, but also those who 
are specialists on local circumstances: those who 
know the history of previous crises, of relations 
between different groups in the country and with the 
state, and who understand culture and politics at local 
levels. 
Lesson #5 Initial responses to crises have often 
been either ineffective, irrelevant or counter-
productive 
A striking finding from this review is how often initial 
responses to a crisis, be it a pandemic or the economic 
crises, were ill-conceived. At best, they proved 
ineffective; at worst, they exacerbated problems, often 
to the detriment of livelihoods and food security. This 
is understandable to some degree. Reacting is not easy 
when the threat is unfamiliar, much is uncertain, but 
prompt action is needed. This applies especially to 
pandemics: while the impacts of most droughts are 
similar, the impact of most diseases are not. Under 
such conditions, it is tempting to fall back on 
analogies, favoured framings and responses. 
Only when it became evident that early responses 
were failing, and changes were made, were most 
crises resolved. 
Recommendation J Manage crises adaptively 
Take prompt action, but be prepared to revisit and 
revise in the light of incoming information. Three 
things facilitate this. One, prompt information about 
impacts from the field becomes critical [see Rec. H]. 
Two, including specialists from across the board [see 
Rec I] helps avoid thinking within silos. Three, 
engaging with communities helps widen information 
and perspectives, hence: 
Recommendation K Consult and engage with local 
communities 
Engaging with communities not only generates critical 




responses, that work locally, that outsiders may not 
see. Indeed, in some crises, engaging local 
communities has proved key to overcoming the crisis. 
Engaging with communities, rather than co-opting 
them, takes time, so it needs to start early. Resources 
need to be assigned to this. 
Lesson #6 Responses to medical crises often 
ignore livelihoods 
When epidemics hit, medical responses almost always 
get first priority, humanitarian relief comes next, and 
considerations of livelihoods tend to lag behind. 
Informal economic activity tends to get very little 
attention at all, yet this includes much smallholder 
farming, trading, and the interactions of rural and 
urban economies. This is particularly costly, since 
most people vulnerable to crises — those on low 
incomes, who lack assets, who may have precarious 
health — work informally. 
Disruptions to transport from countryside to town, 
and the closing down of rural and informal urban 
markets, can harm agriculture and rural business, 
leading to heavy losses of rural incomes. 
Information is thus critical to understanding these 
impacts and to reacting to problems that arise [See 
Rec. H to K]. 
Lesson #7 Demonstrate action and commitment 
Decision-making is not helped when some people, 
above all those in government, overreact to shocks. 
Feedback-loops that exacerbate the initial problem 
can be strong. Two examples often arise. One is fear of 
disease leading to myths about its origins and causes, 
with people then not reporting disease or cooperating 
with medical responses. The other is fear that food 
will not be available in markets, leading to panic 
buying and hoarding —by individuals, companies and 
state agencies — that drives up prices and thereby 
fuelling further overreactions. 
Engaging with local communities [Rec. K] is one way 
to placate fear. Another is: 
Recommendation L Leaders need to demonstrate 
action and commitment to allay undue fears and 
anxiety 
Prompt, visible action with clear messages can allay 
fears. This risks committing to action when much 
uncertainty prevails [Lesson #4], but is a lesser 
danger than fuelling public anxiety that nothing is 
being done: with adaptive management, actions can 
be revised. This imperative will tend to see known 
responses favoured, and those which are feasible. 
Lesson #8 Effective responses depend on 
existing capacity and previous experience 
It is hard to respond to crises without administrative 
structures, procedures and staff in place. Experience 
defines both the range of options most likely to be 
considered, and those that can reasonably be 
implemented within the short to medium term. This 
applies especially to interventions in the field, for 
example, to safety nets. 
Recommendation M Favour feasible responses 
Appreciate existing capacity and experience. If 
necessary, recruit back those with experience who 
have left agencies where they could be useful [Rec. B]. 
Avoid the temptation to try to do things that strain 
existing capacity: such interventions may be 
promising, but if badly implemented, they will fail. 
This does not preclude some innovation that may be 
possible within existing capacity and experience; but 
in assessing innovations, due regard needs to be given 
to capacity and experience. 
Lesson #9 In most crises, most response comes 
from local coping 
In crisis after crisis, what makes the difference for 
most individuals affected and their households is their 
ability to cope — or not — drawing on the means of 
the household, extended family, friends, local 
community organisations and local economy. Coping 
may involve drawing down on savings, or calling on 
assistance from family, friends and community where 
obligations have been established. It can be seeking 




involve liquidating productive assets such as land, 
livestock and tools — at which point coping may be a 
misnomer. 
The ability to cope varies, however, so see Lesson 8. 
Resilience matters more than after-the-event 
assistance. That may not help with immediate 
response, but it matters for longer-run public action. 
Public action should work to support coping by 
affected individuals, households and communities, 
where legal and ethical. At very least public responses 
should not stymie such self-help. 
Recommendation N provide external assistance that 
complements and facilitates local responses 
Respond early. Cash transfers can be delivered faster 
than most other forms of assistance. Being prepared 
in advance makes a difference. Avoid stymieing their 
efforts. Since assistance tends to arrive rather late in 
crises, sometimes as they are receding, a focus on 






The motivation for this study is stated in the terms of 
reference: 
‘The COVID-19 pandemic is driving dramatic and rapid 
changes to the global economy, transportation, labour 
productivity and trade. There are risks that the 
combination of direct and indirect impacts of the 
pandemic will have serious consequences for impacts 
on food systems and livelihood systems, with 
consequences for poverty and food insecurity. 
There is a long history of efforts to deal with food 
security crises, global shocks (e.g. food price crisis 
2008/09) and with pandemics (EVD, SARS, etc.), but 
this experience and knowledge is fragmented across 
the development and humanitarian communities, and 
often only partially documented. This makes it harder 
to learn lessons from previous experience. 
A systematic analysis of what has been learned and a 
compilation of lessons will be helpful to understand 
where previous crisis situations provide comparable 
scenarios for planning, and where circumstances differ 
substantively; and to extracting applicable principles 
from these previous situations.’ [Terms of Reference] 
To inform its response to COVID-19’s impacts over the 
next year, the Growth and Resilience and the Research 
and Evidence Departments of DFID commissioned this 
RER of lessons learned from previous, comparable 
crises. It aims to review lessons learned that are 
relevant for vulnerable countries, broadly defined as 
those who are eligible for International Development 
Aid (IDA and IDA blend) as per the World Bank’s 
definition, and/ or have a minimum score of 20 
(‘serious’) on the Global Hunger Index. 
The review addresses the following questions: 
Content and effects of responses 
• Which policy interventions (public and private 
sector) happened? 
• What were their effects on food production, food 
and nutrition security, and the livelihoods of 
people on low incomes and otherwise 
vulnerable? Why did they happen? 
• Did they succeed in their objectives? Explain 
what worked and what did not, and why. 
Decision-making and implementation: 
• Were assumptions adopted by decision-makers 
realistic? If not, why not? What information was 
lacking? 
• Was the response timely? 
• What options were not used? Why not? 
• How easy was it to implement responses? What 
difficulties were faced? How were these 
overcome, if at all? 
• Can anything else be learned from how decisions 
were made and implemented? 
To answer these questions, background and context 
had to be established, with the following two 
questions to address: 
• What is the nature of COVID-19 as a shock? How 
does it resemble other shocks? 
• How might COVID-19 develop in Africa, and 
especially in rural areas? 
The rest of the report 
The rest of this report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 
reports on the methods used in the review. Chapter 3 
first considers the nature of COVID-19 as a shock, then 
sets out how the disease and responses to the disease 
may affect agriculture, food systems, food and 
nutrition security, and rural livelihoods. The final 
Chapter 4 presents the lessons learned from the crises 
reviewed and the recommendations that can be 
drawn from them. Lessons specific to dealing with the 
impacts of COVID-19 come first, followed by more 
general lessons about responding to crises, above all 
those about making decisions and implementing 
responses. 
To keep the main text relatively short and focused on 
lessons, the findings about responses to the nine 
crises reviewed have been summarised in a table in 




nine crises. Annex K is a literature grid that of key 
documents read with summaries of their main points. 
2. Methods 
The review draws mainly on secondary literature 
focused on a desk-based review of evidence and 
literature on nine recent and comparable crises: 
• 1980–present HIV/AIDS pandemic 
• 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
outbreak in Asia 
• 2013-2015 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in 
West Africa 
• 2018–present Ebola virus disease (EVD) 
outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
• 2019–present COVID-19 outbreak in China 
• 2005 H5N1 outbreak (avian influenza) in Asia 
• 2009 global H1N1 outbreak (“swine flu”) 
• 1997Asian financial crisis 
• 2007/2008 food price spike 
The choice of crises was limited to examples within 
the last 25 years that were similar to COVID-19 in 
their economic and social impacts on developing 
countries. Most are health shocks, but two economic 
shocks, 2008/09 food price spike and the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, were included to see whether lessons 
can also be learned from responses to these. 
Reviews focused on a) the economic and social impact 
of crises on agriculture, the rural economy and food 
systems; b) the technical responses adopted to 
mitigate these impacts, and; c) the effectiveness of 
these responses. The aim was to draw out lessons and 
recommendations that are relevant to LICs, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. 
Evidence consisted of quantitative and qualitative 
data, impact evaluations, peer-reviewed journal 
articles, books, NGO reports, case studies op-eds, 
newspaper articles and other grey literature. Our 
examination of the methods used to judge 
effectiveness showed, a significant evaluation deficit 
and lack of systematic evidence for many, if not all, 
crises covered. 
Evidence was collected through online searches of key 
words, through recommendations from key 
informants interviewed, and from citations within 
documents being read. 
Key informant interviews established initial lines of 
enquiry, provided technical knowledge of the 
respective crises and filled in gaps from the literature 
with anecdotal evidence. A full list of documents 
studied is included in Annex I * 
 Informants interviewed included: 




IDS Sussex 02/04/2020 
Clive English Development 
Alternatives Inc.  
08/04/2020 
Doug Gollin University of Oxford 10/04/2020 






IDS Sussex 11/04/2020 
Tim Waites DFID /04/2020 
Rachel Slater University of 
Wolverhampton 
21/04/2020 
Nick Maunder Consultant, food 
security 
21/04/2020 
Jim Woodhill Knowledge for 
Development (K4D), 
University of Sussex 
22/04/2020 
 
The interviews were semi-structured, focussing on 
three open questions: 
• What lessons have been learned from your 
experience? Lessons on (a) responses, their 




making and implementation when time is short, 
and much is uncertain. 
• Are these applicable to the specifics of COVID-19? 
• Any highly recommended sources or persons to 
check? 
From this information we have distilled the main 
findings, identified lessons and highlighted some 
recommendations for considering options for actions 
in the areas of agriculture, food systems, food and 
nutrition security, and rural livelihoods. 
 
3. Probable impacts of COVID-19 
on rural livelihoods, 
agriculture, food systems and 
food security in the 
developing world 
3.1 Nature of COVID-19 as a shock 
COVID-19 is a disease that has rapid onset. The virus 
is highly transmissible, with an R ratio of those 
infected to those who become infected of 2 or more, 
so that infections unchecked can show exponential 
growth. Moreover, infections can be largely invisible, 
with carriers being infectious for days before they 
show clear symptoms of disease — and some may not 
present symptoms at all. The health impacts are only 
partly understood. 
In these respects, few other health crises resemble 
this one. Ebola virus is similarly a viral threat, and 
hard to detect, but while it is more deadly, it is much 
less transmissible. HIV is similarly viral, hard to 
detect, but much less transmissible than COVID-19, 
and kills those infected through secondary illnesses 
over eight or more years. 
Lessons from previous health crises and pandemics 
may thus not be directly relevant. Indeed, some 
specialists stress the differences and the risks of 
falsely assuming that lessons from other crises are 
directly applicable. 
‘Every epidemic is different; government responses are 
usually the same regardless. Many governments apply 
what they think are the “lessons learned” from a 
previous pandemic to a new pandemic.’ [de Waal 2020] 
‘In the current COVID-19 crisis, as in all crises, public 
policy dialogue and debate are heavily informed by 
history. Our instinct is to avoid repeating the mistakes 
of the past. But in seeking to avoid past mistakes, we 
risk committing new ones.’ [Eichengreen 2020] 
3.2 Economic impacts of COVID-19 
Most of the economic impact comes from responses to 
the disease, rather than the disease itself. Given the 
high rate of transmission of the novel coronavirus, the 
medical imperative is to control this as quickly as 
possible. In the absence of mass testing of populations 
that would allow quarantining of infected persons, 
generalised restrictions on mobility and rules on 
keeping distance between people offer the best 
chance of restricting transmission. Such restrictions, 
however, effectively close down substantial sectors of 
economies, so that responses potentially have impacts 
as harmful as the disease itself. 
Estimates of impact on overall economies see large 
losses of output to disease and its control, with 
considerable unemployment. For example, the IMF 
(April 17 2020) foresees real GDP in the emerging and 
developing economies of the world contracting by 
almost 1% in 2020, and by 2% if China is omitted. 
More specifically, financial assets will probably fall in 
value, and flows of foreign direct investments to 
developing countries may well reverse. Commodity 
prices, above all those of oil, have fallen reducing 
export earnings of countries reliant on exporting 
primary commodities. Remittances from migrant 
workers are likely to fall, as they work and earn less. 
Losses on capital and current account, together with 
increased public spending to combat the virus, could 
lead to increased public debt raising the spectre of 
future austerity for some developing economies. 
Just how badly affected the economies of the 
developing are affected depends on two uncertain 




in arresting its spread which will define just how long 
and how strict controls on movement and distancing 
will be. The other is the degree to which the disease, 
response and policies disrupt supply chains both 
domestically and internationally. (IMF 2020) 
Much speculation surrounds just how severe the 
economic impact will be. On the one hand are 
forecasts from agencies such as UNECA (2020) which, 
admittedly taking the worst cases, see 3.3M dying of 
the disease in Africa, economies contracting by 2.6%, 
and 27M persons pushed into poverty. UN WIDER 
(Sumner et al. 2020) model potential impacts of 
economic contraction to produce headline figures of 
420M to 580M pushed into poverty, with progress 
towards the Sustainable Development Goals set back 
by 30 years.4 
On the other hand, Richard Baldwin (2020) and 
Jonathan Portes (2020) stress the unusual nature of 
the economic crisis: a simultaneous reduction in both 
supply and demand, without much else changing in 
the fundamentals of the economies of the world — 
this is not, for example, a re-run of the 2008 financial 
crisis in which massive losses had been run up by 
unwisely excessive lending. They thus argue that so 
long as capital — physical, human and the social 
networks that underpin supply chains across the 
world — is not destroyed, then economies can 
rebound rather quickly once restrictions on mobility 
are eased or removed. Capital may not be much lost 
during a lockdown of a few months, but were 
lockdowns to last for half a year or longer, then this 
critical assumption may not hold up. 
3.3 Impacts of COVID-19 on rural 
areas of the developing world, on 
food systems, and on food and 
nutrition security 
Urban areas are expected to be most vulnerable to 
COVID-19, owing to high population densities that 
 
4 Those statistics, however, are based on their worst-case scenario of a 
20% contraction in economic output: very considerably more than the 
estimates of either the IMF or UNECA. As ever, once such alarming 
facilitate transmission; and where much economic 
activity lies in services and manufacturing much of 
which is suspended because the risks of mass 
infection are too high. 
Rural areas, however, may differ in both the direct 
effects of disease and the effects of responses. Before 
considering these, however, considerations of how the 
disease may develop in rural areas reveals 
considerable uncertainty. 
Much is unknown is about the epidemiology of COVID-
19 in rural areas of developing countries. Some 
evidence from mainland China (Verity 2020) suggests 
that the impacts for those under the age of 50 may be 
quite moderate. Most of those infected in China 
experienced only moderate disease. (Table 3.1) 
Table 3.1 Infections leading to hospitalisation in 
mainland China, 2020 
Source: Verity et al. 2020 
Some factors might mitigate disease in rural areas of 
the developing world, and in sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular: 





• Rurality and lack of urban connections may delay 
arrival of the virus in villages. In some lightly 
populated areas, the R ratio of transmission may 
be low, and below 1, simply because rural people 
do not mingle frequently with outsiders. 
• The young age structure of rural populations in 
rural Africa may mean that most of those infected 
will neither develop severe disease nor die. 
On the other hand, other factors may aggravate 
impact: 
• While rurality may attenuate transmission, if 
urban economies fail, then rural migrants may 
well return to their home villages and take the 
disease with them; 
• Many people in rural Africa are malnourished; 
some have underlying health problems that leave 
them vulnerable to influenza; and some have 
immune systems compromised by the effects of 
other diseases, such as HIV/AIDS. There are also 
strong connections between inadequate water 
and sanitation, undernutrition, diarrhoea, and 
acute respiratory infections (ARIs). Although 
inadequate water and sanitation is not directly 
linked with all ARIs, studies indicate that 
malnourished children recovering from 
diarrhoea are unusually susceptible to 
pneumonia; and, 
• Curative health services in rural areas are very 
limited. Alleviating symptoms with drugs may be 
difficult; putting those struggling for air on to a 
ventilator impossible. Hence deaths among those 
who develop severe conditions may be higher 
than seen in HICs. 
 
5 Collective assistance in villages are common, but diverse. In general, 
in most villages, people will not let someone in the village die hungry. 
At a minimum they will leave a pot of basic food outside someone’s 
Economic and social impacts from 
disease to agriculture, rural economy and 
food systems 
Direct impacts from disease 
The disease itself, for the moment not considering the 
effect of responses to it, can be expected to have the 
following impacts: 
Loss of labour on farms and in food chains 
Days will be lost to people falling sick and others 
needing to care for them. It is possible that for most of 
those infected, losses will be limited to one or two 
weeks’ absence — the time reported by survivors of 
COVID-19 in China and Europe. 
For farming, labour loss may reduce production, but 
unless sickness coincides with a key moment in the 
season, such as planting crops, much of the labour can 
be rescheduled. Moreover, given the relatively 
frequent bouts of sickness that many African (and 
Asian) farmers experience, farm households are used 
to coping with loss of labour — so long as the sickness 
is short-lived and the patient recovers. Extended 
families, neighbours and community groups are often 
mobilised to help out with farm tasks when someone 
falls sick. Labour may additionally be hired in. This is 
common practice — indeed in some areas, someone in 
the household will be sick every month.5 
For many rural households, losses of farm production 
to sickness may thus be quite small, depending on the 
length and intensity of sickness and on their resources 
for adapting. 
How much this is possible depends on social networks 
and capital, and on having cash to pay labour. 
Typically, chronically-poor households have weaker 
social ties and less cash than other households, and 
may thus find it difficult to cope. They are also more 
likely to rely on daily labour rather than on farming 
house. Similarly, small areas will be cultivated for the old and infirm. 
Help with health care costs may be less common.  




their own land for their sustenance, and to have 
difficulty in meeting their immediate needs if their 
ability to earn money is disrupted even for a few days. 
For workers in the food chains, those employed in 
processing, transporting, storing, and retailing, similar 
effects can be expected. Reduced production and 
services may be more noticeable since it may be less 
possible to reschedule tasks. On the other hand, some 
enterprises in the food chain may be better capitalised 
than most farms and hence able to hire in temporary 
labour. That may not, however, be possible if those ill 
have special skills or manage substantial enterprises. 
Overall, labour loss should not reduce production by 
much, because both farms and many (informal) 
enterprises in the supply chains are used to having to 
cope with sickness, and thus have developed 
arrangements to mitigate the impact of workers being 
sick. 
Extra work for women caring for sick 
When people in households fall sick, especially the 
elderly, women become the main carers. Most rural 
women already spend long hours on whatever 
productive activities they have, on caring for children, 
and on carrying out many of the household duties of 
cooking and cleaning. With more care to attend, rural 
women are likely to be deprived of labour on their 
fields, for paid daily labour or in their small 
businesses. 
How much this affects their enterprises depends 
heavily on how many are sick in the household and for 
how long. As with farming, it may be possible to 
reschedule work, call on families, neighbours and 
social groups, or to hire in labour. Again, while women 
in households with social ties and means may be able 
 
6 When adult women spend more time caring for the sick, their 
daughters may be taken out of school to help out with the mother’s 
work, typically caring for younger children, cooking and cleaning. This 
can interrupt their schooling and may lead to abandoning school 
altogether. In some countries, this may expose them to additional risks 
of becoming pregnant (as was reportedly seen for example in Sierra 
to cope, women in (small) chronically-poor 
households with weaker social ties and few savings 
may struggle.6 
The severity of these impacts will depend on: 
• The epidemiology of the disease. For most of 
those aged under 60 years, only a small fraction 
may develop secondary diseases, and COVID-19 
may be experienced as a short-lived illness of a 
couple of weeks. Impacts will, however, be 
uneven, since the elderly will be more vulnerable 
to severe illness, as will be those with other 
illnesses or with weakened immune systems; 
• The specific labour needs, including the 
importance of timely operations, that apply to 
different crops and enterprises; and, 
• The resources of the household including their 
social capital. Those households that lack means 
of all kinds, those that are chronically-poor, will 
find it much harder to cope than their better-
resourced neighbours. 
Box 3.1 How do the likely impacts of COVID-
19 compare to those of HIV/AIDS? 
It is probable that most of the direct effects of 
disease will be modest for COVID-19. In that, this 
crisis differs substantially from impact of HIV, where 
strong effects on the production of households with 
people living with HIV were observed (see Annex E, 
and especially Figure A in that annex). 
What makes the difference is the length of disease. 
HIV/AIDS took eight or more years to progress from 
initial infection to death, with debilitating illnesses 
Leone during EVD) and in some situations, if they have to take up their 
mother’s job as a street seller, girls may be more exposed to sexual 
harassment. In some countries, girls are either not allowed to return to 




making many patients bedridden in their final years. 
The virus took a heavy toll on the labour of the sick, 
as well as that of the (usually) women caring for the 
sick. It also left many households in near destitution 
as household assets were often progressively sold to 
pay for health care. 
Moreover, while COVID-19 may threaten the elderly 
and leave working age populations relatively 
unaffected, HIV/AIDS was primarily a disease of 
adults in their prime years. 
That said, the epidemiology of COVID-19 in rural 
Africa — the rate and incidence of transmission, the 
severity of disease — has yet to become clear.  
 
Impacts from responses to disease threat 
If governments in the developing world respond 
following the guidelines from WHO and imitating the 
practices seen in heavily affected countries of Asia and 
Europe, the following measures may apply: 
• Restrictions on movement, with household 
members told to stay at home, only to leave for 
essential shopping, exercise, to work for those in 
key occupations; 
• Instructions to maintain distance between 
individuals other than co-residents at all times; 
• Reduced public transport to avoid crowding; 
• Closing down of businesses not seen as essential, 
including sports, entertainment, catering and 
hospitality, tourism services, most retailing, and 
almost all personal services. This may extend to 
manufacturing as well; 
• Bans on collective worship and community 
ceremonies7; and, 
 
7 One potential consequence of restrictions on ceremonies is that 
women married under these restrictions risk being accused alter of not 
• Bans on public gatherings, closing down sports 
events, cinemas, theatre, restaurants, bars and 
cafes. 
In rural areas, these restrictions could mean that open 
air markets will be closed. That would threaten both 
some supply chains, as well as access to food for many 
rural households who depend on markets for at least 
some of their food. 
Such controls may not greatly affect agricultural 
production directly, since farming would almost 
certainly be defined as a key activity, and because 
much farming can be done by workers keeping their 
distance from one another. 
In agricultural and food supply chains, many 
enterprises may also be treated as essential and not 
be closed down. 
Transport of produce could be affected, since in some 
countries smallholders use public transport to take 
(small) surpluses —usually of perishables — to 
market, and any reduction in buses and taxies may 
hinder such flows. On the other hand, under such 
conditions operators of pick-ups may step in to offer 
alternative transport. 
It is possible that transport may be further disrupted 
if police and security forces barricade roads 
instituting stringent controls on who and what is 
allowed to move. 
Other significant effects may also apply from 
lockdowns that close substantial parts of the urban 
economy, as follows: 
• Reduced demand from cities for higher-value 
farm produce as urban households with lower 
incomes curtail spending on foods other than 
staples; 
• Return of now-unemployed rural migrants 
from cities. This would be unwelcome, since 





they might be carriers of infection, and their 
remittances would be lost to the household. On 
the other hand, they would add to the rural 
labour force that could fill in for rural labour that 
is absent or sick. Villages with many migrants 
might actually see the labour force expand, 
although they would be the most affected by loss 
of remittances. 
Finally, international effects may apply. Borders may 
be closed, or stricter controls exercised. Loss of 
passenger air transport may affect some high-value 
agricultural exports shipped in the holds of passenger 
aircraft. 
It is not expected that international demand will be 
much affected. COVID-19 will not affect demand for 
cereals, oilseeds and other basic commodities. It is 
unlikely to have much impact on demand for 
beverages — tea, coffee. sugar, or chocolate. Demand 
for industrial raw materials, however, may fall as 
factories are closed, thereby affecting producers of 
cotton, rubber, and sisal. 
The extent of disruptions to supply chains, in 
transport and markets, is hard to judge; as is their 
impact on production and marketing. National 
regulations are one thing: how they may be 
implemented by local authorities and the police in 
rural areas is another. See Box 3.2. 
 
Box 3.2 Emerging evidence of disruptions to 
supply chains in sub-Saharan Africa 
Market closures. 
In early April 2020, Geopoll (2020) conducted a 
telephone survey of 4,800 persons across 12 countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa. Respondents were from both 
urban and rural areas. They reported market closures 
as follows: 
 
Some disruption is taking place. What is not known, is 
how much such closures affect the food chains and 
whether participants have ways to work around this, 
the same survey reported that some consumers had 
switched to buying from formal stores and 
supermarkets, but that is presumably largely an urban 
option. 
A further unknown is how much local application of 
rules, and indeed the rules themselves, may be 
changed in the light of emerging evidence of impacts. 
Hence the rules forbidding gatherings may be 
implemented strictly with markets closed initially, but 
then relaxed if it becomes clear that local food supplies 
are severely disrupted. Already reports are being heard 
of protests against strict lockdowns. 
Limited supply of air freight 
Half of the world’s air cargo travels in the holds of 
passenger aircraft. Since March 13 air freight rates at 
major airlines in Europe and the UK have shot up from 
about $1.50–$3/kg to $6/kg. At about $7/kg two-way it 
makes sense to fly empty passenger planes, which 
airlines are doing. Governments and larger companies 
have also chartered whole passenger planes. 
See: https://www.joc.com/air-cargo/idle-passenger-planes-
take-mini-freighter-roles_20200317.html 
The WFP is organising a hub-and-spoke system of air 
cargo routes, creating “air bridges” to take food to 
some of the worst-affected regions as ground 
transport becomes impossible in lockdowns. But these 






• Much of farming and the agricultural supply 
chains may be only moderately affected by 
COVID-19; 
• Impacts will be uneven. As often applies, 
chronically-poor rural households that lack all 
manner of resources, including social ties, are 
likely to be much harder hit than their 
neighbours; 
• Women may see their care burden rise, with a 
worrying knock-on effect that teenage girls may 
be taken out of school, their education ended too 
early, and exposed to sexual harassment. 
Gendered effects may not be as visible as any fall 
in farm output, but could be considerably more 
harmful; 
• If rural markets are closed down this could 
threaten both supply chains as well as access to 
food for rural households; and, 
• Much will depend on the specific containment 
measures taken by different states, on the local 
circumstances of farming systems, and impacts 
on specific supply chains. Much will also depend 
on the largely uncertain epidemiology of COVID-
19 in the rural areas of LICs and LMICs. 
 
Box 3.3 The view from below: What’s going 
on in China’s villages? 
With so many unknowns about how the disease may 
affect the rural areas of the developing world, it can 
be instructive to learn what has taken place in rural 
chain in the first three months of 2020. 
While the attention of the international media has 
focused on the city of Wuhan, the initial epicentre of 
the COVID-19 outbreak, it is easy to forget that 60% 
of China’s population is still classified as ‘rural’. That is 
840 million people, though many (over 250 million) 
are migrant workers, living and working in urban 
areas for at least part of the year, and sending money 
back to rural families. 
Not surprisingly, China’s lockdown has had a 
significant impact on rural livelihoods. That is 
because the travel blockade and quarantine has been 
rolled out across urban and rural areas, hitting local 
employment but also the remittances that 
increasingly prop up rural economies. The lockdown 
came during the Chinese Lunar New Year, a time 
when migrant workers return home. Unable to go 
back to their jobs, and without formal employment 
rights, incomes stopped. Meanwhile rural residents 
working in the rural farm and non-farm economy 
have also been affected, and prevented from working 
beyond the village gate. 
A survey of over 750 village informants spread across 
19 counties in seven provinces is revealing. (Rozelle et 
al. 2020) While the lockdown has clearly been 
effective in preventing the spread of the virus, it has 
hit employment and incomes hard. Roughly 75% of 
informants had to stop work entirely; over 90% 
reported a loss of income; many said they were 
cutting down on food, even though food availability 
and prices remain broadly stable across China. 
Adding the numbers up is also revealing. After one 
month of COVID-19 restrictions, China’s economy 
lost around US$100 billion in rural migrant worker 
wages alone, before factoring in losses from rural 
(non-migrant) employment. For rural residents, the 
easing of lockdown restrictions cannot come soon 
enough.  
 
A final consideration concerns timing. Much depends 
on how long the disease remains a major public health 
threat. If, for example, major restrictions on 
movement and economic activity were to last for, say, 
three months, and then most restrictions lifted, 
economies as a whole, and rural economies in 
particular, may recover in very large part — much as 
harvests can rebound after a harvest lost to drought. 




• One, that assets are not lost or deteriorated 
during the period of restrictions. Much of what 
matters for farming — land and livestock, tools 
and pumps, for example, will survive human 
disease if households are not forced to sell their 
assets; and, 
• Two, socially that those who are most affected, 
owing either to their medical susceptibility to 
disease, to their poverty of assets, or to their 
gender, are protected from extreme and undue 
hardship that may lead to longer-lasting 
disadvantages. (see Box 3.4) 
 
Box 3.4 How bad is a crisis? Coping and 
resilience, hardship and distress 
When hazards strike rural societies, individuals, 
households, collectives and communities try to cope, 
sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully. 
Such adaptations have been extensively studied. 
Moreover, observing coping strategies has long been 
used — going back to the Indian famine codes of the 
nineteenth century — to measure of the degree of 
distress occasioned by the shock and hence the 
strength of the public response. 
Households adapt to hazards and the risks they imply 
by: 
• either ex ante trying to smooth their income 
through diversification of activities or through 
savings of income, livestock or food stores; or 
• ex post by smoothing consumption, through 
o drawing down on savings, 
o calling in assistance from family, friends, 
collectives such as savings groups, and 
those who may have a duty to help (such 
as local land landlords, shopkeepers who 
ordinarily may exploit, but who accept a 
duty to ensure survival of their clients), 
o reducing consumption, and 
o earning more income. 
Impersonal assistance from governments, aid partners 
and NGOs may assist through transfers — food, cash, 
goats to restock, seeds, tools, etc.; or by providing 
more work in emergency employment schemes. 
Some of these strategies involve sacrifice and 
hardship, things that can be tolerated for a time — 
even if in rural Africa the cycle of hardship may be a 
year or more. 
When adaptations fail to cope, people may have to fall 
back on tactics that either push them towards 
destitution or impede their ability to recover from the 
shock, or both. Examples include 
• sales of productive assets — tools, livestock 
especially draught animals, land; 
• taking up occupations that are shameful or 
dangerous — commercial sex work, beggary, 
crime etc.; 
• withdrawing children from school; and, 
• providing so little food to infants that they suffer 
stunting. 
Humanitarian workers distinguish coping and distress 
strategies (‘negative coping strategies’). In practice, 
the distinction can be blurred.  
Pastoralists intend to sell livestock to buy food, it is 
what they have livestock for. It is not distress when 
they sell one or two animals; but it is when whole herds 
and flocks are sold. Where the line lies between coping 
and distress is hard to draw. Moreover, it also depends 
on the use of proceeds of distress sales. If, for example, 
the funds pay to put a child through secondary school 
this can be considered an investment, in effect 
changing the portfolio of household assets, rather than 
distress. 
The line is no clearer in other directions. Taking a child 
out of primary school is usually seen as distress. But 
forgoing secondary school or university? Since many 
pastoralists can’t afford secondary school anyway, are 
they living their lives permanently in distress? If so, 




Distress does not even correspond to a hierarchy of 
choices, as aid workers sometimes like to think. For 
example, Somali pastoralists will use the thatch on 
their huts to keep cattle alive, rather than cut out sugar 
in tea — that is what they call distress. Yet to an aid 
worker, cutting sugar should be an early coping 
mechanism, since it does little long-term harm. 
Furthermore, if money is borrowed to buy food, is that 
a sign of distress, suffering, or successful coping — 
having the capacity to take on debt for consumption 
smoothing? 
Humanitarian workers tend to see distress whatever 
people do. Increased debt, for example, is usually 
taken as a sign that humanitarian aid is needed, even 
though that is precisely the purpose of credit. After a 
really bad drought, pastoralists in Ethiopia said it 
would take them two to three years to pay their 
increased debts. Is that successful consumption 
smoothing, or a terrible burden?  
Sources: Bird & Shepherd 2003, Davies 1993, de Waal 
1989 a and b, Goldman 1985, Gray & Kevane 1993, 
Kelly 1992, Kinsey et al. 1998, Pyle 1992, Swift 1993 





4. Lessons and 
recommendations 
Lessons from previous crises can be divided between 
those specific to responding to the consequences of 
COVID-19; those concerning deciding on responses 
and their implementation; and those about the actuals 
forms of response. 
4.3 Lessons specific to responding 
to COVID-19 
Lesson #1 Livelihoods and food systems 
need to be maintained as far as possible 
When epidemics hit, medical responses usually get 
first priority, humanitarian relief comes next, and 
considerations of livelihoods tend to lag behind. 
Livelihood impacts tend to be addressed after a delay, 
which can be costly to people who have few means to 
cope. 
While choices between saving lives from the 
immediate emergency and allowing people to go 
about their normal business may involve hard 
decisions, in some cases measures to control disease 
have been implemented firmly and strictly, with 
limited consideration of impacts on local livelihoods. 
Confining farm households to their houses to prevent 
disease transmission as took place under Ebola, for 
example, makes little sense when so many farm jobs 
can be done with considerable distancing or lack of 
contact with other people. 
In crises, those most affected usually prioritise their 
livelihoods: they give the means to live, function, and 
to have self-respect and dignity. These can matter 
 
8 De Waal 1989 stresses this in his account of the 1984/85 famine in 
Darfur, Sudan. For the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists who bore the 
brunt of the famine, who had left their villages to seek work and 
assistance in towns, their overwhelming concern was to return to their 
villages and farms the moment the next rains fell, whether or not they 
had food, medicines or anything else that was available in the camps on 
the edge of the towns.  
more than health or safety which are usually the 
priorities of outsiders.8 
Moreover, some aspects of rural livelihoods are 
under-appreciated: for example, the importance to 
rural economies of informal markets and trade. 
Humanitarian assistance after crises sometimes 
harms local markets, for example by providing 
assistance in kind rather than in cash, thereby 
depressing demand in local markets for the items 
provided, and potentially harming local producers. 
Similarly, large agencies often have procurement 
systems that prevent local farmers and businesses 
from participating, thereby missing an opportunity to 
stimulate the local economy.9 
This is not to deny that when items are unavailable in 
local markets, and local farms and businesses cannot 
supply them, then assistance should be in kind. But 
sometimes the choice to provide physical items is 
taken without regard to impacts on the local economy. 
For example, it is common to see relief agencies 
distribute seeds and tools to farming households after 
crises. In some cases, such as that of Ebola in West 
Africa, there is little evidence that this response was 
effective or appropriate. [Box 4.1] 
 
Box 4.1 Emergency seed distributions 
Emergency seed distributions aim to provide farmers 
with seed when stored seed has been lost and 
alternatives are not readily available. Typical modalities 
include: 
• direct seed distributions; 
• vouchers to buy seed from dealers; 
9 Such opportunities can be considerable. Refugee camps in north-west 
Tanzania created a demand for produce from the farms of Kagera, a 
stimulus that notably accelerated local agriculture. [Khamaldin 
Mutabazi, local researcher, personal communication] Similar sourcing 
from local producers has been seen for refugee camps in Northeast 




• vouchers to buy seeds at fairs where sellers may 
include other farmers as well as dealer; and, 
• cash for seed. 
Direct distributions are by far the most common. 
Although justified as an emergency intervention, in 
many countries these have become standard annual 
programmes. They have taken place in Eastern DRC 
every season since 1995; in Burundi for the last 38 
seasons consecutively; and have been used continually 
in Ethiopia for the past 42 years (SeedSystem 2020). 
Costs can be high: an estimated US$15M a year in 
Ethiopia. 
Despite the large sums spent, there is remarkably little 
evidence that farmers lack seeds. Very few seed security 
assessments have ever been conducted: it is assumed 
that farm households at risk of food insecurity must lack 
seed. In South Sudan, however, it was found that 
smallholders had the seed they needed: even the 
internally displaced had been able to find the seed 
needed to plant. 
Similarly, hardly any studies assess the impact of 
emergency distributions of seed. Evaluations have 
claimed positive impact, but based either on beneficiary 
satisfaction, or by assuming the entire harvest of crops 
for which the seed had been given could be attributed to 
the seed distributed —an unlikely assumption. 
Moreover, in areas where seed has not been distributed, 
farmers have planted. Indeed, the speed of agricultural 
recovery following crises of all natures is typically very 
rapid across affected countries, suggesting that seed is 
not an obstacle. 
Not much consideration has been given to the 
modalities of seed distributions, despite the logistical 
costs, difficulties and time taken to distribute seed 
directly. Seeds often arrive too late to plant. Difficulties 
with targeting have been common, as expected when 
distributing free items. 
Assessments of using vouchers to buy seed from dealers 
or at fairs are also hard to find. 
Emergency seed distributions should only be carried out 
when seed availability has been assessed, rather than 
assumed. If there is indeed a shortage of seed, then the 
range of modalities need assessing, bearing in mind that 
vouchers or cash can be distributed more promptly and 
at lower cost than physical seed. Moreover, vouchers or 
cash allow farmers to choose the crops and varieties 
they need, rather than having agencies decide this for 
them. 
Finally, a danger exists of trying to use such emergency 
distributions not only to alleviate an assumed lack of 
seed, but also to introduce new, improved varieties to 
farmers. This not only complicates the exercise, but also 
in emergencies farmers want guaranteed yields from 
familiar varieties proven in their fields and conditions, 
rather than experimenting with novel varieties that may 
be not be suited to their conditions.  
Sources: Awotide et al. 2013, Levine 2004, Longley 2006, 
Remington et al. 2002, Sperling et al. 2011, Seed System 2020.  
 
Another aspect of livelihoods that can be overlooked 
is the strength of rural-urban interactions. 
Increasingly, rural households depend on urban 
economies not just to sell farm surpluses, but also for 
employment as commuters or migrants. Some 
households run businesses in the agricultural supply 
chains, such as processing and transporting, that link 
village to town, or else have shops and market posts 
that sell consumer goods from urban areas. 
Disruptions to these links can be costly. For example, 
in 2020 when China locked down, this trapped many 
migrants in their home villages, and led to the 
(temporary) loss of remittances that underwrote the 
village economy. 
Livelihoods of affected populations thus need to be 
understood, to be protected and supported as far as 
reasonably possible. That implies having intelligence 
on what is happening at field level — see 
Recommendation H. 
Recommendation A Ensure farmers can 
maintain output 
Whatever can be done to ensure to maintain farm 
output should be done. Consultations with district 




take place to devise measures that work in local 
farming systems, and for which experience and 
capacity exists [Lesson #8]. 
This may mean, for example, some additional physical 
provision of inputs such as fertiliser. It may mean 
making additional credit available to farmers who 
have access to banks. It could be payments, or 
vouchers, to farmers, to enable them to buy inputs, 
hire labour, rent tractors, etc. 
In some countries, helping farmers to raise production 
at the next harvest would demonstrate the 
government’s commitment to food and agriculture, 
allaying public fears of food shortages and high prices. 
[Lesson #7]. 
Recommendation B Allow rural markets to 
operate with modest restrictions and 
precautions. 
Keep rural markets functioning. Medical imperatives 
may require some modifications, such as installing 
hand washing facilities with soap, distributing masks 
to traders, spacing out sales pitches, increasing the 
number of small, local markets to avoid overcrowding 
and the need for people to travel, and running 
markets over more days, with a rota of sellers to 
prevent crowding. It may even be possible in some 
places to encourage payments by mobile money 
rather than banknotes. Consult with market leaders 
and local government to find the best way to protect 
traders and customers while keeping markets open. 
Recommendation C Set up green channels for 
agricultural inputs, processing and marketing 
Make it crystal clear to the public and to all those 
engaged in crisis response, and especially those 
implementing disease controls, that farming and 
unhindered food supply is a priority. This applies 
above all to rules on imports, and transport of inputs 
and produce. Accordingly, ‘green channel’ priority 
should be given to farming and the operation of the 
food chains: that is, that such activity should be 
permitted to function with minimal hindrance.  
As with allowing markets to function, it may be 
necessary to work with traders, transporters, industry 
associations and local governments to find ways to 
reduce disease transmission while keeping the supply 
chains functioning. 
This does not require additional public capacity. It is a 
question of giving clear instructions from the 
leadership to civil servants, police and security forces, 
local government, and the public in general. Not only 
can green channels keep farming and food systems 
functioning, but they also help allay fears of food 
shortages [Rec. F]. 
Recommendation D Keep enterprises in food 
supply chain running 
With green channels [Rec. K], the businesses in 
trading, processing, transporting, storing, wholesaling, 
retailing and exporting that make up the food supply 
chains should be allowed to continue to function. They 
may still face difficulties, however, if demand for 
produce has collapsed — as may apply to some air-
freighted export crops, for example. They then may 
need bridging loans or grants to allow them to 
conserve capital, key staff, so that they can recover 
when the crisis passes. 
Recommendation E Facilitate remittances 
While remittances will fall as migrant labour is laid 
off, for those who continue to work and earn, making 
sure that remittances can still be sent is important. 
This may mean reducing or removing charges on 
mobile transactions and keeping shops and post-
offices that handle physical transactions open. 
Keeping international flows going may prove difficult 
in a few countries where counter-terrorism rules 
restrict transactions. This can only be addressed 
globally by leaders and those governing the 
international financial system. 
Lesson #2 Impacts of health crises are 
highly selective 
In pandemics a treble selection takes place. Pathogens 
initially select epidemiologically, infecting those 




infection gives rise to differing severities of disease, 
and for some, disability and death. Thereafter, the 
effects of disease vary by incomes, wealth, social class 
and gender. The impacts of health crises can thus be 
extremely uneven, more so than applies in other 
shocks such as drought where all farmers are affected. 
This triple selection can leave some people and their 
households very badly affected. Those with few 
resources and means to cope [Lesson #9] face deep 
hardship and destitution, in addition to suffering from 
disease 
Gendered effects can be hard to spot, especially by 
men, but are important. Women may be more affected 
than men because they almost always do most of the 
caring for the sick. Their informal enterprises may be 
more vulnerable to disease controls. If health facilities 
come under heavy pressure from a pandemic, their 
access to health care for themselves and their young 
children may be suspended, exposing them to health 
risks and additional work in caring for sick children. 
Teenage daughters may be withdrawn from school to 
help with additional work. 
Social protection is implied: offering cash or goods to 
those affected by crises as a safety net is a favoured 
response. In principle, there are good reasons to do 
so: both to compensate people for their misfortune, as 
well as to protect assets: land, tools, livestock, health 
and education, the loss of which may prevent 
recovery. 
Five lessons on safety nets arise from this review. 
One, in the face of a potentially heavy loss of 
purchasing power and business activity, cash 
transfers to large numbers are indicated. In-kind 
assistance risks depressing demand in local markets 
to the detriment of local producers. The key is to 
maintain household ability to access the goods and 
services they need, and to maintain business activity. 
Only cash can achieve this. 
 
10 The world has to work out how to pay for this assistance, just 
as it did after the global financial crisis of 2008 A global fund 
Two, safety nets already in place will need expanding. 
A large step-up in people covered and funds 
distributed can only be done by simplifying some 
features of existing systems. Where possible, it may 
well be better to focus on supporting larger 
programmes, possibly merging programmes to 
simplify provision and coverage. Work conditions 
should be waved, as these add enormously to costs 
and supervision needed to run the programme. 
Three, forget clever targeting. If registers of some sort 
already exist, even if imperfect, use these when needs 
are urgent. Lockdowns may make drawing up new 
registers even more difficult. If not, and where need is 
widespread, targeting can be abandoned in favour of a 
general entitlement in targeted areas, speeding up 
assistance and cutting administrative costs. This may 
be imperfect, but works and helps. Use registers if 
available: if not, forget targeting and go universal. 
This may apply especially if disease control, impedes 
the movements of field staff. 
Four, expanded social safety payments arouse fears 
that it could lead to a continuing sense of entitlement 
among recipients. This resembles a longstanding, but 
long-disproved, fear that emergency cash transfers 
lead to dependency. A limited number of payments 
over the short term can ease unacceptable hardship 
— such as going without food — for vulnerable 
households. 
Five, coordination between different systems and 
agencies is essential. There is no time for 
humanitarian agencies to reinvent wheels by re-
learning lessons about social protection gained over 
many years. No single model for delivering cash 
transfers can be seen. In many cases, emergency 
systems will need to co-exist with state systems: this 
requires joint planning. This is not currently 
happening on the scale required.10 
for social protection was already on the agenda to meet the 




Six, and final, social protection can divert both 
attention and funds from equally important social 
services, such as education, health and clean water. 
While delivering food aid and cash transfers satisfies 
agency needs to be seen to be making a difference, the 
more humdrum issues of keeping services running 
may be less appealing. 
 
Box 4.2 Changing ideas about social protection 
Two significant paradigm shifts in assisting people in 
need have been seen since most of the crises studied in 
this paper (see Cherrier & McCord 2020). 
First, ad hoc assistance used to be provided by a largely 
autonomous humanitarian sector, usually through 
giving food in-kind (food aid). Increasingly, the sector 
has realised that helping households to meet their 
immediate needs can be met in different ways, and that 
in most situations, this is better done through cash 
transfers. Cash increases demand for goods and services 
in local markets, stimulating local economic activity of 
diverse kinds. Aid in-kind, however, tends to substitute 
demand, further depresses local market activity, 
concentrating it instead in national and international 
centres, in the hands of a few large suppliers who have 
the contracts to supply aid operations. 
Second, in the past decade more and more LMICs and 
increasingly LICs have established social safety nets and 
other forms of social protection. In some cases, they 
provide regular and predictable grants to people 
identified as being in need. 
Unitary or parallel systems 
Increasingly the advantages of avoiding the creation of 
two parallel assistance systems, and instead using social 
protection systems to cater for the extraordinary needs 
created by crises — making them shock-responsive — 
are evident. Benefits potentially include reduced costs, 
greater coverage, a speedier response and result in 
more equity between people affected by different 
hazards. Moreover, social protection can encourage 
states to take ultimate responsibility for their citizens, 
albeit with international financial support. 
Significant debate and analysis surrounds the question 
of whether to depend on existing systems alone, or to 
augment them with ad hoc structures to deal with 
emergencies. Criteria for deciding have been identified, 
as have a range of possibilities for what is termed 
‘alignment’. (Barca & O’Brien 2018) Social protection 
systems can expand horizontally the number of 
beneficiaries to help people who not previously eligible 
but who face extraordinary needs; or can raise the value 
of cash payments to respond to increased need (vertical 
expansion); or a combination of both 
Creating a unitary system will not, however, always be 
either possible or desirable. In some contexts, ad hoc 
humanitarian systems may deliver assistance more 
speedily. National social protection systems may not be 
able to cover the whole country. Above all, expecting a 
young and possibly under-resourced system to handle a 
new and complicated challenge may harm its future 
functioning. 
Parallel systems can piggy-back on national registers or 
payment systems; and can follow the same principles as 
national social protection systems for eligibility criteria 
or for payment values. 
These discussions are not always well-known within the 
humanitarian world. Each country needs to ensure that 
there is a single strategy, even where this involves 
parallel social protection and humanitarian systems, 
agreed upon and followed by all actors seeking to 
support people's basic needs through crises. 
Cash or food vouchers 
In some countries, aid agencies have preferred to use 
food vouchers, redeemable at eligible retail outlets 
instead of cash. Because this tends to concentrate 
buying on a limited number of vendors, it carries risks 
during pandemics. To reduce transmission of disease, 
giving people cash to spend as they will is better. It is 
likely to encourage trade to flow to many small and 
dispersed outlets. 
Targeting 
Targeting is another key debate. In regular social 
protection, much concern — not least political — 




undeserving receive help. In crises, however, the prime 
concern is with exclusion errors, that safety nets do not 
cover those in need. Some thus argue either for 
universal provision, or for targeting by vulnerability as 
broadly as possible (Kidd & Sibun 2020, Slater 2008). 
Further reasons exist to favour inclusion: narrow 
targeting of the affected can stigmatise them, as 
happened to those living with HIV/AIDS before this error 
was realised. Moreover, narrow targeting can lead to 
unfairness, as may occur when those infected with one 
disease are assisted, while others suffering from other 
disease or disability are left out. To stigma may then be 
added jealousy, while local leaders disown national 
responses because they can see the discord it sews. In 
this way, programmes for the poor become poor 
programmes — as AK Sen once commented. 
 
Recommendation F Protect and scale up 
existing safety nets to reach more people and if 
necessary, increase payments 
In the face of a potentially heavy loss of purchasing 
power and business activity, cash transfers to large 
numbers are indicated. In-kind assistance risks 
exacerbating the problems for markets, where they 
are still able to function. The key is to maintain 
household ability to access the goods and services 
they need, and to maintain business activity. Only cash 
can achieve this. Target broadly to prevent exclusion 
errors: worry less about inclusion errors. [Box 4.2] 
Prioritise rural women when extending safety nets or 
increasing payments. Ensure that if rural girls are 
withdrawn from secondary school, that ways to 
encourage them to return after the crisis are in place. 
Where no public safety nets exist, use emergency cash 
transfers. Although these may have to be given 
through humanitarian agencies, using systems 
parallel to those of government, procedures should be 
 
11 Four years was fast. Real economic damage was done during the 
crisis: businesses went bankrupt. Restoring some of them, and 
otherwise switching labour and capital to new activities to take 
aligned where possible. This may involve payment 
mechanisms, frequency of payment, possibly transfer 
amounts that are familiar in government systems. 
Each case, however, will need tailoring to national 
circumstances. With some alignment, emergency 
transfers may become the basis for a future public 
safety net. (O’Brien et al. 2018) 
Lesson #3 Recovery from crisis can be 
strong. Agricultural output can be boosted 
very considerably over a season or two 
In several cases reviewed, recovery from crisis was 
more rapid than some observers had imagined or 
hoped for. Recovery from previous epidemics has 
been largely complete within one year. 
For four of the most-affected countries by the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, lost GDP and incomes were 
recovered within four years11 — and with strongly 
growing economies that quickly relegated the crisis to 
memory. When food prices spiked in 2007–08, it was 
thought to be the end of low-cost cereals. Yet by the 
mid-2010s prices, in real terms, had indeed fallen 
back to the levels of the early 2000s. Controlling Ebola 
in rural Sierra Leone looked very difficult indeed at 
the depths of the crisis but was quite quickly achieved 
— once the initial strategy was revised. In the early 
2000s, the HIV/AIDS pandemic appeared poised to 
cause serious economic decline and mass death in 
southern Africa. Economic losses occurred, as did 
deaths; but on nothing like the scale once feared — 
owing in large part to the roll out of anti-retroviral 
therapy (ART). And in contemporary China, the 
nationwide travel blockade and quarantine policy 
imposed in January 2020 has now been lifted in large 
part: people are returning to work, farmers are 
planting spring crops. 
Only in one case, HIV/AIDS, might recovery be 
ascribed to something almost miraculous, namely 
finding effective and cheap ART. In the other cases, 





some relatively straightforward, common-sense 
measures helped households and economies recover. 
Recovery did not depend, either, on profound reforms 
to economies or societies. In part that may reflect that 
the shocks were not necessarily the consequence of 
some deep-seated and generalised malaise, but were 
caused by just a few perturbations to the system — 
the emergence of potent viruses, a perfect storm of 
diverse and largely temporary factors for food prices, 
and the volatility of international capital markets. 
When crises strike, they invite despondency: 
proffered explanations tend to see the crisis as 
somehow inevitable, rather than the result of 
processes that may be as much stochastic — a matter 
of chance — as determined. Such thinking invites 
radical responses, with more modest responses 
dismissed as inadequate. While the former may be 
desirable, they should not lead to the latter being 
ignored. Modest measures may be taken in the short 
term, to considerable effect as well; while taking more 
radical action over the longer run. Not immediately 
embarking on radical responses, which may be 
demanding in resources and time, also allows more 
consideration of the need for them. Experience shows 
they may not be necessary if the priority is to resolve 
the immediate crisis.12 
Public measures to support recovery were often quite 
straightforward and well-known: injections of capital, 
variously through bank credit, small business grants, 
community funds, micro-finance, distribution of farm 
inputs; social safety nets to allow coping without loss 
of productive capital; redoubled commitment to 
provision of public goods and services in rural areas, 
etc. These succeeded partly because it was not just 
government, aid partners and NGOs who were 
responding, but much effort to recover was made by 
those affected [Lesson #9]. 
 
12 That does not necessarily imply, either, papering over the cracks of a 
creaking system that will then shortly lead to another crisis. Some 
systems are more resilient than commonly thought. In 2008/09, not 
only did it seem cheap cereals were a thing of the past, but also that 
Recommendation G Do not overlook modest 
measures, they can be effective 
Faced by daunting crises, it may be felt that dramatic 
and radical responses are needed, such as 
redistribution of assets and tight controls on some 
markets. Experience, however, shows that more 
modest measures — such as cash transfers, grants 
and micro-finance for business, additional support to 
farmers, etc., are not only within the compass of 
existing capacity and experience, but can be effective 
in alleviating hardship and facilitating recovery. 
 
General lessons on responding to 
crises 
Lesson #4 Novel crises involve much 
uncertainty, while previous experiences of 
responses lack evaluation 
Shocks by their very nature are unexpected. In some 
cases, they may be unprecedented as, for example, 
when new viruses replicate. Shock is palpable when 
threats materialise and spread rapidly, when it 
involves an unfamiliar mortal terror, and when the 
medical science and epidemiology are uncertain. 
Decision-makers in such cases tend to: look for 
analogies, whether or not comparable cases exist; 
favour certain familiar framings especially if they 
seemingly reduce uncertainty; and listen to the views 
of specialists who know more about the threat, other 
views being marginalised. Most decision-makers try 
to act quickly, although as we shall see in the next 
lesson (#5), early responses can be wrong. They 
usually have to make unenviable choices, where lives, 
livelihoods and future lives may apparently trade off 
— and uncertainly so. 
They are not helped because institutional memory is 
not what it ought to be. Responses to previous crises 
volatile prices were likely in the future. By 2020, it is clear that since 
cereals prices sank back to their former levels, around 2014, they have 




are commonly under-evaluated. Emergencies are 
usually tackled by ad hoc teams from diverse agencies 
— governments, NGOs, aid partners, multilateral 
agencies, etc. When the emergency passes, such teams 
are disbanded, and little remains in the institutional 
memory. Ideally, experiences would be evaluated, 
learning documented, key lessons distilled to make 
them ready for any subsequent crisis. This review 
shows most interventions are not reviewed as 
critically as needed: an evaluation deficit is common. 
In other cases, economic shocks in particular, similar 
things have been seen in the past, but so long ago that 
memories have faded; or it is thought that conditions 
have changed sufficiently that nothing similar could 
ever happen again. This can dull reactions. For 
example, in the early 2000s before food prices spiked 
in 2007/08, grain traders and market observers 
watched stock-to-output ratios of cereals sink to 
levels they knew were dangerously low, but nothing 
was done. After all, the last large spike seen in cereals 
prices had been in 1973/74 — more than a quarter 
century before. 
Moreover a striking finding in this review was how 
few lessons from fighting Ebola in DR Congo in 2008 
and 2012 were applied in West Africa in 2014, and 
again how few lessons from West Africa were applied 
a few years’ later when the same disease broke out 
again in eastern DR Congo. Almost every error of the 
initial Ebola response was repeated. 
Not all is forgotten, however. Shocks can change the 
appreciation of hazards making people and agencies 
more prepared for them. In Bangladesh, for example, a 
generalised memory remains among politicians and 
civil servants of national traumas such as the famines 
of 1943 and 1974. It was this memory that ensured 
that the government took determined and effective 
measures when cereals prices spiked in 2007/08. 
 
13 Personal communication from a minister in cabinet at the time. He 
frankly admitted that public action was not always well organised in 
Bangladesh, but once the spectre of famine was raised, everyone 
worked with a common will.  
Ministers and civil servants were galvanised to act in 
concert and overcome obstacles, by the very mention 
of the word ‘famine’.13 In 2020, the remarkable 
response to COVID-19 by Taiwan, where few 
infections and deaths have occurred,14 without drastic 
lockdowns, has been attributed to the thoroughness 
which the government had prepared for a potential 
virus crisis after their earlier brush with SARS (Pueyo 
2020). Similarly, although in 2020 some countries 
have limited or banned exports of rice and other 
staples, the scale has been far less than in late 2007 
and early 2008. A lesson, it seems, has been learned 
from that experience. 
Faced by uncertainty, a priority is to invest in 
understanding what is happening. 
Recommendation H Invest in rapid data 
gathering and analysis 
Collect data from the field on changes to livelihoods, 
markets for staple foods and other necessities, 
functioning of food and agricultural supply chains, an 
experiences of food insecurity — see Box B for detail. 
Use of mobile phones and digital records can facilitate 
collection, analysis and presentation of information 
promptly — ideally so that decision-makers have 
information on the situation that is not more than two 
weeks’ old. 
Information needed to assess impacts on food and 
nutrition security requirements 
Gathering information on changes affecting 
populations believed to be vulnerable to food 
insecurity is the priority. These include urban groups 
in informal settlements; rural households that lack 
land, labour, or who live in areas of poor natural 
resources or in remote locations; disabled and 
chronically sick persons; and, in some cases, displaced 
groups. 
14 As at 19 May 2020, Taiwan had registered just 440 infections and 





Key information includes: 
• Changes to livelihoods: impacts of disease, 
controls on movements and gatherings on 
economic activity. Agriculture is a particular 
concern where information is needed on access 
and cost of inputs, labour, freedom to move to 
fields or pasture, the ability to sell surpluses and 
changes to prices paid; 
• Markets for staple foods and other necessities: 
availability of goods, changes in prices; 
• Food and agricultural supply chains. 
Disruptions to markets, transport, and to trading, 
processing, wholesaling, retailing, exporting and 
other businesses in the chains; and, 
• Experiences of food insecurity: difficulties in 
finding food in markets or paying for it; fear of 
infection when buying food. 
Information may be collected promptly and at low 
cost through: 
• Quantitative monitoring as usually already being 
done for either market information or food 
security early warning systems. Use historic 
records to control for seasonality; and, 
• Qualitative interviews, by mobile phone, of panels 
of (a) of households sampled to reflect vulnerable 
groups; (b) farmers sampled to reflect diverse 
farming systems; and (c) trusted informants, 
selected to capture the range of traders, 
processors, transporters, wholesalers and 
exporters. Surveys can be repeated —monthly if 
possible — to track changes. 
Collecting and collating data, analysing it and 
preparing it for decision-makers requires full-time 
staff; but probably a team of less than a dozen 
persons. Teams can be formed building on and 
working with existing groups that gather data in 
ministries, local government, chambers of commerce, 
NGOs, FEWSNET in some countries, FAO or WFP in 
others, FSNAU for Somalia, etc. The experience of food 
security early warning systems can be drawn on (Box 
4.3) Additional temporary staff for increased activity 
during the crisis may be seconded from the civil 
service or contracted from local think tanks or market 
research agencies. 
 
Box 4.3 Data and information: the experience of 
food security early warning systems 
Much experience has been gained over the last 30 or 
more years about early warning of food crises and 
famines, above all in sub-Saharan Africa, stimulated by 
the famines that took place in Ethiopia and the Horn in 
1984/85. Today, the Integrated Phase Classification 
(IPC) brings together a quite remarkable amount of 
information, drawing on FEWSNET and GIEWS data 
collection, about the state of food security in hotspots 
across the world where food crises are most likely to 
happen. The IPC has become a reliable and respected 
source of information for governments and 
humanitarian agencies. 
The IPC, however, is geared to deal with crises that have 
a relatively slow onset; where for example rains failing at 
planting time presage a harvest failure some five or so 
months later. This is distinct to a fast-breaking health 
crisis, where large-scale infection can occur in less than a 
month, and where infection can lead to death within a 
couple of weeks. 
During the food crisis that enveloped southern Africa in 
the early 2000s, Vulnerability Assessment Committees 
(VAC) were established in each country to coordinate 
reactions. The committees brought together all national 
agencies concerned with response, plus aid partners and 
NGOs. Specialised data units, working with FEWSNET 
and GIEWS, using methods such as household 
assessments. gathered data and compiled information 
rapidly, producing monthly updates to facilitate action. 
This system provided reliable information on which 
consensus decisions could be taken across many 
agencies — where the potential for disputes was high. 
(Maunder & Wiggins 2006) 
VACs still exist in southern Africa and in the Horn. The 
systems remain useful, but they are not necessarily 




ago. They could form the basis for enhanced data 
gathering to assist the response to COVID-19, but 
additional features would be needed to capture the 
faster-developing impacts of the virus. 
 
Methods and data can be made open access for other 
researchers can examine, analyse and interpret the 
information. Crowdsourcing of analysis can help 
guard against errors and omissions 
By 2020, the means to capture data in real time have 
multiplied, with advances in mobile phones, the 
internet and remote sensing. DFID and others can 
support data capture and experience in real time to 
ensure that lessons are learned and institutionalised 
before crisis systems unwind and information is lost. 
Good precedents include DFID and NERC funding the 
‘Understanding the impacts of the current El Niño 
event’ research in 2015/16 to monitor the unfolding 
crisis across 12 affected countries. 
If institutional memory is lacking, then drawing on 
the tacit knowledge of those with experience can 
help fill the gap. 
Recommendation I Find and employ persons 
who have worked on previous crises, who carry 
tacit understanding in their memory. 
Make sure that these include not only those who are 
specialists on the technical matter, but also those 
who are specialists on local circumstances: those 
who know the history of previous crises, of relations 
between different groups in the country and with the 
state, and who understand culture and politics at local 
levels. 
Lesson #5 Initial responses to crises have 
often been either ineffective, irrelevant or 
counter-productive 
A central dilemma in fighting epidemics is that they 
demand requires prompt response, but one that is 
both considered and tailored to national and local 
circumstances. 
With uncertainty and unfamiliarity, it is not surprising 
that some responses have been ill-advised. Indeed, in 
almost all the cases reviewed, early reactions of many 
policy makers were usually ill-conceived. Pretending 
that HIV/AIDS could only happen to drug users and 
homosexuals, covering up the outbreak of SARS, 
deflating Asian economies when the financial crisis of 
1997 broke, ignoring rural communities and imposing 
impossible restrictions on them when Ebola struck in 
the Mano River countries and later in the DR Congo — 
all of these were counter-productive. The tide only 
turned when such policies were either abandoned or 
outflanked by more effective measures. 
Three implications follow. One, shocks need to be 
assessed for what they are, rather than what they 
resemble. Analogies can help, but simple replication of 
responses to previous apparently similar crises can be 
deceptive. 
Two, framings of problems need to be broad enough 
to include key dimensions. Narrow framings can lead 
to ill-considered actions. For example, trying to deal 
with Ebola as though fighting a war was misconceived 
in West Africa, and even more ill- conceived a few 
years later in the DR Congo. Some responders may 
have been there primarily to prevent the disease 
spreading to other, richer countries, rather than 
attend to those immediately affected; but such 
imperatives did not help them deal with the epidemic 
in the DR Congo. 
Three, if early responses are often not the best, then 
crises need to be managed adaptively and flexibly. 
Recommendation J Manage crises adaptively 
Take prompt action but be prepared to revisit and 
revise in the light of incoming information. Prompt 
information about impacts in the field becomes 
critical [see Rec. H]. Including specialists from across 
the board [see Rec I] helps avoid thinking within silos. 
Engage with communities 
Four, given both uncertainty and local specificity, 
responders need to engage with local communities. 




their rights; as well for operational effectiveness, local 
communities, their leaders and diverse members have 
to be engaged. The tragic lesson from Ebola in Sierra 
Leone is that little was achieved while the response 
was directed from top down, expert-driven, with rural 
people treated at best as passive subjects and at worst 
as ignorant obstacles to the response. Once 
information was shared locally, and responses 
devised with local participation the tide turned. Not 
only did locals then start to cooperate with 
responders, but they also came up with effective ways 
to limit transmission. 
Locals often have useful ideas on how to respond that 
draw on local capacities that outsiders cannot see, 
while being aware of difficulties in applying solutions 
preferred by outsiders. Rural youth may be a 
resource: indeed, youth may find the crisis a 
stimulating challenge. 
A short paper from a Leonean anthropologist who 
worked for WHO as a front-line worker during the 
outbreak of Ebola, engaging with communities — her 
own maternal communities — in the north of the 
country, has several examples of how communities 
were engaged, and what this entailed in practice (Bah 
2020). The work was painstaking, but in the end it 
saved lives. 
A final reason to engage locally is that with disease, a 
common problem can be disincentives for those 
affected to report cases. For livestock keepers, 
reporting a zoonotic may result in herds and flocks 
being destroyed, often with inadequate 
compensation.15 For humans, reporting infection or 
going to be tested has led to internment in 
quarantined facilities, with little or no access to family 
or friends. Stigma may be a deterrent to reporting 
outbreaks of disease. 
 
15 In the two cases of animal disease, part of the problem was absence 
of trusted, well-functioning veterinary extension services. In the longer 
run, this would be a suitable area for capacity building. 
Recommendation K Consult and engage with 
local communities 
Engaging with communities not only generates critical 
information, but also can be a resource for identifying 
practical responses that can work locally, that 
outsiders may not see. Indeed, in some crises, 
engaging local communities has proved key to 
overcoming the crisis. 
Engaging with communities, rather than co-opting 
them, is far from simple. It requires patience, it 
requires making sure that all have a voice, men and 
women, young and old, majorities and minorities. It 
needs resources: intermediaries who can gain local 
trust but have the status to talk back to heads of 
responding agencies. Because it takes time, it needs to 
start early, rather than being added on as an 
afterthought. 
Lesson #6 Responses to medical crises 
often ignore livelihoods 
When epidemics hit, medical responses almost always 
get first priority, humanitarian relief comes next, and 
considerations of livelihoods tend to lag behind. 
Informal economic activity tends to get very little 
attention at all, yet this includes much smallholder 
farming, trading, and the interactions of rural and 
urban economies. This is particularly costly, since 
most people vulnerable to crises — those on low 
incomes, who lack assets, who may have precarious 
health — work informally. 
Disruptions to transport from countryside to town, 
closing down of rural and informal urban markets, can 
harm agriculture and rural business, leading to heavy 
losses of rural incomes. 
Information is thus critical to understanding these 
impacts and to reacting to problems that arise [See 




Lesson #7 Demonstrate action, 
commitment, and adaptive decision-
making 
Decision-making is not helped when some people, 
above all those in government, overreact to shocks. 
Feedback-loops that exacerbate the initial problem 
can be strong. Two examples arise. One is fear of 
disease leading to myths about its origins and causes, 
with people then not reporting disease or cooperating 
with medical responses. The other is fear that food 
will not be available in markets, leading to panic 
buying and hoarding —by individuals, companies and 
state agencies — that drives up prices and thereby 
fuelling further anxious overreactions. 
Engaging with local communities [Rec. K] is one way 
to placate fear. Another is: 
Recommendation L Leaders need to demonstrate 
action and commitment to allay undue fears and 
anxiety 
Prompt, visible action with clear messages can allay 
fears. This risks committing to action when much 
uncertainty prevails [Lesson #4], but is a lesser 
danger than fuelling public anxiety that nothing is 
being done: with adaptive management, actions can 
be revised. This imperative will tend to favour known 
responses, and those which are feasible. 
Lesson #8 Effective responses depend on 
existing capacity and previous experience 
It is hard to respond to crises without administrative 
structures, procedures and staff in place. Experience 
defines both the range of options most likely to be 
considered, and those that can reasonably be 
implemented within the short to medium term. 
For example, when in 2008, countries tried to 
compensate vulnerable citizens against food price 
rises, it was only possible to do this effectively when 
safety nets were already in place, systems that could 
be expanded to deal with the crisis. 
That said, it is possible to overstretch existing 
systems, especially when external agencies look to 
channel considerable additional resources through 
them. In many countries most of concern to DFID, 
social protection may be young, offering only partial 
coverage of the country. Systems may not have the 
capacity to take on both an additional large caseload, 
as well as the very different ways of working needed 
to be responsive to a shock. 
This point is further considered in the section on 
social protection. 
Recommendation M Favour feasible responses 
Appreciate existing capacity and experience. If 
necessary, recruit back those with experience who 
have left agencies to where they could be useful [Rec. 
B]. Avoid the temptation to try to do things that strain 
existing capacity: such interventions may be 
promising, but if badly implemented, they will fail. 
This does not preclude some innovation that may be 
possible within existing capacity and experience; but 
in assessing innovations, due regard needs to be given 
to capacity and experience. 
Lesson #9 In most crises, most response 
comes from local coping 
A recurring lesson from shocks of all kinds in rural 
areas of LICs, is that the bulk of coping with the shock 
comes from the resources of individuals, households, 
extended families, neighbours and local groups. 
Aid from outside the local sphere is often delayed, 
with crisis conditions receding just as support arrives 
— usually the case with food aid. It may also be a 
blunt instrument not well tuned to the circumstances 
of those affected locally, nor accurately targeted to 
those in need — see the next section for the 
difficulties of targeting. At worst, outside aid may even 
be seen as threatening as with food aid in Sierra Leone 
which some recipients believed to be a vector of 
Ebola. 
At least three implications follow from this. One is the 
broad reflection that resilience, being prepared for 
hazards, is worth more than after-the-event 
assistance. That does not help with immediate 




Another is that when local response is so important, 
then public action should work to support favoured 
coping strategies, where legal and ethical; and at very 
least public responses should not stymie such self-
help. 
A third, uncomfortable reflection is that coping will be 
socially unequal: while some households have the 
resources, including social ties, to cope; others, and often 
the chronically-poor and disadvantaged, lack these 
means. Finding ways to give them special assistance 
should be a priority. 
Recommendation N provide external assistance 
that complements and facilitates local 
responses 
Respond early. Cash payments are much quicker 
than food: they can often be organised in days, plus 
the time to register intended recipients — as Kenya’s 
National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) 
does when satellite images confirm a drought. 
Preparedness is all: be ready to respond if needed. 
The first stage is contingency planning: this review 
may contribute to that. making sure that things that 
ought to have been done anyway are actually done. 
Usually, this refers to public services, such as 
repairing wells, vaccinating children and animals etc 
Being on time needs defining. This is rarely done. 
Most aid works on the principle ‘as soon as I can’ and 
not ‘by an agreed deadline’. That is why so many seed 
distributions arrive too late to be useful. Contracts 
should be made conditional on meeting deadlines 
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A. Responses, effectiveness and lessons summarised 
Cells shaded in lemon are responses not central to concerns over agriculture, rural livelihoods and food and nutrition security 
Cells shared in light green refer to decision-making and implementation. 
Responses Effectiveness Lessons 
Ebola epidemic, West 
Africa, 2013–15 
As a disease and an epidemic, EVD is quite different from COVID-19: it is more deadly and creates a greater degree of fear, but is less transmissible, 
and more easily contained, as there was no transmission from asymptomatic carriers. However, as a crisis, the EVD epidemic has many similarities 
to the expected COVID-19 crisis. Control measures will cause major disruption of trade and economic activities, leading indirectly to household food 
insecurity. The most vulnerable to food insecurity may be the urban poor working in the informal economy.  
General and medical 
Non-food security 
interventions had huge 
ramifications for food 
security and agriculture, both 
because of their indirect 
impacts and because the food 
security was shaped by the 
length of the epidemic more 
than by number of casualties. 
Safe burials 
Initially, was problematic, but later in epidemic it was much more successful. 
When done well, highly effective. Critical in epidemic control. 
Earlier, when done insensitively, caused some hostility and increased stigma. Burials 
are a crucial part of life in many societies so compliance was difficult when badly 
done, including impacts on food security due to nature of social networks, extended 
family and land rights claims. 
When burial staff were not treated well or were left unpaid, some abandoned bodies 
with grave public health dangers. 
Effective when done well 
Lessons on the dangers of a top-down approach to creating 
behaviour change are critical for all dimensions of epidemic 
response. Given the links between epidemic control and 
curtailment of economic activity, it is essential to learn the 
lesson that engaging communities to find behaviours that 
responded both to people's needs and to the demands of 
public health was not only less damaging but also far more 
effective in epidemic control. This lesson had been learned 
in previous EVD outbreaks in other countries. 
 
Public health messages Initially top-down and ineffective when carried out by distant officials. Effectiveness was 
limited partly by inherent mistrust in government in three most-affected countries. 
Messaging became more effective several months into the epidemic with greater 
community engagement. When encouraged to do so, some groups, e.g. youth groups, 
became active messengers of public health messages. 
Need to involve communities as active messengers, not just 
as recipients of messages and directions. This worked when it 
involved sub-groups within the communities, and not just the 
those identified as village leaders. Different groups (e.g. by 
age, by sex) responded to different messaging; and to 




Use of religious leaders to pass on messages, including providing disinfection kits in 
places of worship was reportedly effective 
Messages themselves needed to be tailored to the audience 
to find different ways of meeting the same overall objective 
of reducing physical contacts that spread disease. 
Contact tracing, isolation 
and quarantining 
communities 
Contact tracing and isolation proved problematic initially, partly for reasons similar to 
those discussed above (safe burials). Stigma, and fear of stigma, were a huge barrier 
and disincentive to self-reporting. People were unwilling to identify as potentially 
infected if they did not have trust in the system and trust that they would be 
supported. 
Although many quarantined people were given food rations, for the first months there 
were difficulties in guaranteeing this. Compliance was weakened where the 
immediate needs of the quarantined families and communities were not catered for, 
leading to escapes and risk of further spread of the disease. Insufficient food supply 
was a significant driver behind social unrest in West Point, Monrovia. 
This paper does not discuss the public health impact of contact tracing/isolation or 
quarantining communities. 
Effective when done well 
Voluntary cooperation and community self-enforcement 
will be essential. This requires a system for guaranteeing 
that needs will be met for those quarantined before 
implementing the strategy. Links between support to this 
specific group of people and social protection systems will 
need to be examined in each country. Where cash is the 
medium for SP, people would still access to shops/markets 
to buy their necessities, unless some form of support for 
making purchases is organised (as is being done with much 
success in UK). Whether or not SP systems have the 
bureaucratic capacity to deal with additional and rapidly 
changing caseloads of people who need almost immediate 
pay-outs, possibly of values different from those normally 
transferred, will need to be decided on a country by case 
country basis, and on practical rather than ideological 
grounds. If parallel systems are needed, these can still be 
aligned with SP in many ways. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to draw epidemiological 
lessons on the efficacy of community quarantine for control of 
disease transmission. Blanket quarantines should probably be 
avoided where possible. 
Border closures These were probably effective in limiting spread of EVD beyond 3 countries, although the 
spread to Sierra Leone took place after and despite the border being closed. 
The hardship caused by preventing cross-border trade was 
immense. Where possible, control on movement of 




The disruption on trade was immense, leading to steep rises in food prices, especially in 
border communities. Trade routes adapted (e.g. to Mali), but more trade to border areas 
went through capital cities rather than directly from neighbouring countries. Impact of 
this on local livelihoods has not been documented. 
Probably effective at reducing spread; damaging to livelihoods when trade also curtailed 
little as possible. It currently appears that countries seem 
determined to keep borders open for goods, if not for people. 
Lessons on the impacts of border closures on trade and the 
economy may therefore not be relevant to COVID-19. 
If trade disruptions do occur, or if protectionism leads 
countries to ban the exports of essential items, the livelihood 
and food security impacts will need rapid investigation. 
During the crisis, it will be necessary to monitor markets in 
border areas, and to monitor trade routes and not only the 
volumes supplied in the final markets in major cities. 
Food security and 
agriculture 




There were implementation difficulties, especially in first months. 
Later in the crisis, implementation was improved, and food aid pipelines proved 
adaptable. 
Food assistance was highly necessary for recipients and made quarantine possible. 
No assessment has been done as to the comparative benefits or value for money of 
providing food assistance in-kind or in cash. 
Effective when successfully implemented. Effectiveness of different food assistance 
support modalities unknown 
Assistance will be needed for many households in self-
isolation Mechanisms need to be established quickly to ensure 
that this can take place smoothly. 
In the years since EVD, cash has become the default modality 
for transfers for food security. Since EVD is unlikely to have a 
major impact on food production, cash should be an 
appropriate food assistance modality in most situations. 
Guidelines exist for making and evaluating such decisions. 
SP was largely unavailable as a mechanism for providing 
support during EVD. That is no longer the cases in many 
countries. One of the most critical questions in providing 
support will be the decision on how far to expect SP 
systems to be shock responsive and to take on additional 
needs, or, if not, how and how far to align ad hoc systems 
with SP (see above, contact tracing…). Significant literature 




Cash transfers, other than to 
support quarantined 
households 
Livelihood support began relatively late in the EVD epidemic. 
Given loss of household income for so many, generally accepted that cash transfers were 
important in maintaining households' ability to meet their basic needs. 
Some support was also given in kind. However, recipients almost always preferred cash 
transfers over food aid. 
No studies document the impact of in-kind assistance on markets and the local economy. 
Impacts of transfers have not been well studied, e.g. with controls or with a rigorous 
qualitative methodology. Some evidence that households receiving transfers had better 
diet and less hunger as a result. 
Cash transfers after EVD are reported to have stimulated an increase in local trade and 
savings groups (but, again, studies had no controls). 
Targeting was problematic, with high inclusion error (estimated based on subjective 
observation by one study at around 25%). There was also significant exclusion error found 
in one study. This has not been well studied. Most implementing agencies believed that 
they were highly successful in targeting the most vulnerable. 
Effectiveness not known, but probably high; effectiveness and wider impacts of different 
food assistance modalities not known. 
It is hard to argue against the need for huge cash intervention 
if measures taken to mitigate and control the spread of 
COVID-19 cause disruption to the informal economy. A 
household transfer is likely to be needed by many, and cash is 
likely to be the preferred modality — except where markets 
are shown not to be able to function, even where demand 
would exist, or where there are restrictions on movement 
prevent people in isolation from accessing markets or shops. 
Measures will probably be needed to support the continuation 
of business. In-kind assistance is likely to further suppress 
market demand and thus further depress economic activity. 
The need for cash assistance to cover household needs will 
need to be established case by case. For example, if 
agricultural production is not disturbed, rural households may 
be less in need. This will depend on many factors such as how 
far agricultural production is of food crops or cash crops, how 
far markets continue to operate normally, how far the social 
organisation of agricultural labour is disturbed, etc. 
It will be important not to leave cash assistance late (as 
happened in the case study) but to prepare for a rapid 
mitigation of hardships, if they arise. This means having 
systems to collect and analyse information in real time. 
In some countries, social protection systems may be used to 
deliver transfers. Care will be needing in assessing the ability 
of existing systems to continue to operate under a COVID-19, 




there may be severe restriction on the movement of staff 
working to implement the social protection system. 
Targeting criteria in EVD included those affected directly by 
Ebola and the general category of ‘vulnerable' households. 
The impacts of COVID-19 may not be felt most by those 
normally considered vulnerable, so targeting may be even 
harder than normal.  
Cash grants to village 
cooperatives, savings 
organisations. 
Little information on impact of grants to pre-existing village organisations. 
Reasonable to believe that such interventions may well have assisted in both economic 
and social recovery. One evaluation of 9 villages showed household cash grants increased 
the number of savings groups in the targeted villages, but these quickly fell back down to 
pre-EVD levels, suggesting the number of organisations and the volume of savings/credit 
is determined by wider economic factors in the local economy. 
There is no documented evidence of the impacts of establishing new groups (savings, 
trading, producer) on the speed or extent of recover or in the medium-term. 
No documented information about who benefited and who was excluded by different 
ways of injecting cash into the rural economy. 
Effectiveness not known 
Recapitalising a rural economy by supporting existing 
village economic structures such as VSLA/savings coops, 
rather than just through household handouts makes sense, 
both for immediate stimulus to village economy and also to 
re-stimulate social structures. 
The appropriateness of such interventions will depend very 
much on the context, and so should be based on a 
sociologically-informed study. 
Considering the widespread use of these aid instruments, the 
lack of attention to learning lessons about impact is 
concerning. The attention of those implementing 
interventions is understandably on trying to assist in in the 
immediate crisis, but investment in learning about what 
works and how, including in the medium-term should not be 
neglected. Donors and implementing organisations should 
discuss in advance ways to achieve this which do not detract 
from attention to the quality and speed of implementation.  
Agricultural support 
Seed distribution  
These were implemented and financed by many agencies. The ubiquity of such programming without the evidence that 
it is needed suggests that this is an automatic or default 




Very little evidence beyond the highly anecdotal that planting material was in short 
supply or hard to access for most farmers. If the constraint was the financial cost of 
buying seeds, projects do not document the rationale for preferring an in-kind 
distribution over a cash or credit intervention. Information is lacking on the 
crops/varieties distributed or the rationale for this choice. 
No documented evidence that yields were improved or that household income went up 
as a result of the distributions, as no assessment of impact is available. 
Harvests were generally good. Although seed distributions reached a minority of 
households, there are no documented reports that harvests for some were limited by the 
availability of planting material. 
Nothing has been documented about the impact of in-kind distributions of inputs on 
supply chains for agricultural inputs (private sector suppliers). This possibility is not 
discussed in project documentation publicly available. 
One evaluation of a small vegetable seed distribution found that seeds arrived late, 
causing late planting and loss to grasshoppers. Most groups did not then keep seed for 
following season. 
Effectiveness not known 
production. Approaches for assessing the accessibility of 
planting material and for determining ways to support 
agricultural production if support is needed were established 
many years ago but rarely used. 
Over the last 15 years, there has been an increasing 
understanding in the humanitarian sector of the need to 
separate the discussion on whether or not people needed 
assistance to meet their immediate consumption needs 
(including food) and how that support should best be give (in-
kind food aid, cash grants, market systems support, etc.) That 
discussion is not yet taking place regarding production inputs 
(seeds, tools, livestock, fodder, etc.) It is urgently needed, as 
the majority of humanitarian support for agricultural 
production and rural recovery is based on little or no evidence 
of impact (including unintended impacts) and even less 
analysis that it is being delivered in the right modality. 
In-kind distributions of seeds are unlikely to be cost-effective, 
where market mechanisms are functioning. 
Given the diversity of farming conditions and the diversity of 
socio-economic conditions that farmers live in, there may also 
be questions about the ability of a centralised approach to the 
selection of seeds to be distributed, rather than supporting 
each farmer to choose their own selection of crops, varieties 
and the quality of planting material that they need. 
Given the time-critical nature of crop sowing/planting, care is 




kind distributions, where the inputs needed can be found by 
farmers through markets or informal channels. 
Overall livelihood and 
recovery support, including 
agricultural extension, usually 
though farmer groups 
This intervention is not clearly related to the EVD crisis. No studies of impact were 
available. 
There is no documented information on any lasting improvements brought to the famers 
knowledge systems: that is their links to permanent extension services, research, other 
farming networks, peer to peer learning structures, etc. 
Recovery across the 3 countries was fast and widespread. 
There is little evidence that humanitarian/recovery 
interventions were necessary to achieve a rapid return to a 
basic level of economic activity. 
There is no obvious reason to include interventions for the 
longer-term development of the productivity of the 
agricultural sector or rural economy as a whole as short term, 
ad hoc, recovery interventions. There is also no obvious 
reason to believe that such development impact is best 
achieved through humanitarian programming.  
  See EVD Summary for note on context: recovery was very fast. 
Harvests were generally good in 2015/16, and informal economy returned as soon as 
there was effective demand. 
Range of support measures was quite small and largely generic. Not much was tailored 
specifically to the (unique?) sets of problems posed by EVD. 
Effectiveness not known 
These kinds of interventions to support recovery are common 
across a wide range of crises and countries. It is unclear how 
well they are based on an understanding and analysis of the 
contexts in which they are used. 
The lack of rigorous impact studies makes it still difficult to 
draw many lessons about how best to support populations 
emerging from crisis. This situation is inexcusable, given the 
long history of recovery interventions. See above, cash grants. 
Can we do better this time? 
Support to women Women's 
centres 
A study of one project found a positive impact on out-of-wedlock pregnancy, school 
drop-out and use of transactional sex. 
Evaluations of the humanitarian response generally found that gender programming was 
weak/ This project was an exception in directly addressing the objective of women’s and 
girls’ empowerment. 
The impact of this intervention was specific to the particular 
cultural context where it took place so direct lessons cannot 
be simply copied for other countries. However, it does offer a 




Effective. Gender programming was too often about including a certain 
percentage of female beneficiaries in the same programme. 
This does not have to be so. 
Providing women and girls with spaces and forums to engage 
in discussions about their lives can have positive and tangible 
impacts on their lives 
Ebola Virus Disease, DRC While the disease itself is very different, the response to the disease has generated 
lessons relevant to COVID-19. Firstly, community involvement and trust are absolutely 
essential if an epidemic is to be quashed. Secondly, care must be taken not to cause 
further damage to social structures, health care systems, and livelihood strategies 
through control measures.  
 
Aggressive, bio-security 
approach to the disease, 
including quarantine, EVD 
treatment centres, rapid and 
safe burials. 
Counter-productive, as it resulted in a great deal of community resistance.  Any intervention that leaves the impression that the response 
serves to protect the rest of the world (especially the rich 
world), rather than to care for the local community will 
engender resistance. 
Social distancing and 
quarantine 
Unclear how much impact this had on disease transmission. However, detrimental side 
effects were reported, including significant increases in child malnutrition likely to be 
largely due to response efforts, given that only a small percentage of the population were 
infected with EVD. 
Households quarantining must be supplied with adequate 
food supplies for the period of quarantine and any time it may 
take to rebuild livelihoods. 
Include child nutrition interventions. 
Taking confirmed cases to 
specialist treatment centres 
Largely counter-productive as symptomatic patients became reluctant to seek 
treatment, meaning they infected more people and their chance of survival decreased 
markedly. 
Build trust with patients by ensuring that they understand the 
process and provide them with treatment options. 





Provide food aid or cash assistance to family members who 
have lost the labour of a household member or have incurred 
additional costs due to illness.  
Border closures between DRC 
and Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi 
Cross-border travel increased, as people sought to escape the quarantined areas.  Ensure that communities are well-looked after and are willing 
to work with the response effort, otherwise they will seek to 
escape to where they feel safer.  
Triage of all patients for EVD Gradual reduction in hospital transmissions, but at the cost of reduced maternity services 
(EVD and early pregnancy complications have very similar symptoms, meaning that 
women often had to wait for EVD screening results before treatment). 
Reduce time for screening tests to ensure pregnant women 
can receive urgent maternity care. 
Provide safe spaces for those awaiting results to avoid 
transmission in health centres.  
Vaccination of willing health 
care workers  
Vaccines significantly reduced deaths among vaccinated health workers. Given experimental nature of vaccine, many chose not to be 
vaccinated so 13% of deaths were still among medical staff. 
Need to provide other forms of protection. 
Traditional healers should be included among health workers 
as these are often the first care workers patients visit. This 
would assist in winning trust and ensuring a community-led 
response. 
Vaccination of those who had 
come into contact with a 
confirmed EVD case 
Limited effectiveness due to difficulty in identifying/remembering and tracing all 
contacts. 
A more systematic vaccination campaign would be more 
effective. 
Provision of more routine vaccines during non-crisis times 
would help prevent suspicion towards vaccines. 
Removing the deceased from 
their communities as quickly 
as possible, in some cases 
Counter-productive as it built mistrust and community resistance. Train community volunteers in safe but respectful burial 
rituals. 
Involve religious and community leaders in educating the 




with involvement of security 
forces. 
Provide psychosocial support to the bereaved. 
Employing local young men 
in response to increase 
community involvement and 
address loss of employment 
opportunities. 
Mixed results: did provide some cash for households and communities but increased 
inter-generational conflict within communities and excluded women.  
Provide employment opportunities to women, who may be 
carrying a disproportionate burden in any pandemic. 
Involve community elders in response activities to prevent 
inter-generational conflict.  
Absence of gender-specific 
responses. 
Increased poverty, reduced health care, and increased psychosocial burden for women Ensure provision of health care continues as women use 
services more, particularly sexual and reproductive health 
services. 
Provide food or cash transfers to women caring for relatives or 
those unable to continue income-generating activities. 
HIV/AIDS, 1981 onwards   
Medical: Prevent 
transmission; ART 
Initially efforts to limit transmission ran into obstacles such as moral and religious 
objections to use of condoms, or even to mentioning sexual matters. Same applied to 
clean needles for those injecting drugs. 
With time, however, objections weakened, messages were passed along more openly, 
and some apparent success in limiting transmission. 
ART, initially feared to be unaffordable for those on low incomes has come to be 
rolled out on a large-scale, owing cheaper drugs and public funding of costs. For most 
of those covered by ART, this has much limited or halted the progress of AIDS. 
See below under ‘decision-making’: it took long to persuade 
some leaders that HIV/AIDS was a medical problem that 
unevenly affected individuals and society, and that those 
affected deserved help and treatment as a right.  
Social protection 
Social protection for people 
living with HIV/AIDS tried 
first and foremost to defend 
Cash transfers: Social pensions paid to the elderly particularly appropriate because 
fungible, allowed recipients to pass benefits to other household members. Pensions in 
South Africa often used to pay for children’s schooling. Enable households to buy 
medicines. 
Cash transfers require transparency, accountability and 
financial and administrative capacity on part of governments, 




the consumption of 
vulnerable people, to prevent 
them slipping into deep 
poverty, and to prevent them 
from either selling productive 
assets or resorting to work 
that would have been 
dangerous, criminal or 
degrading — commercial sex 
work being a particular 
concern. 
Beyond this, some measures 
tried to help households that 
had labour to produce more 
and enhance their livelihoods 
in the face of a disease that 
tended to undermine those 
livelihoods. 
 
Child-headed households may not have the capacity to make good decisions about 
expenditure, though orphan allowances paid to households may encourage and 
strengthen community-based care of orphans. 
Often effective 
Food and nutrition: Viable long-term safety net for households severely labour 
constrained unable to work. For households with labour, danger of creating dependency. 
Costly to transport food. 
Effective for very poor, without labour 
Farm inputs: seed and fertiliser, useful for households with labour. Significantly cheaper 
than importing food aid; especially in landlocked countries 
Partly effective 
School feeding: encouraged enrolment and reduced dropouts, but unlikely to be 
sufficient incentive to severely labour-constrained households, particularly child-headed 
households, to attend school. Take-home rations can support orphans and vulnerable 
children (OVC) and their households 
Partly effective 
Public Works Programmes: Cash For Work & Food For Work. Can be self-targeting, for 
example when inferior staple foods or lower wages are paid. Appropriate for HIV-positive 
but asymptomatic people, but only if they have a healthy diet. Since this is unlikely, FFW 
and CFW can be counter-productive and iInappropriate for labour-constrained 
households, i.e. those containing people with AIDS and OVC 
Partly effective 
Need to differentiate circumstances of households, above all 
between those with labour and those lacking labour. 
When targeting households to for assistance, better to target 
broadly for all and any households that are vulnerable to deep 
poverty and destitution, rather than just those living with 
HIV/AIDS. Singling out households affected by HIV/AIDS 
risked stigmatising them 
Take care that spending on social protection does not deprive 
health and education of funding since these services matter for 
most households living with HIV/AIDS. 
Diverse actions: individuals, 
families, communities 
Varied: dependent on all manner of circumstances, including the prior resources of 
the individual and their household, and the degree of secondary illnesses/stage of 
AIDS. Some actions were coping, others were distress — such as asset sales 
In most crises in rural area of LICs, those affected have to 
reply very heavily on their own ability to cope. If any 




Partly effective and (b) may come in forms that are not that well suited to 
the affected individuals.  
Rights HIV/AIDS revealed how widows could lose their land. Led to efforts to protect rights 
of widows and all women to land, thereby contributing to greater gender equality 
Effectiveness not known 
The crisis encouraged reforms at community and national 
level to address issues of rights, above all those of women.  
Decision-making and 
implementation  
Initially, causes of the disease were uncertain and highly sensitive, with much stigma 
attached to disease and those living with it. A combination of scientific ignorance with 
moral judgments about drug users, homosexuals and the promiscuous impeded clear 
debate and action. 
Much advocacy needed before it came to be treated as a disease, with those affected 
treated with respect. 
Perceptions of crises matter. The more alarming the 
problem, the less is understood about its causes and 
treatment, the harder it can be to summon support for 
remedial action. 
With more understanding, crises appear more manageable, 
since specific ways to address components of problem 
become clearer. 
Food price spike, 
2007/08–c2014 
  
Prevent prices rising on 
domestic markets: 
• ban exports, import 
more  
Exacerbated spike in prices on world markets. Some effectiveness in limiting 
domestic price rises 
Effective nationally, counter-productive internationally 
Prompted thinking about how best to prevent overreactions 
that prompt others to imitate. Hard to control export bans — 
even if WTO mandated to prevent them, hard to implement — 
and even less to prevent anxiety-driven over-stocking. 
Providing reliable information on stocks and supplies can 
mitigate over-reaction. 
• release stocks, 
subsidise cost food,  
Much depended in intensity of measure: with enough resources, relatively easy to 
contain prices rises 
Effective, but costly, require prior stocks or funds 
MICs had capacity to consider such measures, while LICs 
almost always lacked resources 




Usually ineffective, potentially counterproductive 
Stimulate production 
through public distribution 
of inputs, subsidies on 
inputs 
Inputs were delivered but many arrived after the first half of 2008, when crops were 
planted in the Northern Hemisphere. 
In following years, strong response in much higher cereals production in Africa and Asia, 
mainly coming from countries where smallholder predominate 
Highly effective in medium term 
When these programmes began, much scepticism from 
observers over whether smallholders who supposedly faced 
many limitations to raise production could take advantage of 
inputs and higher prices. Response from smallholders, 
however, was strong. 
Social protection for those 
on low incomes, vulnerable 
to higher-cost of food 
Safety nets were often delayed: most got going by late 2008 and early 2009, when 
prices had been high for some months. 
Some reportedly suffered from implementers’ capacity constraints, overly complex 
targeting, and insufficient attention to women. Not enough consideration of 
effectiveness of implementing different safety nets, such cash transfers, public works 
employment, food aid, etc. 
Effectiveness varied 
Often school feeding was the focus because, unlike more sophisticated social 
protection, this already existed in many low-income countries and could be scaled up 
relatively quickly. Protected school-age children, but not infants. 
Partly effective 
 
Required schemes to be in place, with agency able to 
distribute funds or food, with register of households likely 
to be vulnerable 
 
Coping and distress by 
affected individuals, 
households  
Most surveys report that not many vulnerable households received assistance from 
state during the price spike. Despite considerable public efforts, for most threatened 
households it was their own ability to cope that mattered. 
Effective for households with savings, other assets, working adults, good social networks 
— and where rural economy had diverse potential for alternative work 
Resilience and ability to cope of households was important 
in avoiding serious harm to individual welfare from the 
price spike.  
Decision-making International response focused on boosting supply, providing social protection, and 
providing more information. In retrospect these were largely appropriate 
While crises require prompt responses, they also require 




National responses varied. In some cases, ineffective or counter-productive measures 
were taken — export bans, price controls; in part, since leaders needed to be seen to act.  
overreactions were evident — export bans, stockpiling in tight 
markets.  




• Monetary and 
deflationary 
IMF orthodoxy: raising interest rates, reducing public sector deficits through reduced 
public spending. 
Led to business closures, unemployment lower wages. 
Aggravated hardship. 
Counter-productive 
Do not depend on the IMF. It was too wedded to its own ideas 
to pay attention to the specifics of the crisis facing the 
different countries 
Think ahead: liberalisation of trade and capital accounts may 
be fine in principle, but has its dangers — especially in capital 
markets, where herd instincts may be strong, where 
international investors may suddenly withdraw their funds.  
• Stimulate economic 
recovery 
Providing support for small and informal businesses in credits and grants. 
Malaysia: Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) revolving fund, RM300 million in interest-free 
loans to retrenched works were disbursed. 
Effective: 100% repayment of loans. 
Yayasan Tekun Nasional entrepreneurial loans scheme, the Graduate Entrepreneurs 
Scheme, and the Economic Business Group Fund, which provides assistance to women 
entrepreneurs — all directed to improve entrepreneurship in informal sector 
Effective in stimulating enterprise 
Thailand: Unemployment Mitigation Program (1998) included innovations such as the 
“Thai help Thai” social protection, provisions for job creation, repatriation of workers, 
promotion of Thai workers working abroad, and employment of university graduates. 
Effectiveness not known 
Indonesia: Revolving-credit schemes (PDM-DKE) 
Speed of recovery from what seemed in 1998 an acute crisis 
was relatively rapid: within 3–4 years in most countries, lost 
GDP was recovered and previous rapid growth was restored — 
owing in part to strong exports benefitting from depreciated 
exchange rates. 
Loans and grants for businesses in these four countries — 
Korea apparently did not do anything similar — were more 
often successful than not, but much depended on existing 
organisations such as Philippines’ micro-finance agencies, and 




Ineffective: criticised for being prone to corruption and cronyism 
Philippines: credit for livelihoods through existing micro-finance organisations 
Effective: microcredit helped ameliorate poverty. Community engagement, effective 
coordination with state.  
Social safety nets, social 
protection 
• Unemployment benefit, 
health care for 
workers: universal 
benefits 
Korea: faced by bankrupt businesses, unemployment insurance extended to all of 
labour force. Universal coverage. 
Effective: crisis saw much greater protection for workers 
Malaysia: Employee Provident Fund was flexible, allowed more funds to cover rising cost 
of housing. 
Effective 
Employment Acts protected against dismissal 
Effective: unemployment rose by just 3.2% at most during crisis 
Thailand: Labor Protection Act (1998—post-crisis) provided limited unemployment 
benefits for non-government employers and employees 
Probably effective 
Post-crisis, created universal health care cover. Voluntary and Low-Income Health Cards, 
though expensive, believed to have facilitated delivery of basic services in remote 
regions. 
Effective, but costly 
 
Richest countries in region had means to extend universal 
benefits to workers, in some cases covering informal workers. 
Generally effective in protecting jobs and incomes, ensuring 
health care, but costly.  
• Safety nets: public 
works programmes, 
cash transfers 
Korea: Temporary Livelihood Protection Program (TLPP) to absorb the newly 
unemployed, covering an additional 310,000 persons: direct cash transfer ($70/month), 
tuition fee waiver and lunch subsidies for school-aged children, and 5% reduction in 
medical insurance premiums for one year. Have to participate in public works and job 
training. 
Much of what was done depended on prior organisation and 
experience that could be scaled up. Where safety nets were 




Effective: elements made permanent in 2000 Minimum Living Standards Security Act. 
Malaysia: Expansion of existing safety nets to cover retrenched workers entering the 
informal sector. Also had informal safety nets along ethnic lines to compensate for the 
low level of coverage of the formal safety nets 
Probably effective 
Thailand: main efforts through community support, see below 
Indonesia: Public works program (Padat Karya) had wage rates were set above the 
minimum wage, creating distortions and diverting labour away from other sectors like 
harvesting food crops. 
Partly effective 
Philippines: Public employment. Food for Work suffered from overlap of seasonal timing 
in agricultural harvesting, planting and cultivation, insufficient funds, and a bad law-and-
order situation. Rural roads programs found to be gender insensitive. 
Partly effective 
 
Where countries knew about micro-finance, such as the 
Philippines, this was a channel to help small businesses in 
distress. 
In countries such as Thailand with all manner of NGOs and 
community organisations, these could be used to channel 
assistance to localised communities.  





Thailand: NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD). Already existed 
to support community organisations, women’s groups, and child development centres. 
The Social Investment Fund (SIF) and the Regional Urban Development Fund (RUDF) 
financed community-based, demand-driven projects. Scaled up after 1997. Communities 
learned to plan, invest, assume debt. Projects undertaken resulted in small irrigation and 
other infrastructure repairs and tourist facility improvements. Provided employment to 
groups, such as women, that labour-intensive workfare can miss. Funds had a clear exit 
strategy (known to participants) were terminated at the end of 1999 
Effective 
 
Price controls, provide 
staple foods and other 
Philippines: Food subsidies. National Food Authority (NFA) mandated to set floor price 





necessities at subsidised 
prices 
buffer stock. In 1998, it imported rice and set up Enhanced Retail Access for the Poor 
(ERAP), or sari-sari, stores to sell basic commodities (such as sugar, coffee, milk, cooking 
oil, sardines, and noodles) at below market prices. Studies show it was overwhelmingly 
the non-poor who benefited from these stores. NFA unable to prevent both high 




Crisis broke suddenly and unexpectedly. In early months, both IMF and governments 
were firefighting, taken aback at the scale and speed with which the macroeconomic 
malaise developed. 
Crisis had not been countenanced — after all, SE and E Asia was a growth success 
with widely shared benefits, so little preparedness. Some early decision-making 
therefore followed the instincts of the IMF and governments, rather than a clear 
analysis of exactly what was happening.  
 
 
Highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza 
Despite the potential for a human pandemic and large losses of life, this remained largely 
a veterinary disease. However, it has had some impact in shaping responses to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Important lessons on decision-making in uncertainty and how to improve mathematical 
modelling of pandemics.  
 
Livestock culling Effective at eradicating the disease in livestock but created mistrust in populations and 
created incentives not to report animal ill-health to the authorities. 
Create veterinary extension services that deal with all livestock 
disease (not only HPAI) to nurture trust between farmers and 
government. 
Combine with livelihood programmes that support the risk 
management strategies of farmers, including supporting their 






Often created more fear than useful response, due to consumers being provided with 
inadequate information, which led to unnecessarily cautious behaviour by consumers. 
Must compensate farmers when the market for eggs and/or 
chicken collapses due to fear of contracting HPAI from chicken 
and eggs. 
Support other impacted industries (such as tourism) where 
reputational damage to a whole country results in tourists 
staying away. 
Provide consumers with detailed information on transmission 
mechanisms and food safety to prevent unnecessary fears. 
Preparing for large-scale 
outbreak by stockpiling 
antiretrovirals.  
Unclear how effective the treatment is or whether stockpiles would be adequate in the 
case of a large-scale pandemic.  
Be aware of attempts by pharmaceutical companies with 
undue influence to participate in policy-making and pandemic 
preparedness.  
Preparation of national 
emergency pandemic plans. 
Reviews suggest that the majority of plans in Africa lacked plans for business continuity, 
sub-national planning, operational details, collaboration with neighbouring countries, 
web reporting systems, and plans for recruiting volunteers from local communities.  
Provide capacity-building support to Ministries of Agriculture 
and Health to better plan for a pandemic. It is likely that 
demand for such support will increase in the aftermath of 
COVID-19. 
Modelling of potential impact 
of HPAI pandemic. 
Models alone are inadequate for pre-empting how a pandemic might unfold as they do 
not include sociological insights, and therefore do not account for the coping strategies, 
local knowledge, or gender and cultural norms of those affected by the disease. Instead 
they treat populations as homogenous and so can neither accurately predict the spread 
of a disease through populations nor identify control measures.  
Ensure that the assumptions behind mathematical models are 
made explicit and shared with a multi-disciplinary team of 
experts who can verify and adapt them. Involve 
mathematical/medical modellers, sociologists, economists, 
and those who are affected to create a participatory pandemic 
model: the same disease will spread very differently in 
different societies, classes, religious groups. 
Accept that policy-making in a pandemic will involve 
uncertainty and making decisions without adequate 
information and that all sources of information should 




Pandemic responses should start with the experiences of the 
poorest, most vulnerable, and usually most-affected groups.  
 






Travel blockade: travel 
between rural 
villages/towns and cities 
suspended; travel between 
rural villages suspended 
(exceptions for transport 
of agricultural inputs and 
outputs). 
Quarantine: lockdown 
policies enforced in urban 
and rural areas, though 
measures and levels 
varied. 
Blockade & quarantine highly effective in controlling spread of virus. Survey results 
indicate very few infections and deaths (>700 village informants across 19 counties 
in 7 provinces surveyed by phone. Only 4 of 726 reported infections in their villages; 





Government seized the moment: acted when millions of 
urban residents and migrants had returned to rural families 
for Chinese Lunar New Year, and before virus transmission 
accelerated. 
Clear, timely messages from government (in contrast to 
SARS). 
Government able to deploy arsenal of tools & methods – 
from high-tech surveillance and monitoring to Mao era 
mass-mobilisation of party workers down to village level 
(rural) and sub-district (urban). 
Public familiar with and broadly accepting of government 
controls. 
 
Agricultural support   
High-level government 
directives: 




Food prices generally stable across China, though some localised price spikes and 
shortages. 
In contrast to western governments, Chinese government 
does not appear to have (so far) spent heavily on propping up 
incomes, despite thin rural safety nets. Why? High savings, 




cascaded to lower levels on 
need to support agric 
production and 
distribution. 
Rapid transit of agric 
inputs & produce via green 
channels (frictionless 
transport on road 
network). 
 
Spring planting, a key government concern, goes ahead on time 
Appears to have been effective based on news reports. 
 
Safeguarding agricultural production and distribution was a 
key priority early on: all tiers of government hierarchy 
instructed to make this a key priority, with performance 
grading of lower level officials (affecting pay & promotion) 
adjusted accordingly (China’s cadre evaluation system, which 
sets ‘hard’ performance targets, works very effectively in 
ensuring lower level officials follow central directives)  
Direct support for farmers: 
Modest direct support for 
farmers – cheap credit and 
lower taxes for farmers 
Effectiveness of (limited) government fiscal measures hard to discern, but overall points 
above (stable prices, spring planting) suggests overall package effective in terms of 
agricultural production and distribution. 
But lockdown has negative impact on employment, income, diet, education, because 
rural livelihoods increasingly dependent on migrant remittances. Likely buffered over 
short term by savings, strong family networks and normal (pre-virus) stockpiling of food 
for Chinese New Year.  
Direct support options limited as rural workers and migrants 
self-employed. 
Negative impacts on rural incomes due mainly to temporary 
cessation of remittances as migrants locked down in ‘home’ 
villages and unable to return to towns and cities.  
Swine flu 2009   
Travel restrictions: e.g. the 
EU advised against all non-
essential travel to the US 
and Mexico. 
No effectiveness on mitigating the spread of the disease. Instead, restrictions helped 
further stoke fear of the virus, leading to avoidable economic impacts on tourism. 
Unlike other flu epidemics, ‘swine flu’ was widespread within 6 weeks. Combined 
with late discovery of the virus this meant that even the most severe travel 
restrictions would not have helped further human-to-human transmission. The CDC 
estimates that 60.8 million people in the US alone were eventually infected. 
Policy responses need to be run by high reliability 
professionals (in this case, epidemiologists), who were 
missing during ‘swine flu’ outbreak. 
 
Trade embargoes: 27 
countries banned imports 
of pork/pork products 
No effectiveness on mitigating the spread of the disease, which was being transmitted 
by humans. Instead, embargoes led to a fall in demand for pork and pork products. In 
the US alone, prices fell by 15% and caused total costs of up to $400 million to the 
Consult OIE and veterinary experts before policy decisions 




from North America, 
including mass slaughter 
in Egypt 
industry. In Egypt, mass culling of 300,000 pigs disproportionately impacted poor, 
pig-raising communities (e.g. garbage pickers). 
how H1N1 strains spread was already there, yet it was not 
used as part of the public health response. 
Incentivising farmers to self-report disease outbreaks, for 
example by providing economic safety nets when their 
livelihoods are threatened, can be far more effective in 
controlling animal disease outbreaks before they are 
potentially transmitted to humans. 
Local knowledge of disease surveillance can also help 
control animal disease outbreaks. 
Public awareness 
campaigns 
Campaigns managed to restore confidence of eating pork and pork products among 
consumers. Markets normalised within 4 months. 
Very effective: 
Prompt dissemination and clear communication of 
information regarding the disease, leaving as little room for 
uncertainty as possible. 
Public purchase 
programmes 
Despite USDA purchasing over $200 million worth of pork and pork products, prices 
still slumped. Public information campaigns had far greater effect on restoring prices 
at a much lower cost. 
Ineffective. 




Lack of international coordination between WHO, OIE and FAO led to delays and 
uncertainty over how pH1N1 could spread, fuelling uncertainty and fear. This led to 
avoidable negative economic impacts, such as a slump in demand for pork and 
damage to tourism and hospitality sectors. 
Counter-productive 
Invest in capacity to monitor developments and bring 
together lessons, evidence and findings effectively and from 
a number of different agencies to fully inform policy 
decisions. As zoonotic pathogens become more common, 
there will be an increasing need to bring together 







Accounts of other recent crises 
B. Ebola in West Africa (2013-2015) 
What happened? 
Causes: Ebola virus disease (EVD) spread from Guinea to Sierra Leone and Liberia, and eventually to at least three 
neighbouring countries, as well as leading to cases in Europe and the United States. In total, around 12,000 people 
died. The case fatality varied from 28% in Sierra Leone to 67% in Guinea (WHO). (It was significantly higher than 
mortality rates for COVID-19.) 
Economic impact: EVD had a huge impact on the livelihoods of millions of people. In the informal sector, more than 
half of all jobs and self-employment was lost. Agricultural labour, on which many of the rural poor depended, was 
badly disrupted. Job losses were worst for women, because of their disproportionate work as small traders and in 
self-employment in the food sector. The impact on jobs was especially large in urban areas (construction and 
restaurants) but in rural areas, food/beverage and restaurant industries were worst affected, partly because of fears 
food included bush meat. Overall, a majority of people — up to 66% of households in Liberia — reported lower 
incomes. The impact on food production was not nearly as great as was feared or as was portrayed at the time. At 
national level, the production of rice (the main staple food) in 2014 was estimated at down by 4%, 8% and 12% 
respectively, in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia compared to 2013, although some sources suggest that production 
was down by up to 25% in the hardest hit areas. However, this is under one standard deviation of the multi-annual 
variability of lowland rainfed rice production in West Africa, i.e. represents a 1 in 6 year event.16 At the peak of the 
food insecurity, over two million people across the three main affected countries were deemed to be in need of 
assistance or to be in severe food insecurity (FAO Oct 2015). 
Cause of economic impact: Overall, the overwhelming majority of the economic impact of the EVD outbreak was not 
due directly to EVD (i.e. to mortality or morbidity) but to the impact of control measures taken to control its spread 
and to changes in behaviour, caused by fear of the disease. Markets were disrupted by the closure of borders, 
including to trade; difficulties in internal trade because of travel restrictions, checkpoints and fear; and problems for 
retailers, due to fear and the loss of purchasing power. The economic impact was widespread, with little geographic 
association between the incidence of Ebola cases and declines in economic activity. It is important to put into context 
the high numbers of people deemed to be highly food insecure (over 2m, see above). Peak food insecurity was 
recorded in September-October 2015, i.e. months after the epidemic was largely over and when economic activity 
was already beginning to recover. This, though, is the annual hungry season, just before the next harvest is due and 
when heavy rains make many rural areas quite inaccessible for food markets. The analysis of acute food insecurity 
by same sources in May 2015 (when the epidemic was almost over in Liberia and Sierra Leone) attributed less than 
a quarter of the acute food insecurity to EVD in Guinea and Liberia and less than a third in Sierra Leone (FAO 
May 2015). Economic slowdown in China and the collapse of global commodity prices led to an almost total collapse 
in production, in particular of rubber (10% of the economy of Liberia in 2014) and iron (18% of the economy of 
Sierra Leone in 2014). This had a greater economic impact than EVD, both on the national economy as a whole and 
as a cause of acute household food insecurity. Liberia’s GDP remained flat in 2015 with EVD, but suffered a 
 




significant contraction in 2016, due to capital flight and a fall in private investment as a result of the collapse of 
prices from rubber and mining. 
Food insecurity and prices: Food insecurity was heightened because food prices increased, mainly because of 
difficulties with trade. Price rises varied from around 30% (e.g. for imported rice in the Sierra Leonean capital) to 
100% in more distant areas where supply chains were longer and more disrupted after the closure of borders. There 
were particular hardships for some quarantined areas where community sharing was no longer possible and the 
supply of food to the quarantined was insufficient. Fewer traders were operating, partly because of restrictions (e.g. 
closed markets, checkpoints, border closures) but also because of fear. This particularly affected perishable products 
such as vegetables. However, price rises were relatively short-lived and by 2015 prices had stabilised. 
Agricultural production and incomes: Agricultural production in 2014 declined (on average by under 10%, but 
locally by up to around 20%) despite favourable growing conditions, mainly due to disturbances with the movement 
of agricultural labour at the beginning of the agricultural season (March-May). Agricultural income declined more 
due to market disruptions and collapse in demand, especially for perishable crops. The reduction in number of 
traders may also have reduced farmers’ bargaining power. Some longer market chain sectors (e.g. cocoa, animal 
products) were affected more than others (e.g. maize, cassava), e.g. due to reduced purchasing power of consumers, 
reliance on feed imports, exports, etc. However, the overall impact on farm-gate prices was small. By 2015 the 
number of rice traders had normalised. 
Adaptation/mitigation: There was evidence of some adaptation and resilience, which softened the impact. For 
example, many market traders began selling from home. However, there was little evidence that people moved 
sectors or adapted their work type in the face of the crisis. Changes were made in consumption patterns, and new 
trade routes were developed (e.g. through Mali). Coping mechanisms were similar in urban and rural areas, and are 
similar to those found in most food security crises: reducing consumption, including a reduction in diet diversity, 
borrowing, using savings (including selling livestock), sending children to stay with relatives, delaying investments. 
Between 35%–65% of households reported using each of these. 
Gender impacts: Because the most-affected sectors in the informal economy are dominated by women’s 
participation (retail marketing, cooked food), they were affected more than men by the economic disturbance. 
Teenage pregnancies increased during Ebola, which led to a drop in post-crisis school enrolment. There was also an 
increase in transactional sex among older women in areas unaffected by Ebola. However, there was reduced fertility 
overall (UNDP). 
Children: Schools were closed for months. Most primary school children returned after the epidemic but drop-out 
rate from secondary was high (27% did not return). 
Recovery: Economic recovery was fast. 2015/16 harvests were good. By beginning of 2016, household incomes were 
back at pre-EVD levels (FEWSNET). Other non-EVD factors became important (see above). International trade had 
resumed by end of 2015. The speed of recovery was not a surprise. Productive assets and productive capacity had 
not been lost in EVD, despite warnings from aid agencies that farmers had eaten their seeds as a result of EVD and 
would be unable to produce. (In this, EVD is unlike the AIDS epidemic, which involved sales of productive assets for 
repeated medical care). Agricultural producers only needed access to planting material (which is rarely difficult for 
farmers) and possibly cash to pay agricultural labour, depending on how mutual labour was organised. Recovery 
was similar in the informal economy: as soon as there was demand, it bounced back very fast. Economies grew in 




insecurity across the region was minimal. Long-term trends showing a decline in stunting and acute malnutrition 
were not impacted by EVD. Residual poverty remains post-EVD– just as it preceded EVD. 
Responses: content 
a) General 
Control measures needed for EVD were well-known from previous isolated outbreaks. They include diagnosis and 
contact tracing; isolation of patient and quarantine of contacts; safe burials; public health information on safe 
behaviour. 
Focus in the beginning was a top-down, medical response. But this was ineffective due to low trust in government, 
lack of previous experience with Ebola, and lack of community engagement, including insensitive details (e.g. colour 
of body bags). 
Contact tracing in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia was difficult, mainly due to economic and social population 
mobility patterns, as well as fear-induced movements. The West Africa outbreak was the first time Ebola had 
reached highly urbanised areas, complicating matters further. When intensive community follow up was eventually 
done on contact tracing, many contacts had not been on initial lists. Stigma/fear provided disincentive to come 
forward, leading to unreliable data on caseloads. 
Some whole communities were placed in quarantine as well as affected households. Some in quarantine were not 
given adequate support for their food supply, leading to some people escaping quarantines. In some cases, mistrust 
of all authorities led to food aid distributions being met with violence, of fears that the food had been poisoned. 
As the importance of social understanding and treating people with respect became more accepted, the way in which 
communities were engaged with changed (e.g. engaging traditional healers, using youth as peer educators), the 
response was much more successful and the epidemic was gradually brought under control. 
This allowed Sierra Leone and Guinea to move from district-level quarantines to micro-cerclage approach once 
transmission dynamics were better understood. Behaviour-centred interventions also proved more scalable than 
medical ones. 
Isolation units and field hospitals were set up in late 2014/early 2015, but by then the chain of transmission had 
more or less been broken, although isolated outbreaks continued to occur until the end of 2015. 
b) Food security and agriculture 
Livelihood responses came late, when EVD was already peaking or afterwards. 
Market support was not a major humanitarian focus in 2014. Disruption to markets was the big issue, but not 
addressed by any interventions – beyond some grants to individual traders in 2015. No documents were found 
analysing how market disruption could be minimised during EVD. 
Most international assistance for livelihoods (covering agriculture and food security) was delivered in 2015, and 
much geared at supporting recovery. However, the recovery in 2015 was very widespread, far beyond the coverage 
of aid projects. There is little evidence that support given in the name of recovery made any significant difference to 
the speed or extent of recovery. 
We found little publicly available documentation about what non-humanitarian actors were doing to support 




The content of livelihood support was similar to that found in most humanitarian response. Cash assistance was 
prominent. Otherwise, interventions were from the usual list of seed distributions, disseminating standard technical 
agricultural messages, support to village coops and some ‘livelihood diversification’. 
There is very little evidence about effectiveness of different livelihood support interventions. Evaluations are rare 
and those that exist are poor on impact assessment – almost nothing has a control, which is critical to understanding 
if any improvements have anything to do with an intervention, since projects were taking place at a time of general 
recovery. The economies of the three countries all bounced back very quickly. Cash assistance was certainly 
important – if targeted well. However, it is less clear if the various projects distributing seeds and tools, or creating 
farmer groups, had a major influence on the speed of recovery. 
Responses: process, implementation 
WHO recognised scale of pandemic much too late (7th August, 4 months after MSF calling it an emergency), leading to 
delayed response by DFID, USAID, etc. Prompt responses in Nigeria and Senegal were far more effective. WHO 
recognised its failings in October (in a leaked report). 
Funds to response came very late. Pledges were made late, but arrival of funding only took off in Dec as epidemic 
peaked. Response at its height in 2015, when it was tailing off. 
Agencies gradually recognised importance of being flexible. Ebola was different from other crises, since it evolved 
gradually and in uncharted ways. But data on the spread of EVD and mortality rates was a significant bottleneck. You 
cannot be proactive if you do not know what is going on. It took a long time before responders had the data that they 
needed. 
Required local technical knowledge in epidemiology, especially adapting existing competencies to new situation (e.g. 
Cholera in Sierra Leone). 
Response had a negative impact on health care for everyone else. Aid support for health care was almost entirely for 
EVD during 2014. There was a decrease in normal vaccinations, on those seeking treatment for malaria, etc, and on 
number of women giving birth in medical facilities. But no data exists on what impact this had on health of babies or 
on maternal mortality. 
Cash transfers to Ebola victims and survivors seen as effective in rebuilding livelihoods, particularly as they were 
stigmatised. Various aid agencies also provided food and non-food items to quarantined households (DFID, USAID), 
but also cash transfers to people (USAID) or businesses (DFID). 
Important lesson: front-line workers need looking after, including rotation, support and recognition of dangers they 
run from both EVD and angry communities. Like COVID-19, healthcare workers and carers treating Ebola were at 
particular danger of mortality. There was a significant need of PPE. And they need paying. People working on burials 
in Sierra Leone stopped when they were not paid. 
Coordination was a huge problem, especially between the medical/epidemiological and the humanitarian 
responders. Tensions between UNMEER and UN agencies used to taking the lead in humanitarian crises. UN agencies 
complained of being side-lined and their capacities not fully exploited – though UNMEER only established on 18th 
Sept, largely in response to the lack of leadership then prevailing. 





The impact of the epidemic on food security will be related much more closely with the duration of the epidemic in 
any country than on its severity (number of cases or fatalities). Measures taken to control the epidemic will be the 
major determinant of the epidemic’s impact on food security. A top-down approach to enforcing behaviour change is 
likely to be counter-productive, and to delay the time when the epidemic is brought under control. If top-down and 
insensitive measures are used which do not treat people with respect and as active agents in the control of the 
disease, this will thus increase the impact of the epidemic on food security. 
Many of the lessons which had been learned in previous epidemics of Ebola (in DR Congo, Uganda, etc.) were not 
applied and had to be relearned in West Africa at great cost. It cannot be taken for granted that these lessons, many 
of which are highly relevant to COVID-19, will be recognised and applied in 2020. The control of COVID-19 is likely to 
be harder than EVD in some respects: asymptomatic transmission occurs, it is more infectious, diagnosis is harder 
without testing. This makes the basic strategy for controlling epidemics (case identification, contact tracing, ensuring 
isolation) much harder. 
There are signs that lessons have still not been learned that epidemics are controlled better through constructive 
engagement with people than by heavy-handed, top-down and authoritarian enforcement of rules. As of 25th April 
2020, COVID-19 had killed 32 people in Nigeria (source: John Hopkins). By 15th April, the state’s armed forces had 
killed at least 18 in enforcing lockdown measures (source: National Human Rights Commission). 
Each country is different. The lack of trust in authorities was particularly low in war-torn Sierra Leone (as in DR 
Congo) and this had a huge influence on the spread of the disease. It is necessary to understand the history of the 
country in order to know how to respond. 
The delays in developing a coherent strategy for response are understandable, because of the almost irresistible 
pressure in an emergency to react quickly. Nonetheless, time invested in thinking through a strategy, in undertaking 
preparatory work, setting up data and information management systems and in establishing coordination structures 
will prove essential during the epidemic and should not be delayed by other pressures. It is necessary to be proactive 
and at the same time to recognise that events may not unfold as predicted. There is a need therefore to have a plan, 
and also to have a plan for changing the plan quickly. 
Decentralised response works best. Some guidelines need to come from centre and for some things a national 
approach and national policy is needed. But the more actors at sub-state level, from districts to communities to 
individuals, are empowered, the quicker, the more flexible, the more appropriate and the more effective will be the 
response. This applies both to measures to control the epidemic and to measures to ensure food security. 
Delays in addressing the other needs which arise as a result of the epidemic can have serious consequences, 
especially in societies where many people live a hand-to-mouth existence with almost no capacity to absorb any 
additional shocks. Action is needed to ensure the continued functioning of other health services, and of other basic 
services such as education, water, etc. There is a need to take measures to protect livelihoods as soon as these are 
impacted, e.g. with lockdown measures (see below). 
b) Food security and agriculture 
There is a general lack of documented evidence of the impact of livelihood interventions undertaken in the EVD 
epidemic. Evaluations rarely analysed impact with any rigour (e.g. claiming credit for changes without their being 




Livelihood interventions in the humanitarian sector were highly generic, which suggests that they were not 
necessarily addressing the actual problems faced by people. Apart from direct cash transfers based on household 
need, there is little documented evidence of what the actual constraints were. For example, distributions of 
agricultural inputs do not detail what assessments were made of farmers’ actual constraints in accessing inputs. The 
modality of intervention is almost never discussed in project documentation or evaluation. This does not only refer 
to the choice of in-kind food aid or cash transfers. Constraints to accessing agricultural inputs or to farmers’ ability to 
market their crops (for example) can be addressed in many ways, and the purported existence of a constraint may 
justify an intervention, but does not necessarily justify the intervention chosen. This distinction was not well 
considered by the humanitarian sector in the EVD crisis. The Global Humanitarian Response Plan for 2020 suggests 
that the same pattern of generic responses is likely to continue. 
There is generally a need to question the expertise of humanitarian agencies in supporting post-crisis recovery. 
There is an equal need to expect a greater engagement of non-humanitarian actors in supporting recovery as the 
COVID-19 crisis recedes; for their interventions to be more explicit and their impact monitored; and for much 
greater dialogue between humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors on the development of a strategy for 
supporting recover and how it can best be implemented. This does not imply that recovery may not take place 
without external assistance. 
The predicted impact of COVID-19 on agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa, at 2.6-7%17 is slightly lower 
than was the impact of EVD (4% to 12%). This small loss of production is unlikely to have any measurable impact on 
food security at either population level or at household level. (Most of the poorest rural households depend heavily 
on paid labour rather than on production and thus do not depend so heavily on crop yields for food security.) 
Agricultural production is likely to recover fully in the first season after the epidemic is over, unless it is long-lasting. 
It is highly unlikely that difficulties in accessing planting material will be a constraint to recovery. 
Disturbance to markets is likely to be the critical economic disturbance that affects most people's livelihoods. Heavy-
handed measures to control the spread of COVID-19 should be avoided as far as possible. Closing international 
borders to trade in the EVD epidemic had a serious impact, and fortunately it seems that this lesson has been 
learned. 
There is a danger that the top-down authoritarian approach to public health is being repeated in some countries. 
This has direct relevance for market activity and food security. EVD showed that communities are capable of 
working together with public health experts to devise their own ways of working that meet their own needs and also 
the needs of public health. This creativity should be engaged, for example to design ways to keep more markets more 
open in safer ways. The best outcome for mortality overall will have to find the balance between minimising the risk 
of transmission while finding a way to maximise how much economic activity can be maintained. 
Distribution of food proved critical to supporting people who were in quarantine or who could not access food 
markets for other reasons. However, in-kind aid did not support market activity, and there is no reason to believe 
that there was any reason to give food assistance using in-kind modalities (rather than cash) for the majority of 
recipients. There is no documentation of any analysis that led to decisions about the choice of modality, although the 
criteria for making the choice were largely accepted in the humanitarian community years before.18 Other studies 
 
17 Source: Albert Zeufack, Royal Economic Society webinar on Developing Nations and COVID 19, 23 April 2020 [https://www.res.org.uk/resource-
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have shown how far aid can have a negative impact in depressing market activity further, retarding recovery and 
concentrating the benefits of trade very narrowly in a few elite hands. This lesson may need re-learning: several 
countries are already implementing in-kind food assistance projects, even where food markets are open. 
Market chains can be very adaptable, but even when supply chains do continue to operate, there may be many 
livelihoods lost as a result of the disturbance. The continued supply of a commodities in a capital city market is not 
necessarily an indicator that livelihoods have not been destroyed. Supporting continued market functioning is likely 
to be the most important intervention in the economic domain during the COVID-19 epidemic. This requires 
decentralised ways of working that can appreciate the business workings of people with little financial capital, who 
depend on credit financing from within the value chain and not from financial institutions. 
The aid discourse can easily be dominated by highly incomplete narratives. Food insecurity and poverty have many 
overlapping and interacting causes, yet there is a tendency to focus only on the most visible and, in the case of 
humanitarian actors, only the causes related to what has been defined as a humanitarian crisis. Aid documentation 
for 2014-15 only discusses food insecurity in relation to EVD. There is no mention of commodity prices, and the loss 
of income and employment in rubber or iron. (strikingly, the report by FAO that EVD was a minor contributor to 
acute food insecurity is not reflected even in FAO’s project documentation.) This probably led to serious problems of 
structural acute poverty being ignored, while resources were spent on largely ineffectual interventions of a 
humanitarian nature. There is a risk that such a blinkered approach to food insecurity will be repeated in 2020, if aid 
actors who come in to respond to a new crisis do not have a wider perspective on the challenges being faced in the 
affected country and only focus narrowly on COVID-19, rather than on the wider network of causes of the problems 
they try to address, particularly in the area of food security. For example, in areas affected by the current locust 
threat, this is likely to be a far greater threat to rural livelihoods. 
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C. Ebola DRC 
What happened? Causes, Consequences, Nature of Shock 
Causes: the disease was first reported in early 2018 and an outbreak was confirmed in August 2018. By March 2020, 
there had been around 3,500 cases of EVD and 2,300 deaths, making it the second largest outbreak of EVD after the 
West African pandemic of 2013-16. A small number of cases emerged in mid-April 2020, dashing hopes that the 
epidemic had been squashed, and it remained unclear at the time of writing whether these were isolated cases. The 
disease was caused by the Zaire Ebola virus strain, which is the most lethal known strain, originating in fruit bats 
which are widely eaten as bush meat. Combined with the heavy-handed response to the disease by government, 
NGOs, and the international community, which created mistrust and a reluctance to seek treatment, this led to a very 
high case fatality rate of above 60%. Delaying medical treatment, as with many other diseases, reduces the chance of 
a cure, and for EVD the odds of death increase by 11% per day without treatment. 
Economic impact: as this epidemic was ongoing in April 2020 and focus had shifted to COVID-19 by March 2020, the 
economic impact of this particular epidemic remains relatively poorly researched and documented. However, there 
were detrimental disruptions to agricultural labour, travel restrictions, and the closure of markets, which resulted in 
many small businesses shutting down and – seemingly – a decline in investment. There has also been a decline in 
cross-border trade and business-related travel. A significant consequence of the epidemic was the damage caused to 
the health system (due to mistrust, death of health workers, funding being diverted to EVD), resulting in relatively 
simple illnesses going untreated and leading to excess morbidity and mortality. 
Cause of economic impact: the economic impact of the disease itself was relatively small as of a population of over 10 
million people, only 3,500 cases were identified, i.e. less than 0.04% of the population became infected. Control 
measures were stringent and often enforced violently, which led to changes in behaviour and the cessation of normal 
economic activity. This, coupled with fear-based behaviour changes, is likely to have been much more detrimental. 
Food insecurity and prices: reports suggest significant increases in child malnutrition, due to disruption of 
agricultural labour, a reduction in trading activities, and fears around the consumption of bushmeat (Rohwerder, 
2020). Food prices also increased, by approximately 15 to 20% in 2019, though it is unclear whether this can be 
attributed to EVD and containment measures or whether this was due to crop pests and armed conflict (FAO, 2019). 
Gender impacts: women, reportedly, were at increased risk of infection due to caring duties, lack of decision-making 
power particularly with regards to sex. Their livelihoods were also impacted by changes in time-use and quarantine, 
which resulted in many resorting to risky coping strategies, including transactional sex. Finally, reduced access to 
sexual and reproductive health services reportedly caused increased morbidity and mortality among women. 
Responses: Content 
The initial response to the epidemic was driven by the desire to contain the disease geographically as much as to 
prevent community transmissions. The result was a heavy-handed response, which included: 
• Having armed forces accompany health workers to collect the deceased and quarantine contacts; 
• Taking Ebola patients to isolated facilities where family were not allowed to visit them, created the impression 
that sick relatives were being kidnapped and brought back dead. Given that most sought treatment long after 
symptoms had started, the majority did not return alive from treatment centres; 
• Preventing travel and closing borders, resulting in increased population movement (including across borders) 
as people sought to escape quarantined areas; 




• Using material from West African, without adapting it to Congolese cultural norms. One example: a poster 
depicted women involved in preparing a body for funeral, which is taboo in DRC and so caused a great deal of 
confusion and mistrust; 
• Failure to recognise that EVD was not the only or even biggest concern of local populations. Concerns that were 
as or more important than EVD to local populations included: reproductive health services, armed conflict, 
other diseases that were causing morbidity and mortality but were less likely to spread to the West, 
maintaining livelihoods, paying for school fees, etc. (In the absence of EVD, health care spending in DRC is $21 
per year. During the epidemic, the international community spent hundreds of millions of dollars in Eastern 
DRC which has a population of perhaps 10 million people. This did the opposite of engender trust); 
• Excluding traditional healers from EVD response both increased mistrust and meant that their skills and social 
capital were not used; 
• Poor disease prevention protocols meant that infections in hospitals were common: infections in hospitals 
were the second most common source of transmission, after caring for a sick relative) (Roberts et al., 2020). 
There is not much numerical analysis on the impact of the epidemic, but particularly the secondary impacts of the 
disease are reported to have been significant and local populations were left to foot the high costs of containment 
without receiving adequate health care or compensation: 
• Social impacts: trust declined in an area already suffering from conflict due to restrictions on movement/fear of 
infection; stigmatisation of survivors; school closures; greater disease burden for women; 
• Health care provision beyond EVD declined and in some cases became very difficult to access. This affected 
pregnant women and those needing sexual and reproductive health services in particular; 
• Increased distrust stoked further political tensions and insecurity; 
• Loss of labour, particularly in the agricultural sector; 
• Limits on movement impacted all sectors, but was particularly detrimental to traders (often women); 
• Stigmatisation/fear of survivors impacted individual household’s ability to recover economically (Rohwerder, 
2020); 
• Influx of cash into the local economy generated opportunities for economic and sexual exploitation 
(Rohwerder, 2020); 
• It was easier for young people to find work than their elders in the response programme which meant that 
“traditional leadership structures have been increasingly challenged, and inter-generational tensions may 
result in challenges for participatory decision-making” (Rohwerder, 2020); 
• Cost of health care increased as nurses were not paid and so they began charging patients (Rohwerder, 2020); 
• Dramatic increase in malnourished children, due to neglect of fields by those working in the response, lack of 
manpower in some families, self-isolation, higher wages due to EVD response hiring large numbers of people, 
reduced market trading, fear around bushmeat (Rohwerder, 2020); 
• 13% of fatalities were health care workers, which had a significant impact on the ability of the health care 
system to recover, impacting long-term economic growth (Fanning, 2018). 
Impacts on women were particularly detrimental: 
• Women were at increased risk of infection, due to their caring duties, food preparation, types of work, lack of 
decision-making power with regards to sex, transactional sex to make up for lost income; 
• Time-use: quarantine often increased women’s domestic work, including caring for the sick; 




• Reduced access to sexual and reproductive health services: initially, as EVD can cause miscarriage any type of 
vaginal bleeding was treated as a suspected EVD case, including the imposition of draconian measures. 
The high cost of prevention measures were finally recognised in mid-2019, which resulted in a change in the tone of 
interventions, which gradually earned the trust of local populations. 
The most important lessons absorbed from West Africa were: 
• More humane treatment of EVD patients, including allowing visitors to the sick and those in isolation; 
• Collaboration with the community to find safe burial rituals that fulfilled ritual needs and did not cause 
contamination risk; 
• Not simply enforcing quarantine on those who had been in touch with someone who had EVD, but providing 
them with adequate food/financial resources and vaccine; 
• Discuss vaccination, including why it was available to some but not everyone, how it works, etc. to prevent 
rumours about vaccines causing death or infertility; 
• Provision of psychosocial services (mainly grief counselling) to traumatised communities and families; 
• Providing support to survivors who were experiencing the non-infectious, but chronic stage of EVD that lasts 
for up to a year after the main disease has been successfully treated. 
Responses: Process, implementation 
Perhaps because the delayed response in West Africa caused unnecessary deaths and, importantly, the spread of the 
disease beyond Africa, an early and aggressive intervention was launched in DRC by the international community. 
While the main lessons from the Mano River EVD pandemic for social scientists was the need to work with the 
cultural grain, it is possible that the international community absorbed another lesson: namely the need to act early 
and aggressively in order prevent the spread of the disease regionally and (probably more importantly) inter-
continentally. It was only sometime into the epidemic that lessons around community involvement were picked up 
in DRC. 
All of this created the (not entirely false) impression that neither the Congolese government nor the international 
community were really interested in the health and well-being of Congolese populations, resulting in rumours that 
the international community was making money from the Ebola effort and/or that the government was trying to 
eradicate the Nande people with EVD (Fanning, 2018). The other – correct – story that circulated was that the 
international community was only providing such resources to the region to prevent the disease spreading to the 
West and people felt that they were treated as disease vectors, rather than human beings. 
About a year into the epidemic, the government and internationally community realised that stringent and 
insensitive control measures continued to lead to counter-productive outcomes, including those with symptoms 
avoiding treatment, large numbers of people attempting to escape to the safety of Rwanda and Uganda, or refusal to 
allow safe burial teams to take corpses away. Once this was recognised, lessons from West Africa were absorbed, 
experts who had been involved in the successful stages of the West African outbreak were consulted, and – with the 
help of local communities – EVD cases started to decline with local community’s assistance. 
Lessons from DRC 
‘We care about Africans only when they get diseases that can harm us, not when they are dying of disease that we can treat 




Engage with communities to devise actions that are informed by local knowledge, cultural needs, and 
which are owned by the communities 
• Same as in West Africa: Be nice to people!!! Treat them as humans, rather than dangerous, contagious, 
infectious disease vectors who are too stupid to prevent illness themselves. 
• Be prepared. There will be more EVD epidemics and we know where they are likely to happen. Consider how to 
respond with communities in advance of an outbreak. Involve community leaders and traditional healers in 
that planning process. 
• Engage anthropologists to avoid generic responses to calls for participation and respect of local cultures and to 
understand the power mechanisms/underlying logics behind resistance to control measures (Kelly, 2020). 
• Make sure that women are meaningfully involved in planning. 
• Train healthcare workers not only in disease control, but in participatory epidemiology. 
Communicate sensitively: 
• Avoid militaristic language – battle/fight/survivor, etc. – as these may be misunderstood, particularly in 
translation (Roberts et al., 2020). 
• Provide practical information – including how to care for the sick and bury the dead – rather than detailed 
information on the disease itself (Kelly, 2020). 
Ensure adequate medical and public health response 
• Protect health care workers from the disease (Fanning, 2018) and ensure that health care providers are paid 
adequately so that they do not resort to charging patients (Rohwerder, 2020). 
• Focus on the provision of basic health and WASH services, both before and during a pandemic. 
• Vaccines seem to be effective but without trust, people will be reluctant to submit to vaccination protocols. 
• Train health care workers in basic triage: EVD symptoms are similar (but not identical) to symptoms 
associated with early pregnancy complications, which can cause much confusion (Roberts et al., 2020). 
Protect livelihoods of affected populations 
• Limit control measures as far as possible as these may be much worse for livelihoods than the disease itself 
(Rohwerder, 2020). Significant impacts on agricultural production, were caused mainly by control measures, 
and could have been limited (Rohwerder, 2020). 
• Ensure that the primary motivation of control measures is not to protect the global north, but to deal with the 
epidemic locally. That means ensuring that affected communities receive food aid that is sufficient not only for 
the required quarantine, but also for as long as it may take to re-establish an income stream and providing 
quality health care for a wide range of medical needs (Roberts et al., 2020). 
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D. HPAI – Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
What happened? Causes, Consequences, Nature of Shock 
“The world was waiting for a pandemic… and I think that just because people were waiting for this event to occur, when it 
did occur, everybody capitalised on it” – key informant quote (Forster, 2012) 
Causes: H5N1 was first isolated from a farmed goose in Guangdong, China, in 1996. In 1997, a similar strain of flu 
resulted in outbreaks among poultry in Hong Kong, necessitating mass culling. Human infections of H5N1 were first 
reported in a family in Hong Kong in 2003, but no further cases were reported in humans until December of that 
year in Vietnam. Thailand and Vietnam both had further cases in early 2004, while there were significant poultry 
infections in Vietnam, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos and further culls were deemed necessary. Following 
approximately 30 human deaths and one incidence of human-to-human transmission in January 2005, countries that 
were able to afford it and the WHO began stockpiling Tamiflu. Since then, N5N1 has continued to cause disease in 
both farmed and wild birds across much of Asia and Europe, West Africa, Sudan and Egypt, and the occasional 
human infection and death. However, very few human cases have been reported globally since 2010. 
Economic impact and causes: the H5N1 pandemic caused fewer avian cases than feared, and very few human cases. 
Some, therefore, consider this largely a veterinary rather than a human epidemic. Direct economic consequences 
were limited to the loss of livestock by poultry farmers, mainly in South-East Asia, where damage to livelihoods were 
limited due to farmers’ established coping strategies. Nevertheless, Thailand saw its GDP decline by 1.5%, Vietnam 
between 0.3 and 1.8% and Thailand’s agriculture growth was halved in the years of the outbreak (Rushton, Viscarra, 
Guerne Bleich, & Mcleod, 2005). However, economic damage was not due to avian flu, but due to tourists staying 
away for fear of HPAI (ibid.) An outbreak in Nigeria resulted in the most significant event in Africa, with economic 
impact resulting from fear-based responses, when the sale of egg and chicken fell by more than 80%. Nearly half of 
poultry farm workers on unaffected farms lost their jobs. Four months later, sales were still <50% of baseline 
(Breiman et al, 2007). 
Food insecurity and prices: impact on prices was limited to (usually localised) decreases in chicken and egg prices, as 
consumers chose other animal products over poultry. 
Agricultural production and incomes: poultry farmers were affected, mainly in South-East Asia. However, studies by 
the FAO suggest that the impact was limited on livelihoods, as livestock rearing usually represented only one of 
many income-generating activities for affected households (Rushton, et al. 2005). 
Adaptation and mitigation: this was limited to farmers shifting production away from poultry to other livestock or 
crops. 
Recovery: where studies exist – for SE Asia – recovery for individual households was reportedly very rapid, often 
within the same season (Rushton et al, 2005). At the national level, recovery was largely determined by how rapidly 
tourists returned to the country after the outbreak. 
Responses: content 
The primary response was the culling of livestock, as human cases were limited, and the aim was to prevent a more 
virulent form of the virus being transmitted to humans. There was some conflict between veterinarians and 
livelihoods experts, with the former emphasising culling as the main strategy and livelihoods experts being reluctant 
to take such drastic measures without more information on the nature of the disease. “The outbreak narrative may 




different approaches are needed: long-term prevention and managing endemism. Emphasising the eradication 
pathway may be impossible” (Scoones & Forster, 2008). Nevertheless, culling remained the primary response. 
The hoarding of vaccines, ARVs, and other scarce resources, was common among rich countries (and to a lesser 
degree the WHO) benefitting pharmaceutical companies but possibly hampering global preparedness as only rich 
countries were able to stockpile (Scoones & Forster, 2008). 
Many countries drafted national preparedness plans, though many were found to be inadequate by the WHO, 
particularly in Africa (Sambala et al., 2018). National preparedness plans require five functional components: 
planning and coordination; situation and monitoring; prevention and containment; health system response; 
communication. Across Africa the WHO found a lack of preparation to ensure business continuity, sub-national 
planning, operational details, collaboration with neighbouring countries, web reporting systems, plans for recruiting 
volunteers from local communities. 
Responses: process, implementation 
Pandemic modelling (by Ferguson from Imperial College among many others) demonstrated the potential spread 
and devastation of HPAI. However, these models did not consider socio-economic class and livelihoods strategies, 
most likely overestimating the speed of spread (Leach & Scoones, 2013). These models also fed into well-established 
narratives surrounding flu and other epidemics, which creates the impression that disease emerge from dangerous 
places and from people who are ‘different’ to ‘us’. Such narratives pave the way for draconian measures, which may 
be more detrimental than the epidemic itself, while also capturing the imagination of the general public which may 
ensure that resources are made available (Leach & Scoones, 2013; Scoones & Forster, 2008). In the case of avian flu, 
this also meant that the costs of protecting the West was borne by South-East Asia – and particularly its smallholder 
farmers – where culling was the primary policy response and justified by supposedly ‘neutral’ modelling and the 
WHO’s narratives of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (ibid). 
At the national level, government responses were hampered by limited knowledge about the effectiveness of policy 
options: there is not enough information on how diseases spread (beyond simplistic modelling) making it hard for 
governments to choose between policy options. In addition, governments frequently lack technical and financial 
management capacity (particularly in Ministries of Agriculture) to respond effectively and with pro-poor policies 
(Ear, 2009). 
Many countries drafted preparedness plans at the national level. Most are lacking in detail at the sub-national level 
and/or are unrealistic (Ortu et al 2008, WHO 2011, Sambala et al 2018). However, narratives around HPAI have 
prepared the world for the fact that there will, one day, be a global pandemic that will cause significant disease and 
economic damage (WHO, 2018). 
Avian flu demonstrated – yet again – that the ability to control epidemics depends on state capacity. The ability to 
control HPAI was severely limited by veterinary extension services which were decimated by SAPs and which were 
no longer trusted by farmers, meaning that disease outbreaks were often not reported to the authorities quickly 
(Rushton et al., 2005). Low levels of state capacity, manifested in poor service provision, reduce trust in the state and 
increase reluctance to report animal disease to governments. (There are clear parallels with the far more deadly 
epidemics of EVD in DRC and in West Africa in 2013/15). 




Most of the lessons from the HPAI pandemic are long-term and around preparedness and developing capacity in 
systems to deal with pandemics more generally. Lessons with some relevance to the current COVID-19 pandemic 
include: 
The recommendations and narratives that emerge from mathematical models of epidemics are only one possible 
epidemiological story and are often poor at predicting actual outcomes (Scoones & Forster, 2008). Context matters: 
the same disease will spread in very different ways in different societies, and within societies in different socio-
economic and cultural groups. Differences include socio-economic inequality, livelihoods strategies, gender, religion, 
and cultural norms. Models that do not incorporate these dimensions are unlikely to be helpful for determining 
appropriate control measures and for predicting the impact of a pandemic on the economy or food and nutrition 
security; 
It is important to acknowledge and treat seriously that communities have their own narratives about the disease 
based on their experiences. These narratives matter, because they shed light on how the disease behaves in this 
particular group. Control mechanisms that run counter to these local contexts and narratives are likely to be 
ineffectual because they do not address how the disease spreads and affects people and because they are likely to 
engender mistrust. 
Dealing with pandemics means dealing with an unknown disease and so decision-making in a situation of 
uncertainty and ignorance. This requires supporting state capacity to ensure that policymakers have access to 
analyses that bring together the micro-experiences of those affected by the disease – such as a country’s poultry 
farmers or certain religious groups – with the bigger epidemiological picture (the “missing middle” of of skilled 
advisors) (Scoones, 2019). 
Dealing with pandemics often means dealing with a novel disease (or at least a new variant of a well-known disease) 
and so decisions must be made in a situation of uncertainty and ignorance. To do this well, state capacity is essential: 
this means that policymakers who have access to medical and mathematical analysis and can bring these together 
with the micro-experiences of those affected by the disease – such as a country’s poultry farmers or certain religious 
groups – with the bigger epidemiological picture are essential (Bazeley & Macleaod, 2006; Scoones, 2019). Scoones 
refers to this as the “missing middle” of skilled advisors (Scoones, 2019). 
To prevent zoonotic disease that may affect humans, trusted state-run veterinary services are essential (Rushton et 
al, 200%). This also allows any compensation schemes to build on farmers’ existing risk management strategies 
(Roland-Holst et al., 2008). 
It is always critical to ask in whose interests particular control measures are being taken and how their costs and 
benefits are shared. Pandemic responses would do well to take the needs of the poorest, most vulnerable as its 
starting point. Focus would then be on disease control, agricultural production techniques, extension advice, etc. 
rather than disease prevention in the world’s richest countries (Forster, 2012). 
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E. Swine Flu 
Causes 
In the spring of 2009, a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus outbreak was first detected among people in North America. 
Although the exact origin of the virus remains unknown, many agree that the source of the outbreak was an 
industrial swine farm in northern Mexico, from where it earned the name “swine flu”. 
The virus is complex and contains genetic material from swine, avian and human influenza from different parts of 
the world. Like COVID-19, it is respiratory and can be spread through close contact between humans, pigs, birds and 
other species. However, the spread of the virus is almost certainly linked to humans. People working in industrial 
swine farms initially spread the virus across North America, including to pigs and humans in rural locations. Human-
to-human transmission then helped the virus spread elsewhere. 
Confusion over the virus’ origins, its similarity to other strains of flu (both swine and human) and poor surveillance 
allowed the virus to spread quickly among humans. It eventually affected 208 countries and became the dominant 
strain of the following flu season. It is estimated that 151,000-575,000 people died of the virus globally. While this 
falls within the lower end of the range of annual deaths caused by seasonal influenza, the virus was unusual in that it 
primarily affected children as well as young and middle-aged adults. Typical flu epidemics see 70-90% of deaths in 
the 65+ age category, whereas people aged under 65 accounted for an estimated 80% of deaths from swine flu. 
Economic impact 
The total direct economic impact of the pandemic was not much different from typical flu epidemics, causing losses 
of between 0.5% to 1.5% of GDP in affected countries. Apart from Mexico, South American countries were affected 
most due to the outbreak of the virus coinciding with an unusually cold winter in the Southern Hemisphere. 
In addition, poor coordination and communications based on inadequate knowledge led to avoidable but short-lived 
economic impacts on certain sectors. In June, the WHO declared a first global pandemic for 40 years since the 1968 
Hong Kong Flu. In the media, comparisons were made to the Spanish flu outbreak in 1918, which was also attributed 
to a strain of H1N1. Fuelled by the “swine flu” misnomer, there was also a widespread and persistent belief that the 
virus could be contracted by consuming pork. Even after the pandemic, up to a fifth of Chinese people and 13% of 
Americans still believed so. Fear of the virus, partly stoked by governments issuing travel warnings and trade 
embargoes, led to changes in consumer behaviour, including a reduced demand for pork/pork products, tourism and 
hospitality. These behavioural changes hit countries linked to the source of the outbreak more than others. 
Agricultural production and food prices 
The North American pork sector was impacted most by the pandemic through reduced domestic demand and the 
imposition of over 20 import restrictions on pork or pork products, including important markets such as China or 
Russia. These embargoes were imposed despite no clear evidence that the virus could be spread by meat trade or 
consumption. Pork prices and futures fell by 15% and exports by 31-36% in the US, resulting in an estimated cost of 
between $200-400 million to the country’s pork industry (similar estimates are unavailable for Canada or Mexico). 
There were knock-on effects on feed markets, but these have not been quantified. 
Trade embargoes probably helped some countries protect domestic pork markets and prices. Egypt and Norway put 
in place plans for mass culling with Egyptian authorities eventually slaughtering 300,000 pigs in May 2009. No 
compensation was offered, primarily affecting poor, marginalised communities who raise pigs. In Canada, a pig 
farmer voluntarily slaughtered his herd without compensation after it was infected with swine flu in the early stages 




Impacts on (a) women and (b) children 
There is no evidence that women were affected by the outbreak more than men were, although the virus did 
primarily affect younger populations, including children. 
Recovery 
The US Department for Agriculture implemented a purchase programme to help boost prices, buying over $200 
million worth of pork and pork products. 
Public awareness campaigns on behalf of the US pork industry helped the market recovery relatively quickly (within 
4 months). Eventually, trade embargoes were also dropped. 
Governments around the world stockpiled medical supplies (vaccine, anti-virals such as Tamiflu and PPE) and up to 
600 million people were vaccinated. 
Lessons 
The virus was first detected among humans, even though it originated in animals. The impact of the virus could 
therefore have been mitigated through improved surveillance in livestock farms. Unlike avian flu (H5N1), swine 
farmers are not required to report cases of H1N1 to the OIE. This is because H1N1 is relatively common among pigs, 
and is not considered as virulent as H5N1. However, there is clearly a danger that the detection of a novel virus 
outbreak falls between the cracks, for instance where it contains genetic material from different strains as the “swine 
flu” pathogen did. Reporting guidelines need to be improved to prevent such gaps. 
In addition, there are economic disincentives for farmers to report cases voluntarily. Farmers are typically not 
compensated when their populations are culled or where other restrictions are placed on operations, leading to a 
loss in livelihoods. The response (culling) can typically cost more than the symptom (1-2 weeks of respiratory 
symptoms). Providing safety nets could be more effective in detecting initial disease outbreaks than enforced 
reporting. 
In Mexico, residents at the affected swine farm complained about wind blowing fetid air from industrial pig farms 
into their communities. If local knowledge and disease surveillance had been taken seriously, the outbreak could 
have been avoided. 
Improved international coordination and work with high reliability professionals could have prevented avoidable 
behavioural economic impacts. The OIE dismissed the outbreak as a public health/human crisis, whereas the WHO 
treated it as an animal/food chain crisis. The FAO was late to investigate the link between animal and people, leading 
to uncertainty and misinformed policy-making, such as the imposition of import restrictions, issuance of travel 
warnings and in one instance, mass culling. When OIE/FAO/WHO/WTO eventually issued a joint statement 
emphasising that pork was safe to consume, governments dropped these measures. Increasingly common zoonotic 







Nature of the shock: process, causes, consequences 
The first case of human immunodeficiency viruses leading to acquired immune-deficiency syndrome — HIV/AIDS — 
was reported in 1981, at the time a mysterious and novel disease. 
It is a viral infection which attacks and progressively weakens the immune system, so that increasingly infected 
persons become susceptible to opportunistic infections and cancers. It is these secondary complaints that lead in 
most cases to death, but usually only after 9 or more years since the initial infection by the virus. (Box A) The virus is 
transmitted through body fluids, including semen and blood, hence those most likely to be infected are: 
• Those having unprotected sex, especially if intercourse is rough causing blood to flow; 
• Intravenous drug users sharing needles where contaminated blood can transmit from one user to another; 
• Those receiving blood transfusions where the blood has been contaminated; and 
• Babies of infected mothers through birth fluids or breast milk. 
Box A The virus, the disease and transmission  
The human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) are two 
species of Lentivirus (a subgroup of retrovirus) that infect 
humans. Over time they cause acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS),[1][2] a condition in which progressive 
failure of the immune system allows life-threatening 
opportunistic infections and cancers to thrive.[3] Without 
treatment, average survival time after infection with HIV is 
estimated to be 9 to 11 years, depending on the HIV 
subtype.[4] 
 In most cases, HIV is a sexually transmitted infection and 
occurs by contact with or transfer of blood, pre-ejaculate, 
semen, and vaginal fluids. Non-sexual transmission can 
occur from an infected mother to her infant during 
pregnancy, during childbirth by exposure to her blood or 
vaginal fluid, and through breast milk.[7][8][9][10] 
Source: Wikipedia 
Because the first cases of HIV/AIDS were often male homosexuals and drug users, a stigma was attached to the 
disease so that some early sufferers were reluctant to admit their infection. 
Because it was soon evident that the virus was a slow killer, with treatments only able to ameliorate the secondary 
conditions arising from weakened immunity, it became a dreaded disease. A positive test for HIV was for many years 
an effective death sentence. 
By 2005, more than 40 million persons had been infected, of whom almost 26 million lived in sub-Saharan Africa, 
with particularly strong infection rates in southern Africa. By 2005, 28 million had died from the syndrome. At that 




By 2018, it was estimated that 37.2M persons were living with HIV, that new infections in 2018 were 1.8M and that 
0.8 million died from HIV/AIDS in that year. (UNAIDS estimates) 
The threat from HIV/AIDS has reduced owing to measures to reduce infections and to anti-retroviral therapy (ART) 
that can control viral loads and prevent the advance of the syndrome. In 2018, it was estimated that 23.3M persons 
were on ART, 62% of those living with the virus. 
Consequences 
From evidence of the impact HIV/AIDS on agricultural households carried out at village and district-level in Eastern 





Labour shortages in households living with HIV/AIDS arise when adults become unable to work through illness, as 
well as through the time taken to care by others to care for them. In time, labour is lost to premature deaths, and for 
others, to the time taken up by funerals and mourning rites. 
Lost time affects production because of the demography of HIV/AIDS. It mainly attacks prime-age, economically-
active adults, leaving only the elderly and children to replace the labour lost to agriculture. It also exacerbates the 
gender divisions of labour. Women are more likely to be infected with HIV than men, owing to their physiology and 
because they have less control over preventative methods. However, husbands with the virus tend to develop AIDS-
associated illnesses and die before their wives. This increases the number of female-headed households. Women 
take on most of the caring and usually attempt to compensate for the missing labour of their sick husbands. 
Reductions in time spent farming, however, are not always that marked. Some households affected by the disease are 




Loss of assets and capital 
Affected households often not only lose income owing to lost productive labour, but also face additional costs of 
medicine, fees to doctors or traditional healers, transport to health facilities and other items for the care of the sick. 
To make ends meet, households thus have to draw down on their assets. 
Savings and cash are usually the first to be depleted after the onset of AIDS. After this, items such as furniture, 
cooking utensils and clothes may be sold off. Finally, households may have to dispose of productive assets such as 
tools, draught animals, and even land ⎯ although in systems of communal tenure land sales may not be an option. 
Households lose both working capital and fixed capital. From the little evidence, the loss of capital can be heavy. In 
Western Kenya households that lost a member to disease spent US$460 a year on medical expenses and funerals: 
households with someone chronically sick spent almost US$200; while those households not directly affected spent 
just over US$20 a year. This was then reflected in clear differences in spending on farm inputs: unaffected 
households spent more, and were rewarded by higher returns to their labour and land. 
Widows may suffer further loss of assets. When male heads of household die, widows may be pressured to leave the 
fields to the late husband’s family. In some cases they may be obliged to return to their home village. 
Changing patterns of farming 
With less labour and working capital, and in some cases having sold off tools and livestock, affected households often 
have to adapt their farming. Less land may be tilled, leaving parts of the farm in fallow. Cropping patterns may switch 
towards food crops to assure survival, and towards crops for which there are lower peak demands for labour ⎯ for 
example, from maize to cassava and sweet potato. Cash crops are particularly likely to be abandoned when adult 
males fall sick, since they typically attend such crops and have the contacts to market the produce. 
Households may sell off large livestock, such as cattle, and use smaller stock units, such as goats or chickens, that can 
be reared closer to the homestead and be sold off in small quantities to release cash for purchases of medicines for 
the sick or for basic needs where regular sources of income are lost. 
Farming systems may also become simplified because when people die from AIDS. Agricultural knowledge and skills 
crucial for production are not passed down to the next generation. Furthermore, the context-specific, local 
knowledge that people use to respond to risks is also lost, as is understanding of local plant varieties. 
Thus the impact of the disease on affected households can be cumulative, cutting incomes, depriving them of assets, 
undermining coping mechanisms and leaving them ever more vulnerable. Poverty, if not outright destitution, and 
food insecurity seem the fate of many affected households. This has led to warnings of disaster: so-called ‘New 
Variant Famine’, when households affected by HIV/AIDS cannot cope with shocks such as harvest failure, leaving 
them to face destitution and famine. Fortunately studies report that this has not happened on any significant scale. 
Effects on rural communities 
The impact of HIV/AIDS is usually much heavier on persons and households that are poor and vulnerable. For 
example, in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe studies show that while poor households affected by the disease cut their 
fields by 40%, richer households cut the area farmed by just 1%. 
The epidemic opens up existing lines of cleavage and reflects existing patterns of vulnerability. Hence it may leave in 




In the wider community mutual support networks that offer some protection against calamity to individuals and 
households may wither in the face of an epidemic that creates heavier additional demands than the unaffected 
population can meet. 
Prominent community members, such as school teachers, may be particularly prone to infection ⎯ thanks largely to 
their mobility and relative wealth. Their loss can undermine the working of local organisations and institutions. 
Community-based management of natural resources, for example, depends on both effective leadership and on 
people having the time to participate in discussions ⎯ premises that are less plausible in the presence of HIV/AIDS. 
Less tangibly, the epidemic may sap morale, encourage despair, and undermine local community initiatives in 
general. 
HIV/AIDS, the wider economy and effect on agriculture 
Rural households and communities may also suffer from the impacts that the disease has on the wider economy. For 
example: 
• Government services may be reduced as staff are hit by sickness and death, and as budgets are strained by the 
costs of the epidemic. FAO report that as much as half of the time of extension staff may be lost to the disease; 
• When family living in the cities fall ill this can lead to loss of remittances. If the person returns to the village for 
the final stages of their illness, there are additional costs of caring. In either case, capital is likely to be lost to 
agriculture; 
• Supply chains for inputs and marketing may depend heavily for their functioning on the knowledge, skills and 
contacts of a few key intermediaries. Contacts within the chain may be highly personalised, with key knowledge 
and skills lodged in the heads of these traders. As and when they fall sick, this tacit knowledge may be lost, 
disrupting the marketing chains; and, possibly most important of all; 
• Demand for farm surpluses may be reduced: in countries most affected by the disease, per capita income may fall 
over the next two decades and the proportion living in poverty rise. Even in countries less affected, economic 
growth is likely to slow down. The outcome is likely to be a severe curb on domestic demand for farm produce, 
depressed prices, and a reduced incentive for farmers to produce marketable surplus. 
In sum, then, agriculture may be deprived of capital ⎯ although not necessarily of labour since even in the most-
affected countries rural populations are expected to increase, in a context of weakened supply chains, fewer 
government services, and lower demand for marketed surplus. Agricultural output will be thus be less than it might 
have been, and a depressed agriculture will tend to reduce activity in the rest of the rural economy. Indeed, farming 
may shift towards more extensive production primarily for local subsistence ⎯ the reverse, in most cases, of the 
intensification and increased commercialisation that would mark successful agricultural development. 
Responses to HIV/AIDS 
Content 
Medically, the main responses were initially to prevent transmission, largely through campaigns to encourage safe 
sex and use of clean needles among drug users — supported by distribution of condoms and needles. When ART 
became available and affordable, this was then rolled out to those living with the disease. Demand to be tested for 
the presence of the virus was much enhanced once ART was in place and a positive test did not imply early death. 
For livelihoods, much of the response came from affected individuals, households and communities. This may be 
termed coping, although often they are better termed as distress responses. 
Documented responses include labour sharing, orphan support, community-based childcare, community food banks, 




collection and food preparation (Mutangadura, Mukurazita, and Jackson 1999; Donovan et al. 2003; Drimie 2003; NAADS 
2003; Gillespie and Kadiyala 2005). 
In some places, concerns over rising numbers of widows vulnerable to losing their land when their husband died led 
to changes in customary land tenure norms. Advocates on behalf of widows, such as NGOs, convened with elders and 
community leaders to agree to modify longstanding practices to accommodate the needs created by the disease. 
[Aliber et al. 2004 on Kenyan experience] 
Social protection was a common response. Slater (2008) summarises typical forms of assistance and their 
effectiveness: 
Table A: Impacts and appropriateness of various interventions  
Types of 
intervention 
Impact on and appropriateness for 
HIV/AIDS-infected and affected 
households 
Cash transfers Social pensions paid to the elderly can be 
particularly appropriate because of 
fungibility and the passing of benefits to 
other household members. Evidence 
shows that social pensions in South 
Africa are often used to pay for children’s 
schooling and are not as expensive as is 
sometimes assumed 
Enable households to buy medicines so 
that they are less likely to adopt coping 
strategies that are ultimately destructive 
(i.e. drawing down on productive 
household assets in an unsustainable 
way) 
Require transparency, accountability and 
financial and administrative capacity on 
the part of governments, otherwise are 
subject to elite capture 
Among donors there may be reluctance 
to commit resources to recurrent welfare 
budgets, though the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
is contributing to a rethink of 
perspectives 
Child-headed households may not have 
the capacity to make good decisions 
about expenditure, though orphan 




encourage and strengthen community-
based care of orphans 
Food and 
nutrition 
Viable long-term safety net for 
households that are severely labour 
constrained and cannot participate in 
social protection programmes that have 
a labour constraint 
Less viable for households that are not 
labour constrained because of danger of 
creating dependency 
Donors, because of own grain surpluses, 
are willing to commit large quantities of 
food 
Costly, particularly where there is poor 
transport infrastructure (for example, 
sub-Saharan Africa) 
Farm inputs  Significantly cheaper than importing 
food aid 
Provide seeds and fertilisers to 
households but are inappropriate for 
households that are severely labour 
constrained 
Could be adapted to provide labour-
saving technologies to households 
School 
feeding 
School feeding can encourage enrolment 
and reduce dropouts but unlikely to 
present enough of an incentive to 
severely labour-constrained households, 
particularly child-headed households 





Work & Food 
For Work 
Can be self-targeting, for example when 
inferior staple foods or lower wages are 
paid that richer households will not work 
for 
Appropriate for HIV-positive but 
asymptomatic people, but only if they 
have a rich, healthy diet. Since this is 





Inappropriate for labour-constrained 
households, i.e. those containing people 
with AIDS and OVC 
Source: Slater 2008, Table 2, edited 
Social protection for people living with HIV/AIDS tried first and foremost to defend the consumption of vulnerable 
people, to prevent them slipping into deep poverty, and to prevent them from either selling productive assets or 
resorting to work that would have been dangerous, criminal or degrading — commercial sex work being a particular 
concern. Beyond this, some measures tried to help households that had labour to produce more and enhance their 
livelihoods in the face of a disease that tended to undermine those livelihoods. 
Two lessons arise from social protection in this case: 
• When targeting households to for assistance, better to target broadly for all and any households that are 
vulnerable to deep poverty and destitution, rather than just those living with HIV/AIDS. Singling out households 
affected by HIV/AIDS risked stigmatising them; 
• Take care that spending on social protection does not deprive health and education of funding since these 
services matter for most households living with HIV/AIDS. 
What tended to work best was where the efforts and funds of state agencies and NGOs were combined with 
community initiatives to provide remedial actions in local circumstances. 
In some cases, responses to HIV/AIDS created opportunities to promote the right so women and girls to education., 
land., and fair treatment. The example mentioned was the vulnerability of women widowed by the disease to losing 
their land. Because the disease shone a light on this, finding a solution also meant strengthening women’s right to 
land that applied to all women, not just the widows. In this way, some responses had the potential to improve gender 
equality. 
Decision-making and implementation 
The story of HIV/AIDS is strongly political. Initial reactions by some leaders to the disease was to stigmatise the 
disease and those living with it. Many were reluctant to engage with issues such as the sexual behaviour of the 
promiscuous and homosexuals, or the practices of intravenous drug users. That meant that many of those infected 
did not want to be tested or identified. 
It took time before groups of those affected and their supporters could overcome resistance, alter the narrative that 
the disease was sinful, and make sure that internationally fighting the disease was seen as matter of decency and 
human rights that applied to everyone, no matter their preferences or behaviour. 
The political waters were further clouded because of controversies over the source of the virus and potential 
treatments. Until the science of the origins of the virus in populations of primates was established, all manner of 
hypotheses circulated, with a wide range of folk treatments being disseminated. These included the disastrous idea 
that men could cleanse themselves of the virus by having sex with a virgin. 
Eventually, most leaders were prepared to accept the science of HIV/AIDS, and to recognise it as health crisis that 
potentially could affect anyone, and therefore a matter of human rights. The push for a more considered reaction to 




Most observers report that the effectiveness of medical and livelihoods interventions improved when local leaders 
and communities were engaged. This ensured that locals appreciated the science, while outsiders could appreciate 
how the disease affected local communities and the varied impacts it was having. 
Key lessons 
Medical advances can change the face of a disease. Before ART, to be HIV-positive was a death sentence. Those 
positive were readily stigmatised by others, some took on a mantle of shame. The advance of a novel virus that 
insidiously infected people who would not know of their fate for months if not years, was seen with dread. Self-help 
groups of those infected could easily become forums of little hope. 
When ART started to be rolled out, a plague became a disease, something that could be treated. This gave hope to 
those infected and everyone working with them. 
Much of the response to the effects of the disease came from individuals, families and communities who had to find 
ways to counteract the losses caused by the disease. 
Public interventions to assist those living with HIV benefited from engagement with communities. 
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G. China COVID-19 impacts & responses 
What happened? Causes, Consequences 
The COVID-19 outbreak began in the city of Wuhan (capital of Hubei Province) in December 2019. On 23 January 
2020, a nationwide travel blockade and quarantine policy was published by central government, requiring all public 
spaces, businesses, and schools to shut their doors until further notice. The policy also placed restrictions on 
individuals leaving their homes or travelling. 
By 24 April 2020, the pandemic had killed 4642 people and infected 84, 311 others.19 According to government 
figures, the economy contracted 6.8% over the first quarter of 2020, the first recorded contraction since Mao era 
collectivisation was abandoned in the late 1970s. Others reckon the economy shrank by as much as 10%.20 
Responses 
Lockdown measures began during the annual Spring Festival (Chinese Lunar New Year) in mid-January, when 
roughly 200 million migrant workers return to their registered homes in rural areas21. The lockdown prevented 
return journeys and closed down work in rural areas, curtailing the spread of the virus, but also hitting rural 
incomes (see below). For migrant workers dependent on wage labour in China’s towns and cities, and rural families 
dependent on urban remittances, impacts have been significant (ibid). 
Lockdown measures were implemented across urban and rural areas, although the measures employed and levels of 
restriction varied, depending on policy makers’ estimation of risk and the feasibility of using different instruments. 
Overall, the government deployed an impressive arsenal of tools, from high-tech surveillance, monitoring and 
messaging, to low-tech blockades and mass-mobilisation of party members, civil servants, army personnel, NGO 
staff, retirees and ‘private’ workers following party orders.22 
Ensuring availability and access to food has been a top priority for the government. On 25 Feb, China’s President Xi 
Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang issued instructions on the need to ‘stabilise agriculture’, calling for an ‘all-out 
effort’ to ensure the epidemic did not affect the planting of Spring crops. At the same time, officials at all levels have 
been told their performance (and therefore pay & promotion) will be judged by farmers’ success in securing inputs, 
planting crops, and in ensuring smooth food distribution. 23 
In terms of specific responses, the government has prioritised ‘green channels’ for supply of farm inputs and 
distribution of fresh produce, and provided financial incentives to farmers via lower taxes, and access to cheap 
credit. In some cases, government has stepped in to directly contract farmers to supply produce to needy areas, and 
has instructed China’s biggest food & agricultural firms to step-up supplies of rice, meat & cooking oil. 
 
19 WHO COVID-19 Dashboard, accessed 24 April 2020 at 15:30. 
20 The Economist, 26 March 2020. 
21 Rozelle et al in IFPRI, 30 March 2020 
22 NYT, 20 Feb; WEF 12 March; East Asia Forum 7 April. Note: China’s bureaucracy is 40 million members strong, and covers a much wider swath of 
society than is typical in most countries.  




Impacts? We have some emerging and pretty robust evidence: phone surveys, media reporting, government 
announcements/guidelines: 
• Strict lockdowns were enforced in all surveyed villages, and were very effective in controlling spread of the 
virus. Only four village informants out of 726 reported COVID-19 infections in their villages, and of the 
nearly 700,000 residents in these villages, only about 10 had contracted the virus. No one in any surveyed 
village reported deaths from the virus.24 
• Lockdowns have caused hardship, however. Roughly 75% of informants stopped work (farm, off-farm, 
urban); over 90% reported loss of income; nearly 50% reported impacts on diet. After one month of COVID-
19 restrictions, China’s economy lost around US$100 billion in rural migrant worker wages alone, before 
factoring in losses from rural (non-migrant) labour/employment.25 
• There have been some shortages and price spikes (especially for poultry & pork), but supplies of staples, 
fruit & veg have been adequate in most areas.26 
Travel and lockdown restrictions in Wuhan, the epicentre of the outbreak, were lifted on 7 April. In other areas, in 
March. While schools and colleges remain closed, businesses and public spaces are re-opening, and migrants are 
returning to work – once they successfully complete a 14-day quarantine.27 
Lessons 
• Learning lessons from the SARS outbreak in 2003, the Chinese government reacted swiftly to the COVID-19 
outbreak in Wuhan, implementing a nationwide travel blockade and quarantine policy across rural and urban 
areas. 
• The government deployed an impressive arsenal of tools and approaches to prevent transmission, from high-
tech surveillance and monitoring to the mass-mobilisation of party members. Measures were effective, even 
though China’s reporting of COVID cases has been questioned. 
• Lockdowns have caused hardship in rural areas, however, not least because rural incomes are increasingly tied 
to remittances from rural-urban migration. Many migrants have faced lockdown in their ‘home’ villages during 
New Year; unable to return to work in towns and cities, wages stopped more or less overnight. 
• A key concern of government has been agricultural production and distribution to ensure food availability and 
prevent price spikes. Policies – from the setting up of frictionless green channels on the country’s road network, 
to fiscal incentives for farmers – appear to have been effective. 
  
 
24 See note 3 above. 
25 See note 3 above. 
26 See notes 3 & 4 above. Plus personal communications with colleagues in Beijing and Shanghai, 6-13 April 2020.  




H. SARS, China 
What happened? Causes and consequences 
The SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was identified in 2003, and is thought to be an animal virus from an as-yet-
uncertain animal reservoir, perhaps bats, that spread to other animals (civet cats) and first infected humans in 
Guangdong Province, southern China, in November 2002. 
The SARS epidemic affected 26 countries and resulted in more than 8000 cases in 2003, primarily through person-
to-person transmission. Of these, 774 people died, mostly in China (349), in ill-equipped health care settings. The 
economic cost (international) has been estimated at US$30 billion over a 6-month period. 
Other countries/areas in which chains of human-to-human transmission occurred after early importation of cases 
were Toronto in Canada, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Chinese Taipei, Singapore, and Hanoi in 
Viet Nam. 
Responses 
The first cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) are thought to have occurred in China Guandong 
Province in November 2002. Local health personnel reported to superiors about the new disease in mid-December 
2002, but, given restrictions on the release of public health-related information, it was not till February 2003 that 
Guangdong health officials made a public announcement about the disease. The first nationwide alert was issued in 
early April 2003 and a coordinated and effective campaign to combat SARS in China began in mid-April. 
Word of mouth about the disease spread quickly both inside and outside China in early 2003. Millions of text 
messages were sent referring to a ‘fatal flu’ in Guangdong Province, pharmacies were stripped of antibiotics and flu 
medications, and there was panic buying in shops. 
The first recorded case in Beijing occurred on 5 March, and the numbers of probable cases accelerated quickly. 
Nonetheless, Chinese health authorities, knowing they were dealing with an epidemic of SARS, continued to parrot 
the line that there was nothing to worry about, in part because the government as a whole was preoccupied with 
planning for the National People’s Congress in March, heralding in a ‘new’ government. 
The official response only changed when 72-year-old doctor, Jiang Yanyong, contacted the foreign media and WHO 
began an investigation. Two weeks later the government fired the health minister and mayor of Beijing, dramatically 
raised its estimate of deaths, and began a nationwide campaign alerting the Chinese to the dangers. 
In the weeks that followed, the Chinese government launched a crusade against SARS, effectively bringing the 
disease under control in late June and eliminating all known cases by mid-August. By May 7, 18,000 people had been 
quarantined in Beijing. The Maoist “Patriotic Hygiene Campaign” was revitalized. In Guangdong, 80 million people 
were mobilised to clean houses and streets. 
When widespread quarantine was imposed in China and social disruption occurred in April 2003, the peak of the 
original Guangdong outbreak was long past. 
As part of the nationwide mobilisation campaign launched in April 2003, the State Council sent out inspection teams 
to 26 provinces to check for unreported cases and ensure compliance with new quarantine and travel restrictions. 
Lower level officials went from under-reporting cases to implementing lockdowns with new-found political zeal. 
They sealed off villages, apartment complexes, and university campuses, quarantined tens of thousands of people, 
and set up checkpoints to take temperatures. In the countryside, virtually every village was on SARS alert, with 




Very little information is available on the impact of SARS on agriculture, food systems and rural livelihoods more 
broadly. Our quick review draws the following, tentative conclusions: 
• There were reports that SARS outbreak delayed China’s winter wheat harvest by two weeks because farmers 
could not travel to the field or access inputs. However, this does not appear to have had any significant impact on 
production. 
• There were newspaper reports (Asian press outside China) of food market panics in Guangdong and Zhejiang as 
rumours spread of a ‘killer flu’. However, food supply and prices nationwide were broadly stable. 
• Official news reports acknowledge the impact of the SARS lockdown on rural incomes – farm, off-farm and 
remittance. Nonetheless, official figures indicate that agricultural incomes and production both grew during 
2003, albeit at a lower rate than planned. 
Lessons 
The government’s attempt to cover-up and then downplay the SARS epidemic in early 2003 backfired badly. Under 
intense domestic and international pressure, leaders made a dramatic volte-face in April, launching a nationwide 
‘crusade against SARS’, bringing the disease under control in late June, and eliminating all known cases by mid-
August. 
In initiating its campaign, the government did little to consult or inform local people. Instead, the government relied 
on its extensive array of mobilisation vehicles installed in the Mao era—village party branches, street sub-district 
offices, former barefoot doctors—to take temperatures, quarantine people, trace infections and round up laggards. 
The response to CODID-19 has been strikingly similar, albeit with the added deployment of China’s high-tech 
surveillance and tracking systems. 
Impacts in rural areas are difficult to identify with confidence. There were reports of delayed harvests, localised 









I. 2007/08 food price spike 
Nature of the shock: Process, causes, consequences 
Between September 2007 and April 2008 the prices of maize and what on world markets roughly doubled, while 
those of rice tripled. (Figure A) 
The spike in prices of cereals on world markets in 2007/08 was as unwelcome as it was unexpected. Nothing similar 
had been seen for more than 10 years: indeed, the last time cereals prices had spiked to such a degree was in 1973–
74 — 34 years earlier. 
For poor and vulnerable people the spike spelled hardship as the costs of cereals in many parts of the developing 
world rose sharply. For leaders, it came as a shock given that for more than three decades previously, real food 




Figure A: Prices of maize, rice and wheat 2000 to 2012, constant US$ 
Source: Compiled from IMF commodity statistics, deflating prices by the US GDP deflator 
Causes 
At the time of the spike, much debate arose about the its causes. In broad terms, explanations divided into two wings. 
One argued that the spike signalled a sea change in conditions in the markets, a symptom of a broken and unjust food 
system that would never again be the same. The era of low prices for staples, one that had seen a long-term trend for 
falling real prices for at least 60 years, was over. The other wing argued that the spike was the result of a ‘perfect 
storm’, where several factors had converged to create any extraordinary event — with the implication that once the 
conjunctural factors faded or passed by, prices might return to something like their pre-spike levels in real terms. 
With the benefit of hindsight, and the knowledge that within five or so years prices would indeed fall back to their 
previous low levels, it is clear that the latter explanations were more satisfactory. So, what were the factors that 




The argument here distinguishes the conditions that made possible the spike — mainly a slowdown in the growth 
of cereals production, stocks depleted to a level at which short-term shocks could not be accommodated, rising oil 
prices and the associated extraordinary increase in the demand for US maize to be distilled to ethanol; short term 
triggers of harvest failures and biofuel mandates that accelerated price increases; and the very short term, anxiety-
driven overreactions of governments, traders and consumers whose restocking, export limitations and hoarding 
aggravated the initial price increases to produce an extraordinary spike. (Table A) 
Table A Causes of the price spike 
 
The relative importance of the different factors has been 
debated. The spike, however, arose from the interplay of 
several factors: in the absence of most of which the spike 
would not have occurred; hence it is difficult — and 
potentially misleading — to apportion weights to these. 
Most of the contributing factors outlined in Table A are 
reasonably well understood and agreed: but contention 
remains over the role of index investment 
(‘speculation’) on futures markets for maize and wheat. 
Despite the many papers addressing this issue, the arguments continue. To some extent this reflects the technical 
difficulties of proving the argument one way or the other; but those with opposing views tend to cite different 
literature and adopt different standards of evidence. The balance of the evidence seems to show that index 
investment may have exacerbated the spike in maize and wheat prices, but that this cannot explain more than a 
small part of the large price increases seen. That the largest spike occurred for rice for which there was little or no 
such investment also suggests that this was a minor factor. 
Consequences for prices on domestic markets 
How much did increases in cereals prices on international markets push up domestic prices in developing 
countries? Three broad patterns of transmission can be identified. Very large Asian countries, such as China and 
India, were insulated from world markets by large (and costly) public stocks and restrictions on trade. Other 
developing countries with reasonable access to world markets saw a significant if muted transmission to their 
markets, so that domestic prices of staples rose considerably, with rises in the range 30% to 70%. A third group of 
countries, mainly low-income, especially in Africa, were insulated from world markets by high transport costs; and 
in some cases additionally by the importance of little-traded staples such as cassava, yams, millet and sorghum in 
local diets. Food prices in these countries depended far more on domestic harvests, and in some cases on restrictions 
to trading regionally with neighbouring countries, than on world prices. In some parts of inland Africa food prices 
rose at the same time as the spike on world markets, but domestic inflation and harvest losses were probably the 
causes, not the international price spike. 
Impacts, especially on vulnerable people 
Even five years after the spike, impacts were not entirely clear. Models and surveys deployed soon after the spike 
predicted hardship and suffering for households vulnerable to rising food prices. Yet subsequent national surveys 
suggested less harm: indeed food security and nutrition actually improved in some developing countries. 
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This is not so surprising: changes in food prices are only one factor affecting income, food security and nutrition. At 
the time of the price spike developing countries were also experiencing rising costs of fuel as the oil price soared, the 
start of the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 in Europe and North America, and, most important of all, the 
performance of their own economies in creating jobs and incomes — and of their governments in providing public 
goods, services, and social protection. Trying to separate the effects of higher prices for staple foods from other 
confounding variables is a challenge. 
Time scales complicate these judgments. Short-term impacts of higher prices can be strong since there is little time 
to adjust consumption or to earn more from the opportunities that come with higher prices. With time, however, 
households, farms and firms may adjust, public policy responses may help, so that negative effects may be much 
mitigated. On the other hand, with time short-term coping may prove difficult to sustain and vulnerable households 
may slide into deep poverty and destitution as they exhaust their options. 
Any rise in prices of essential items such as staple foods entails hardship. The more important question is whether 
the price spike resulted in temporary hardship for vulnerable households, or whether it led to permanent damage. If 
this latter were the case, then it should show up in the nutrition of infants: they are usually the most vulnerable 
members of vulnerable households. Yet the statistics from national surveys conducted before and after the spike do 
not show a general trend towards damage: on the contrary, in 37 out of 52 countries, child nutrition improved rather 
than worsening. 
A simple interpretation may be that for some vulnerable households, the price spike was not much of a problem 
provided that the household lived in a fast-growing economy with a reasonably competent government capable of 
providing the public goods and services to spread the benefits of growth, and able to protect the vulnerable. Those 
vulnerable households living in countries with slow growing economies, on the other hand, with governments barely 
able to fulfil their functions and unable to react effectively to the spike, may well have suffered. 
Responses to rising food prices 
Content 
International responses fell into three major categories: 
1. Collecting and disseminating information internationally, to assess the crisis and its implications, to mobilise and 
coordinate responses; 
2. Technical advice to national governments on how to respond, particularly on identifying the vulnerable; 
3. Funds and in-kind donations to: 
• Stimulate agricultural production — mainly through seed and fertiliser distribution; 
• Provide food aid, health and nutrition programmes — with assistance from UNICEF, WFP and WHO; and, 
• Expand (support or in some cases implement) other safety nets. 
The international community mounted a response to the food price crisis of 2007/08 that was remarkable and 
admirable for its size and urgency. 
Responses were heavily conditioned by how different agencies perceived the crisis. Humanitarian organisations, 
for example, tended to see the crisis as exacerbating costs of food aid, undermining cash transfers, and adding extra 




saw higher prices arising from low production and stocks of staples, and hence responded by promoting agricultural 
production, and in some cases taking steps to increase (often humanitarian) cereal reserves. Other agencies took the 
perspective of developing country governments. They saw the crisis eating into the budgets of low-income countries 
attempting to stimulate national production or cushion their vulnerable populations from price rises, so they 
provided funds to pay for these, and in some cases to compensate for budget losses arising from reduced import 
taxes, higher fuel bills and the like. When they saw governments struggling for lack of administrative capacity, they 
helped with technical and financial support. 
Were these efforts directed to the right place and people? By location, the agencies seem to have chosen the right 
countries to focus their efforts. Only nine out of 123 countries seemed to receive more or less attention than might 
have been expected. It is not clear, however, if the neediest locations within countries were reached, as it is difficult 
to find information on the extent to which spatial mapping of sub-national vulnerability influenced decisions. Rural 
areas seemed to get less attention than urban in many cases. In this respect, targeting was misinformed. The typical 
expectation was that urban households would be harder hit than rural ones since it was assumed that the latter 
would not have to buy in food. In fact, many of the rural poor — who were often poorer than their urban 
counterparts — relied heavily on buying in food and so were hit hard. 
Socially, not enough is known about whether or not the right people within selected locations were reached. In some 
cases, reaching the neediest was too difficult at short notice. 
Were the responses the right ones? Most responses fell into two categories: stimulating production and protecting 
vulnerable people from high food prices. Broadly, these responses were appropriate, but perhaps not always entirely 
accurate. In addition to the questionable assumption that problems were more severe in urban areas, it was also 
often thought that the prime cause for concern was adding to the numbers in poverty, rather than the increased 
poverty of the already poor. Much of the urgency of the international response was stimulated by the estimate of an 
extra 100 million or so being added to the numbers of the hungry; rather than the worsening fate of the 850 million 
who were already hungry, ill-placed to cope with extra strain on their access to food. An earlier review found that 
not all of the predicted impacts of higher food prices were entirely as expected 
As predicted, high food prices increased malnutrition (especially in young children) and poverty. Some findings were less 
obvious. These included: the depth of the impact in rural areas, the increase in inequality; the widespread use of credit to 
buy food, and the fact that most poverty impact came from increasing depth of poverty in the already‐poor, rather than 
increased ‘poverty headcount.’ (Compton et al. 2010) 
How effective were these responses? Responses were not as timely as would have been ideal. Inputs were delivered 
but many arrived after the first half of 2008, when crops were planted in the Northern Hemisphere. Some individual 
programmes report positive impacts on people’s food security. 
Safety nets were similarly delayed: most got going by late 2008 and early 2009, when prices had been high for 
some months. Less is known about their effectiveness. Some reportedly suffered from implementers’ capacity 
constraints, overly complex targeting, and insufficient attention to women. There were also not enough attempts to 
examine relative effectiveness of implementing one type of safety net compared to another. In many cases, school 
feeding programmes were the focus because, unlike more sophisticated social protection programmes, they already 
existed in many low-income countries and could be scaled up relatively quickly. 
There were furthermore some reports that initiatives to respond to crisis took priority over existing programmes. 
Higher food and fuel prices meant some programmes already underway had to be scaled back, even as funds were 




A final reflection concerns the evaluation deficit. While it may still be early to ask questions about impacts of these 
responses, not all agencies have made sufficient attempts to evaluate their response. Most reporting stops at outputs 
without consideration of impacts or outcomes. Very few evaluations of what was done are available; exceptions 
being for FAO’s TCP responses, and for some WFP and DG-ECHO programmes in place at the time of the food crisis. 
And while these studies did the best they could given limited time and data, they still leave some questions 
unanswered. 
Most governments tried hard to react to higher world food prices. Low-income countries (LIC), however, despite 
the additional aid many received, struggled to make a difference. They had few means by which to mitigate price 
rises, either at the border, or on domestic markets. Most of the buffering of international price rises came through 
the natural protection of high transport costs to ports. Not that this was necessarily an advantage for those LICs 
distant from the sea: that protection usually left them highly vulnerable to price volatility from domestic harvests. 
When it came to protecting vulnerable citizens, again LICs often faced the twin challenges of not having safety nets in 
place — both policies and agencies — that could be scaled up when prices rose, combined with not enough resources 
to provide adequate protection in countries where half or more of the population were in danger of impoverishment 
and hunger. 
Most countries tried to stimulate domestic production. Again, however, LICs had few means by which do so: 
distribution of seed and fertiliser were costly exercises, while promising farmers higher prices was unthinkable for 
lack of funds. 
Middle-income countries, on the other hand, often had more scope for action, thanks to their greater administrative 
capacity, deeper funds to draw on, and often a smaller share of population to protect. Where agriculture had a 
smaller share of the economy, offering farmers higher prices or subsidised inputs was feasible. 
Having the means and acting effectively or efficiently, however, were not necessarily linked. For example, Argentina 
tried to protect consumers by restricting and taxing food exports, the main effect of which was to undermine 
production that made it all the harder to hold down domestic prices. 
Across countries, higher food prices were commonly seen as a threat to the lives of poor urban households with less 
appreciation that poor rural households might be equally vulnerable. In any case, for many countries it was 
administratively easier to protect urban rather than rural households. Urban households, moreover, were better 
placed to protest in the face of price increases. Hence responses tended to show a bias to urban areas. 
Overall, most surveys report that not many vulnerable households received assistance from the state during the food 
price spike. Despite considerable public efforts, for most threatened households it was their own ability to cope that 
mattered. 
Decision-making and implementation 
Decisions were much influenced by analysis of the causes. Those who saw the price spike as the outcome of a perfect 
storm of conjunctural factors, saw solutions as being to remedy or more of those factors. That tended to leas to the 
following favoured responses: 
• Suspend biofuel mandates 
• Build modest public stocks of cereals, mainly for food aid 




• Provide more information on markets, advocate against export bans. 
One might add, ‘do not overreact’. 
Those, on the other hand, who saw a more systemic malaise proposed more radical action including: 
• Build very large public stocks 
• Ban or heavily control speculation on futures markets 
• Create funds to counter speculators on futures markets. 
They believed that it was time for governments and multilateral agencies to intervene in cereals markets. 
Because the latter set of proposals would have required both considerable international consensus, coordinated 
action and funding, the proposals were easy to resist when significant actors were unconvinced. In G8 meetings, 
most leaders were averse to the more radical proposals. 
In responding to the immediate distress caused to those low incomes seeing higher prices for staples, there was 
widespread consensus on the need for forms of social protection. 
Implementation 
As noted above, it was easier to implement responses where systems already existed and could be ramped up, above 
all for social protection payments. 
Key lessons 
When crises break suddenly and unexpectedly, some governments, firms and households may overreact — and 
those actions can aggravate the initial crisis very considerably. 
It is easy to overreact to unexpected and unwelcome shocks, seeing them as almost inevitable outcome of broken 
systems, rather than accepting that complex systems will occasionally and randomly generate shocks. 
Running down stocks of cereals was unwise: traders knew well the levels of stocks typically necessary to keep prices 
within a band no matter the occasional harvest failure or surge in demand. For several years, it was clear that ratios 
of stocks to annual average demand were too low. Neither traders nor governments paid enough attention to act to 
change this. Perhaps 34 years without a price spike had bred complacency. 
Some initial assessments of the effects of the price spike were indiscriminate and exaggerated. Those assessments 
tended to see all LICs as likely to be hard hit, saw the urban poor as the hardest hit. Hardly anyone was prepared to 
admit that higher food prices might favour rural poor households who depended on farm labouring for their 
incomes. 
Responses 
Efforts to contain prices domestically were only possible for large countries with considerable grain reserves, above 
all China and India. LICs in particular struggled to influence market prices. 
Some LICs did not see much transmission from world market prices, since they were landlocked with very high costs 
of access to the world market — for example, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia. So long as their domestic harvests did 
not fail, events on the world markets had little influence on domestic prices. 




(a) had the means to finance this — LICs where most households were vulnerable simply could not fund this; and, 
(b) had social protection schemes already in place, with registered eligible households, and with agencies and 
systems in place to deliver additional benefits. 
In most countries, and for most vulnerable households, their defence against the hardship of higher staple food 
prices was whatever the household, with support from kith and kin, could manage. [This has been observed time and 
again in rural Africa: see for example the 1991/92 drought in Zimbabwe] This is a massive lesson with profound 
implications. 
Both international coordinated efforts and those of many governments in the developing world was to try to ramp 
up the next food harvest, through public distribution of food, fertiliser and other crop inputs, and in some cases by 
making electricity for irrigation pumps free of charge. 
Some observers derided these efforts. They believed that smallholders faced too many obstacles to react within one 
harvest to the spike. They were proved dramatically wrong. Supply response, aided by determined public action 
meant for the next five years or more cereals harvests were substantially larger than before the spike, and in excess 
of demand. The largest increases were seen in countries where smallholders dominated farming, in Asia and Africa. 
It was this supply response that killed off the spike, with prices on world markets settling back to pre-spike levels, in 
real terms, by 2014 or so. 
Key sources: 
Headey, Derek & Shenggen Fan, 2010, ‘Reflections on the global food crisis. How did it happen? How has it hurt? and How 
can we prevent the next one?’ IFPRI research monograph 165. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute 
Wiggins, Steve & Sharada Keats, 2013, Looking back, peering forward. Food prices & the food price spike of 2007/08, 
Project Report, ODI Shockwatch: Managing Risk and Building Resilience in an Uncertain World, Overseas Development 
Institute 
Keats, Sharada, Steve Wiggins, & Edward Clay, 2011, International rapid responses to the global food crisis of 
2007/08. Three years on: How relevant, effective, and efficient were international responses to food price rises 





J. 1997 Asian financial crisis 
Nature of the shock: Process, causes, consequences 
The financial crisis broke over Southeast and East Asia in late 1997 and 1998. Private investors, both within and 
outside the region, were spooked that a credit bubble was about to burst. They took flight, taking capital out of the 
region, and converting as much domestic currency into dollars as possible. As they did so, domestic currencies 
depreciated and central banks began to run out of foreign reserves. 
Currency depreciation pushed up domestic prices. It made repaying dollar-denominated private debt much harder. 
Most affected countries were Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand. 
Causes of the crisis were disputed, with some arguing that this was a financial crisis caused by opening up capital 
markets unduly and by the herd behaviour of uninformed investors, Others, above all the IMF, saw it as the 
consequence of defects in the economic structures — crony capitalism, inefficient state enterprises, etc. — of the 
affected countries, that needed structural reform. 
Faced by a macroeconomic crisis, the IMF played a prominent role in offering the most-affected countries some 
assistance, but only in return for conditions that included ‘reforms’. These stressed austerity measures, with control 
of money supply, high interest rates; plus privatisation of state enterprises and liberalisation of financial systems. 
The effect of austerity was to push many domestic firms into bankruptcy, with increased unemployment, downward 
pressure on wages, and downward multiplier effects throughout the economy. GDP and incomes fell. 
The IMF role was to be heavily criticised, not least by Stiglitz, leading to a loss of prestige and its position as leader of 
a cartel of like-minded institutions lending to MICs. 
For most countries, with the exceptions of Indonesia and the Philippines, recovery from the shock was relatively 
rapid — within at most four years, most economies had returned to their former level of GDP, with strongly growing 
economies and booming exports — in part facilitated by depreciated currencies. 
In the meantime, most of the population saw their lives and livelihoods affected by: 
• Loss of jobs or falls in wages or both; 
• Rising prices for basic commodities cutting the purchasing power of their diminished inc0mes; and, 
• A squeeze on social services as governments tried to balance their budgets in line with IMF instructions. 
Impacts were considerable for most households. By and large, they were able to protect core elements such as food 
spending, although they may have economised on higher-cost items, and education of children. Many switched away 
from private health care to depending on state facilities, that were not only under pressure but were in some cases 
operating with reduced budgets. In some households, the search for additional work to make up for lost income 
drove women to work longer. 
Crisis made clear that the vulnerable included many people who had previously not been seen as poor. 
Responses 
Content 
The immediate response was to try to tackle the macroeconomic imbalances in which the IMF played a key role in 




ideological seeing any elements of state control of the economy and enterprise as defects to be remedied. Camdessus, 
the IMF director, even saw the crisis as a welcome opportunity to put the region to rights. 
World Bank tried to help out with its favoured safety nets. 
Governments responses were diverse, but included: 
• Introducing social protection for workers that was universal, including unemployment benefit and health care. 
Done in the better-off economies: Korea, Malaysia, Thailand; 
• Providing support for small and informal businesses in credits and grants — often successful; 
• Grants and credits to community organisations to ameliorate local conditions — again, often favourably 
reviews; and 
• Attempts to control prices or to provide staple foods and other necessities at subsidised prices with mixed 
results at best; and, 
• Safety nets such as public works employment, often criticised for poor design and implementation. 




Table A Summarising social protection responses to Asian financial crisis by country  
Source: Bhushan & Blouin 2009
Country Pre-crisis Responses to financial crisis 
Korea. Rep. Had a relatively well-developed 
livelihood protection system that in 
1997 provided income support to 
1.2M. Unemployment insurance 
since 1996 on OECD entry. 
 
In response to the insolvency of 3,323 small and medium enterprises 
in the first month of 1998 alone, the Tripartite Commission (business-
labour-government) launched sweeping legislation extending 
unemployment insurance to all sections of the labour force. 
Temporary Livelihood Protection Program (TLPP) to absorb the 
newly unemployed, covering an additional 310,000 persons: direct 
cash transfer ($70/month), tuition fee waiver and lunch subsidies for 
school-aged children, and a 5% reduction in medical insurance 
premiums for one year. 
Successful: elements made permanent in 2000 Minimum Living 
Standards Security Act. Provides for food, clothing, housing, 
education, and health care—subsidised through cash and in-kind 
transfers for households that otherwise would not meet the basic 
living standard. Have to participate in public works and job training. 
Korea’s Employment Insurance System (EIS) 
Benefits in Korea are universal, with no costs or exclusion through 
targeting. 
In sum, post-crisis unemployment reforms in Korea followed a four-
pillar approach: job security, job creation, training and placement, 
and livelihood care 
Korea epitomizes productivist East Asian welfare where investment in 
social protection, though limited as a percentage of public spending, 
focuses on education and health care (i.e., human capital 
development). 
Malaysia History of well-organised labour 
with trades unions. Following were 
in place: 
Employee Provident Fund (EPF) 
1951 — bulk of social protection. 
Employees Social Security 
Organization (SOCSO, 1971) 
Social Security Act (SSA, 1969) 
Informal safety nets along ethnic 
lines to compensate for the low level 
of coverage of the formal safety 
nets. 
Reforms to existing provisions: In 1994 the EPF was made flexible 
by splitting each account into three: 
60% held for retirement after age 55; 
30% for large one-time expenses such as housing —important 
during crisis year as housing interest rates rose rapidly; and 
10% for medical emergencies. Flexibility in the EPF made for better 
monitoring of withdrawals and expenditures. 
Expansion of existing safety nets to cover retrenched workers 
entering the informal sector: Under the Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia 
(AIM) revolving fund, RM300 million in interest-free loans were 




Employment acts protected against 
dismissals, covered 2/3rds of 
employees in 1997. At most 
unemployment rose by 3.2% during 
crisis.  
Crisis used as an opportunity to strengthen entrepreneurial capacity 
in informal sector by launching the Yayasan Tekun Nasional 
entrepreneurial loans scheme, the Graduate Entrepreneurs 
Scheme, and the Economic Business Group Fund, which provides 
assistance to women entrepreneurs. All seen as successful in 
stimulating enterprise  
Thailand Lacked universal unemployment 
insurance and health and education 
coverage. 
Social protection for government 
employees. Extensive and 
comprehensive: 
Largest is private provident fund 
established by government decree, 
including Civil Servants Pension 
Fund, Social Security Fund, and 
Provident Fund. 
Social Security Act (1990) and 
Labor Protection Act (1998—post-
crisis) provided limited 
unemployment benefits for non-
government employers and 
employees. 
Early 1990s: government set up the 
NGO Coordinating Committee on 
Development (NGO-COD). 
Supported community 
organisations, women’s groups, and 
child development centers since the 
1970s. The Social Investment Fund 
(SIF) and the Regional Urban 
Development Fund (RUDF) financed 
community-based, demand-driven 
projects: apparently successful. 
Amid civil society criticism of austerity policies recommended by 
IMF, government introduced by 1999 four fiscal stimulation 
packages containing elements of social safety. These were: 
a social sector program loan (Asian Development Bank funded); 
loans under the Miyazawa Plan. [Named for Japanese finance minister 
who committed over US$30 billion in loans to the most-affected countries to 
help them restructure the corporate and banking sectors, establish or 
improve social safety nets, and alleviate the credit crunch].; 
Unemployment Mitigation Program (1998) included innovations 
such as the “Thai help Thai” social protection, provisions for job 
creation, repatriation of workers, promotion of Thai workers 
working abroad, and employment of university graduates. 
Mixed reviews: need for better planning and coordination to avoid 
overlaps; targeting (especially wage setting for public works); and 
enforcement of laws (such as minimum-wage enforcement even 
when people are willing to work for much less); and, 
Social Investment programs (World Bank funded): one channel 
supported existing public programs and employment creation; while 
another focused on bottom-up local community building. Latter 
drew on Thai experience of civil society organisations. 
Seems that NGO-COD-backed SIF and RUDF were scaled up. 
Communities learned to plan, invest, assume debt. Projects 
undertaken resulted in small irrigation and other infrastructure 
repairs and tourist facility improvements. Provided employment to 
groups, such as women, that labour-intensive workfare can miss. 
Funds had a clear exit strategy (known to participants) were 
terminated at the end of 1999. In this way, Thailand avoided the 
fiscal trap that often accompanies such programs. 
Post-crisis, Thailand has experimented with universal schemes, 
most prominently the “30 baht scheme.” Some universal programs 
have been criticised lately for being too expensive and unnecessary. 
These include the Universal Health Scheme (UHS), which provides 
universal health coverage at a set amount of 30 baht for all citizens: 
relatively effective and has found international support, particularly 




Schemes such as the Village Community Fund, which provides low-
interest loans of 20,000 baht to individuals in every village, have also 
received criticism. 
Another post-crisis scheme, the Voluntary and Low-Income Health 
Cards, though expensive, is believed to have genuinely facilitated 
the delivery of basic services in remote regions. 
Indonesia Less well prepared than neighbours 
Fewer community organisations 
Long history of geographically and 
individually targeted poverty 
alleviation programs, such as the 
1970s INPRES (Instruction of the 
President of the Republic of 
Indonesia) programs financed 
through windfall oil revenues. 
Provided education for children 
through the building of some 60,000 
schools in the mid-1970s alone 
Common complaints in the health 
care initiatives, however, included 
poor targeting, lack of data, 
inconsistent data, and lack of 
administrative capacity. 
Government’s response stymied by an inadequate bureaucracy, 
absence of early warning signals, and the lack of reliable and timely 
basic poverty data. Responses focused on: 
• Securing affordable food supply, 
• Supplementing purchasing power, 
• Preserving access to health and education, and 
• Sustaining community activity through regional block grants 
and small-scale credit. 
Public works program (Padat Karya) had wage rates were set above 
the minimum wage, creating distortions and diverting labour away 
from other sectors like harvesting food crops. 
Revolving-credit schemes (PDM-DKE) criticised for being prone to 
corruption and cronyism  
Philippines Least prepared in social protection 
in region. 
Comprehensive and Integrated 
Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS), 
launched in 1994, praised as 
effective. Facilitates consolidation 
and cooperation between 
government and civil society 
groups, delivering benefits using 
minimum basic needs indicators, 
community organising, a total 
family approach, a community-
based monitoring network, 
capability building, and resource 
mobilisation. 
Focal programs include family and 
community welfare, women’s 
welfare, child and youth welfare, 
Response: 
• Food subsidies. National Food Authority (NFA) mandated to set 
a floor price for rice to protect farmers and a ceiling price to 
ensure consumer welfare, and maintain a buffer stock. In 1998, 
it imported rice and set up Enhanced Retail Access for the Poor 
(ERAP), or sari-sari, stores to sell basic commodities (such as 
sugar, coffee, milk, cooking oil, sardines, and noodles) at below 
market prices. Studies show it was overwhelmingly the non-
poor who benefited from these stores. NFA unable to prevent 
both high consumer and low producer prices 
• Public employment programs — Food for Work suffered from 
overlap of seasonal timing in agricultural harvesting, planting 
and cultivation, insufficient funds, and a bad law-and-order 
situation. Rural roads programs found to be gender insensitive 
Above not seen as very effective. 
and 





employment assistance (SEA-K), 
food and nutrition, health, water 
and sanitation, income security, 
basic education, and literacy. 
 
Through CIDSS self-employment programs, members given small 
start-up capital with which they could set up ERAP stores. Nominal 
daily repayments were required, part saved in bank accounts. 
Efforts consistent with long history of microcredit in the Philippines 
(84 in operation when crisis hit). 
Collectively, the CIDSS and microcredit programs helped ameliorate 
poverty. 
Community involvement counted, as did coordination with state 
efforts through the CIDSS: 
‘initiatives that require less outlay, are open to diverse funding sources, 
and are well coordinated can be far more beneficial than expensive 
public works programs.‘ 
Decision-making and implementation 
Crisis broke suddenly and unexpectedly. For most of the early months, both the IMF and governments were 
firefighting, taken aback at the scale and speed with which the macroeconomic malaise developed. 
Crisis has not been countenanced — after all, SE and E Asia was a growth success with widely shared benefits, so 
little preparedness. Some early decision-making therefore followed the instincts of the IMF and governments, rather 
than a fresh analysis of just what was happening. 
Key lessons 
Do not depend on the IMF. It was far too much in love with its own ideas to pay attention to the specifics of the crisis 
facing the different countries. 
Think ahead: liberalisation of trade and capital accounts may be fine in principle, but it has its dangers — especially 
in capital markets, where herd instincts are strong and may take fright at a moment’s notice. 
So much what could be done effectively depended on prior organisation and experience that could be scaled up. 
Where safety nets were not in place, it was hard to set them up — Indonesia. Where countries knew about micro-
finance, such as the Philippines, this was a channel to help small businesses in distress. In countries such as Thailand 
with all manner of NGOs and community organisations, these could be used to channel assistance to localised 
communities. 
Key sources 
Bhushan, Aniket & Chantal Blouin, 2009, ‘Liberalization “Shocks” and Social Protection Policies Lessons from the East Asian Financial 
Crisis’, in Ronald Labonté, Ted Schrecker, Corinne Packer, and Vivien Runnels (Eds), Globalization and Health. Pathways, Evidence and 
Policy, London & New York: Routledge 
Jones, Nicola, & Hannah Marsden, 2010, Assessing the Impacts of and Response to the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis through a Child 
Rights Lens, UNICEF Social and Economic Policy Working Paper, New York: UNICEF 
Atinc, Tamar Manuelyan, and Michael Walton, 1998, Social consequences of the East Asian financial crisis. World Bank Group, 1998. 




K. Literature summaries 
Source Keywords Method Summary notes 
HIV/AIDS (1980-ongoing) 
Gillespie, Stuart, ed. 2006. AIDS, poverty, 
and hunger: Challenges and responses. 
Highlights of the International 
Conference on HIV/AIDS and Food and 
Nutrition Security, Durban, South Africa, 
April 14–16, 2005. Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research 
Institute 
 
[Paragraphs indented in Sweden Sans are 
direct quotes] 
HIV/AIDS 
Food and nutrition 
security 
Synthesis of papers 
to conference 
Impressive review that covers much ground in summarising ideas at the 2005 conference. 
Three questions: 
In short: what is happening, how are people responding, and how can external support 
be best applied? 
Adopts a framework that has determinants of infection, factors and responses, converging 
on the individual, resulting in consequences that lead to impacts and responses. 
Useful wisdom about the nature of HIV/AIDS and responses: 
Stillwaggon (this volume) asserts that global health policy is trammeled by reliance on 
tools of epidemiology and health economics that are too rudimentary for understanding 
a complex epidemic. Public health problems of populations in poverty are interrelated, 
synergistic, and they are virtually ubiquitous in poor populations. Attempts to isolate 
the effects of vitamin A or malaria or worms on HIV transmission may be confounded by 
other endemic conditions, and treatment of any one condition may be constrained by 
the persistent impact of others. 
Global AIDS policy is paralyzed because epidemiologic methods demand a “smoking 
gun” as evidence of relationships between HIV and the endemic conditions of 
malnutrition, parasites, and infectious disease. Such a burden of proof is inappropriate 
because interventions to reduce malnutrition, parasite load, and infectious diseases are 
beneficial in themselves (Stillwaggon, this volume). 
On community response: 




labour sharing, orphan support, community-based childcare, community food banks, 
credit schemes for funeral benefits, and new ways of reducing the time and energy of 
domestic tasks such as fuel and water collection and food preparation, to name but a 
few (see Gillespie and Kadiyala 2005). 
In the context of high HIV prevalences and associated stigma, community-driven 
approaches, with their advantages of local knowledge, may represent an untapped 
resource for addressing the HIV/AIDS–food insecurity nexus. Like the problem itself, 
community-led approaches are naturally more “multisectoral” and cross-cutting. Unlike 
vertical sectoral programs that tend to focus narrowly on infected individuals, they focus on 
affected communities. 
The issue of capacity to respond is critical, particularly as AIDS itself is eroding local 
capacity. 
 Tony Barnett warns against defaulting to “installed capacity”— the fact that certain 
vertical program infrastructures are in place does not mean these are the most 
appropriate ones to employ.  
Binswanger, Gillespie, and Kadiyala (this volume) point to evidence from the field on the 
existence of latent community level capacity including unemployed or underemployed 
youth. Resources could be applied to developing appropriate community responses to 
AIDS, thus obviating constraints on personnel experienced in scaling up vertical 
programs. 
Investing in local institutions through support to decentralisation could go a long way in 
addressing remaining evidence gaps too, as communities have local knowledge, but 
they often lack power and resources. To support such new approaches, donors need to 
alter their time horizons, and they need to be more flexible. 




Binswanger, Gillespie, and Kadiyala (this volume) highlight lessons learned from 
“Integrated Rural Development,” a failed centralised and state-driven approach to rural 
development, and show why highly decentralised and community-driven approaches 
(as discussed above) with strong private sector involvement, hold great potential for 
avoiding difficulties in the coordination and execution of multisectoral programs. 
Problems of evidence base: it is thin: 
When it comes to interventions aimed at combating the HIV/AIDS–food insecurity nexus, 
the evidence base remains weak. Little is known about designing cost-effective solutions, 
scaling them up, situating them in the larger strategies for obtaining complex development 
objectives, or monitoring the full multidimensional nature of such interventions. “Best 
practices” are often announced that have never been properly evaluated or compared.  
Where organisations have launched interventions, they are usually isolated, small-scale, 
with minimal monitoring, and they are rarely well evaluated. 
Concluding: 
In many ways, HIV/AIDS is exposing the fragility of people’s livelihoods, a fragility that 
derives from multiple sources of vulnerability, many of which interact and are worsened 
by AIDS. Poverty, malnutrition, and hunger have been around a lot longer than the 
virus. We should thus not be blind to AIDS, but nor should we be blinded by it. An HIV 
lens, not a filter, needs to be employed. Any move toward “AIDS exceptionalism” will 
not improve understanding of these important interactions and may even close off 
some important opportunities for effectively responding. 
Three overlapping sets of problems therefore need to be kept in focus: HIV/ AIDS, food 
insecurity, and malnutrition. Not only do these problems overlap significantly, they interact 
too. We need to keep track of the nature, magnitude, and outcomes of these interactions 






Greater emphasis needs to be placed on learning from, supporting, and enabling 
community-driven responses and innovations. Communities have better, more relevant 
information (that responds to the diversity and context-specificity), and they often have 
latent, untapped capacity. Transparency and accountability may also be enhanced through 
local peer oversight. Communities have incentives to act, and they are responding, albeit 
not always optimally. But in general there is a need to start with an understanding of which 
community-driven responses are working before looking at ways to provide relevant 
support where local capacity is exceeded. This in turn requires a clear articulation of roles of 
other stakeholders, including the state, in a broad-based system of social protection. 
In the face of the challenges posed by the interactions among HIV/AIDS, food, and nutrition 
security, there is no convenient magic bullet intervention and no blueprint.  
The fact that “business as usual” is not working well, however, does not mean that 
everything needs to change.  
Rather, a truly multisectoral involvement is required, not the perfunctory addition of more 
(usually vertical) HIV activities on to sectoral plans. Mainstreaming starts with decision-
makers internalizing AIDS as a development issue, leading in turn to a critical review of 
existing policies and programs through the lens of their growing knowledge of AIDS 
interactions. It is a process involving continual reflection, and the progressive application of 
principles and processes for responding rather than pulling predesigned interventions off 
the shelf. 
Need to balance between the need to know, and the need to act. Learning by doing 
indicated.  
Binswanger, Hans P., Stuart Gillespie, and 
Suneetha Kadiyala, 2005, Scaling up 
Multisectoral Approaches to Combating 
HIV and AIDS, in Gillespie, Stuart, ed. 
2006. AIDS, poverty, and hunger: 
Challenges and responses. Highlights of 
the International Conference on HIV/AIDS 






There is significant consensus on how to prevent, mitigate, and treat HIV and AIDS, well 
summarised in recent guidelines and best practice papers of UNAIDS, WHO, UNICEF, and 
other organisations. Nevertheless, scaling up of actions recommended in these documents 
has been slow. 
 In this chapter we conclude that the slow speed cannot be explained by absence of the 
required knowledge or by the prohibitively high costs of scaling up; scientific consensus 




South Africa, April 14–16, 2005. 
Washington, DC: International Food 
Policy Research Institute 
explanations must be sought in the slow onset nature of the catastrophe, the enormous 
stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS, and the multiplicity and complexity of the actions required in 
the areas of prevention, care and treatment, and social protection. 
Regarding the latter, we show that implementation of parallel vertical intervention by 
different central sector agencies is not a practical way of scaling up. Integrated rural 
development is the classic example of the failure of such a strategy… 
 The approach has been supplanted by local and community-driven development 
approaches in which implementation and coordination of many actions are delegated to 
communities and development committees associated with local governments, with the 
assistance of sector agencies and the private sector. Information at the local level is much 
more readily available, and therefore coordination at that level becomes feasible. The deep 
involvement of communities and existing local implementers sharply reduces cost, 
increases willingness to cofinance the interventions, and improves commitment and 
understanding of the programs. … 
Early implementation experience, although not yet conclusive, shows that such 
implementation mechanisms can mobilise significant local capacities in communities and 
at local levels and can be scaled up at more affordable costs. Impact evaluation, however, 
lags behind. … 
Slater, Rachel, and Steve L. 
Wiggins. Responding to HIV/AIDS in 
agriculture and related activities. Natural 
Resources Perspectives 98, London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 2005 
HIV/AIDS 
Agriculture 
Review of literature 
on impacts of 
disease on 
agriculture and fam 
households 
HIV/AIDS represents a severe threat, not just to those households affected, but to 
agriculture as a whole. Key impacts include loss of capital on the supply side, and loss of 
demand for output: together, these effects could mean all but the most favoured farming 
areas retreating into more extensive production to meet local subsistence needs. 
Multipliers from farming to other rural activity would be depressed, and the whole rural 
economy could thus be trapped in a low-level equilibrium, leaving the majority of 
households living in poverty and vulnerable to all manner of hazards. 
Much of what needs to be done to counter the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on 
agricultural and related activities represents a redoubling of development efforts, 
including: 
Education and training needs stepping up to compensate for loss of labour and skills. This 




With the expected loss of capital to the costs of the disease, the value of improved rural 
financial intermediation, in particular making the best possible use of savings, will be even 
greater. The considerable experience of institutional development and innovation for rural 
finance needs to be drawn on and applied more widely, taking into the account the need for 
adaptations to context; 
For households losing labour to HIV/AIDS, labour-saving technology will be particularly 
valuable. This may be in farming itself, but it may be more pressing and feasible to reduce 
time taken on other tasks, such as drawing water. This applies above all to activities usually 
carried out by females. Ideally, extension services need to be able to provide additional 
options for households affected; 
For some households, labour loss may be so severe that farming is no longer an option. 
Strengthening the rights of women and orphans to land worked by the household would 
allow them to retain a key asset, and derive income from renting our or share-cropping the 
land; and 
Little attention has been paid to the threat to supply chains from the disease. The epidemic 
thus underlines the importance of finding ways to improve their functioning, already often 
deficient, and make them less reliant on the personalised contacts of key players. Little 
attention has been paid to this so far in the thinking about the impact of the epidemic. 
HIV/AIDS creates an additional, heavy stress on rural societies, with the pressure falling 
highly unevenly across households. Many of these are already vulnerable to multiple 
hazards. The disease underlines the challenge of finding appropriate and effective social 
protection for affected households, when resources are limited.  
Slater, Rachel, 2008, Institutions and 
instruments for tackling chronic poverty: 
the case of special protection and 
HIV/AIDS, Working Paper 127, Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre, London: 





people living with 
HIV/AIDS  
Box 4 summarises main findings (verbatim): 
Box 4: Policy conclusions and recommendations 
Singling out the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a special and unique kind of crisis can be useful in 
order to direct resources and political attention towards dealing with the impacts of the 
epidemic. However, actual activities focussing on HIV/AIDS mitigation and coping should 





Except in very specific circumstances, targeting of social protection mechanisms should be 
towards vulnerable people to reduce risks, some of which are the result of HIV/AIDS and 
some of which have other sources, rather than targeting towards people affected by 
HIV/AIDS specifically/only. 
Support should be targeted to households and not just individuals because of the problems 
that emerge when an AIDS patient dies and because, since it is generally orphans left 
behind, household recovery options are severely hampered. 
Direct targeting of HIV/AIDS orphans, as opposed to other orphans, raises equity and social 
justice problems and is, in many cases, inappropriate. HIV/AIDS orphans should be 
supported alongside other orphans who have similar needs, for example, alternative 
curriculum and training at school to help them take on adult roles and responsibilities. 
FFW and CFW programmes can be appropriate for HIV-positive but asymptomatic people, 
but these should be in parallel to other transfers, notably food and cash, for households 
that are labour constrained through morbidity or mortality effects. Running FFW and CFW 
programmes in parallel with food and cash transfers is important in preventing children, 
especially orphans, from being forced into labour markets. 
Innovations in micro-finance to support HIV/AIDS-affected and other vulnerable 
households should be encouraged, accompanied by a careful consideration of the 
embedded inequalities in communities that may result in exclusion of HIV/AIDS-affected 
households. 
Various institutions have a role to play in contributing to or implementing safety nets. 
Outside HIV/AIDS-affected households and communities, other stakeholders, notably 
NGOs, governments and donors, should scale up community safety nets without 
generating a ‘crowding out’ effect. Partnerships between NGOs, governments and donors 
are crucial in this respect. 
Better coordination is required between NGOs, governments and donors and could be 




programmes and projects should be mainstreamed into sectoral activities, in part to 
prevent HIV/AIDS exceptionalism. 
Social protection interventions should be designed around impact rather than prevalence 
rates, and donors, governments and NGOs should ensure an appropriate balance between 
prevention, care and recovery activities, whatever the prevalence. Donors and 
governments should acknowledge the policy choices that are made between fixed-life 
projects that promote people’s livelihoods through economic growth, and recurrent 
expenditure on social protection for households that cannot contribute to, and are unlikely 
to benefit from, economic growth. They should recognise that the HIV/AIDS epidemic will 
create a long-term welfare bill and find ways of supporting this. 
Nolan, Ann. "Social Protection in the 
Context of HIV and AIDS’ in OCED, 2009, 
Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Social 





people living with 
HIV/AIDS 
HIV/AIDS takes a heavy toll on livelihoods and economies. 
Cash transfers help preserve consumption and prevent people from having to resort to 
sales of assets or to work that endangers them. Targeting should be broad, aimed at 
poverty in general, rather than trying to isolate those living with HIV/AIDS — since that can 
confer stigma. 
Take care that funding cash transfers does not deprive health and education of funding. 
Opportunities exist for action to promote the right so women and girls to education., land., 
and fair treatment.  
Buse, Kent, Clare Dickinson, and Michel 
Sidibé. HIV: know your epidemic, act on 
its politics. Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 101, no. 12 (2008): 572. 
HIV/AIDS 
Political economy 





Argues that the political determinants of responses to HIV/AIDS matter as much, if not 
more, than medical considerations. 
The literature reveals the tremendous impact of ideas on HIV policy. The social 
construction of who is thought to be at risk plays into the perceived political acceptability of 
action on HIV.8 
 
Piot, P., Russell, S., & Larson, H. (2007). 
Good politics, bad politics: the experience 
of AIDS. American Journal of Public 
HIV/AIDS 
Political economy 
Editorial Records how HIV/AIDS has been treated politically, as a disease that was for many scorned 
as a disease of homosexuals, drug users and the sexually promiscuous. 




Health, 97 (11), 1934–1936. 
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.121418 
 
Setting the pandemic as a human rights issues, making people aware how much those who 
are vulnerable on account of low incomes are the hardest hit, these made a difference. As 
did building a set of international conference and forums that encouraged leaders to sign 
up to fight the disease and aid those living with the virus. 
Effect on public health has been transformational: 
Action on AIDS has been truly transformational for public health. AIDS has also introduced 
a new paradigm for the involvement of affected individuals and communities and changed 
the dynamics between caregivers, the pharmaceutical industry, public health 
establishment and international organisations, and affected communities. Arguably the 
most extreme public health issue of our time, AIDS has underscored the imperatives to 
think and act beyond the confines of the classic public health arena, adopt comprehensive 
approaches, and engage leadership at all levels.11 
Two big take-aways: work with communities, work with leaders.  
Asian currency crisis 1997–98 
Bhushan, Aniket & Chantal Blouin, 2009, 
Liberalization “Shocks” and Social 
Protection Policies Lessons from the East 
Asian Financial Crisis, in Ronald Labonté, 
Ted Schrecker, Corinne Packer, and 
Vivien Runnels (Eds), Globalization and 
Health. Pathways, Evidence and Policy, 






Review of primary 
literature 
The Asian currency crisis that broke in 1997 delivered a sharp shock to many economies of 
Southeast and East Asia, most notably those of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines 
and Korea. IMF role in enforcing austerity exacerbated the impacts of the crisis. 
Businesses went bankrupt, unemployment rose, real wages fell, and household incomes 
declined. Many had to economise on food and seek cheaper health care. 
It made clear that the vulnerable included many people who had previously not been seen 
as poor. 
Responses were diverse, but included: 
• In MICs introducing social protection for workers that was universal; 
• Providing support for small and informal businesses in credits and grants 
• Grants and credits to community organisation to ameliorate local conditions 
• Attempts to control prices or to provide staple foods and other necessities at 
subsidised prices; and 




So much what could be done effectively depended on prior organisation, experience that 
could be scaled up. 
One outcome was increased suspicion of external agencies, the IMF in particular, and the 
sense that if the region — especially ASEAN — was to avoid recurrences, it had to take care 
of itself. 
Recovery for most of the region was rather rapid, except for Indonesia. 
Jones, Nicola, & Hannah Marsden, 2010, 
Assessing the Impacts of and Response to 
the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis through 
a Child Rights Lens, UNICEF Social and 
Economic Policy Working Paper, New 
York: UNICEF 




Review of primary 
literature, data 
bases 
Crisis of 1997 resulted in unemployment, else employment, lower wages, higher prices and 
hardship for most people. 
Children may have survived — rates of life expectancy, infant mortality, stunting and so on 
seem to have held up; but have suffered from reduced spending and consumption. 
Policy responses ranged from economic adjustment, to social services to social protection. 
Lessons around economic crisis impacts and policy responses to cushion children and 
caregivers: 
 1) understanding the underlying political economy drivers of policy choices so as to design 
more strategic policy advocacy strategies; 
2) designing gender- and age-responsive social protection mechanisms; 
3) balancing investments in targeted social protection measures with protecting 
investments in basic service provision; 
4) harnessing potential synergies between informal and formal social protection 
mechanisms; 
5) ensuring that social protection responses are not limited to addressing economic and 
related consumption vulnerabilities but also adequately address social vulnerabilities, 
especially those related to gender-based violence and child protection from violence and 
abuse; and 
6) investing in more systematic age- and gender-disaggregated data collection and crisis 
monitoring initiatives so as to better inform policy debates on how best to respond to 




Atinc, Tamar Manuelyan, and Michael 
Walton, 1998, Social consequences of the 





Weisbrot, Mark. Ten years after: the 
lasting impact of the Asian financial 
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Review of policy 
responses of IMF 
The crisis was one of short-term liquidity. The affected countries had taken on much private 
short-term debt. When currencies depreciated, paying this off led to a run on currency 
reserves, then to external investor overreacting so that large inflows of private finance 
became outflows. 
Author then explains how counter-productive was the IMF response, that omitted to act as 
lender of last resort, but instead committed the errors of insisting on recessionary policy. It 
was these measures that led to far greater economic malaise and social hardship than was 
merited. 
Indeed, it had been the IMF;s insistence on freeing capital markets that had laid the ground 
for the liquidity shock in the first place. 
These failures were highly visible, leading to the IMF losing its role as arbiter in MICs, as the 
countries themselves built large reserves to deal with any subsequent problems, in which 
regional cooperation was seen as the way to avoid a repeat, rather than any reliance on the 
IMF. 
The problem was caused by a sudden reversal of private international capital flows to 
the region: from a net inflow of $92.8 billion in 1996 to a net outflow of $12.1 billion in 
1997. 
In the crucial first few months of the crisis (August to December 1997), the IMF 
concentrated on structural "reforms," and put forth the argument that the crisis was 
due to "fundamental structural weaknesses"13 in these economies, rather than the 




2007/08 food price spike 
Headey, Derek & Shenggen Fan, 2010, 
Reflections on the global food crisis. How 
did it happen? How has it hurt? and How 
can we prevent the next one? IFPRI 
research monograph 165. Washington 
DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute 
Cereals prices Review of causes of 
the price spike 
The food price spike caused concern since poor people spend much of their small incomes 
on food: higher food prices mean hardship. 
Given that prices may be higher than before, and spikes can happen, thus: 
Indeed, without actions to repair some significant flaws in the global food system, the food 
crises of 1972–74 and 2008 could be repeated, perhaps sooner rather than later. 
Causes 
Multiple causes: 
Indeed, the more one assesses this crisis, the more one concludes that it is the result of a 
complex set of interacting factors rather than any single factor. 
Some explanations hold up better than others, including: 
A complex of macro factors that pushed up maize prices with some knock-on to other 
cereals — 
This set of interconnected factors includes rising energy prices, the depreciation of the US 
dollar, low-interest rates, and investment portfolio adjustments in favour of commodities. 
This saw energy prices push up costs of production, allow oil exporters to import more 
cereals, and led to a great rise in demand for biofuel feedstock — the latter being of about 
the same order as the export surge of 1973 in wheat to the USSR. 
A rice price bubble that resulted from panic buying when exports were banned; and, 
Reduced wheat supply from harvest failures and export restrictions, although mainly the 
former. 
Other explanations are popular, but less convincing. 
Demand from China and India — but they are self-sufficient in cereals. China’s imports of 
soy took off from 1995, not more recently, and most of this comes from new lands in 
Argentina and Brasil. Yes, they reduced their stocks, but from high levels: it is not clear this 
affected expectations — although lower stocks in India may have influenced the late 2007 
ban on rice exports. Oil prices are affected more by other countries’ demand than these 




… we find that growth in cereal imports was much stronger among other sets of countries, 
including Mexico, the European Union (EU), and a range of Middle Eastern and North 
African (MENA) countries. 
Declining growth of production and yields, land degradation. Most of the slow down comes 
from old Eastern Bloc: 
It turns out that production per capita has indeed declined, but about three-quarters of that 
decline is explained by falling production in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. However, 
that trend did not affect international trade, because the former Soviet bloc countries 
actually increased cereal exports to the rest of the world over this period. 
Africa is problematical, but barely affects the world price. 
Stock declines are also less convincing, since: 
First, global stock declines are much less impressive once policy-driven reductions of the 
excessive stocks in China and the former USSR are excluded. Second, because stocks are a 
residual, stock declines in other countries primarily reflect deeper causes, such as rising 
demand or insufficient supply. Indeed, in the case of wheat markets we find that trade 
shocks reduced US wheat stocks, so that low stocks can hardly be a cause of the crisis. 
Similar results are true of biofuels demand and US maize stocks. Hence we do not believe 
low stocks were an important cause of the crisis. 
Speculation, on which this report is agnostic: 
Our view is ultimately agnostic, because we believe it is impossible to discern causality in 
the context of futures markets, even from time series econometrics, as futures market 
variables represent expectations of the future. Thus the usual Granger-causality tests are 
potentially irrelevant, because expectations of price rises at time t might be noncausally 
associated with higher prices at time t + 1. However, whether or not futures market 
activities were a cause of the crisis, we find it unlikely that they were a driving force, if only 
because we have substantial confidence in several of the more tangible explanations of the 
crisis discussed above: oil prices, biofuels demand, a depreciating US dollar, and various 





The macro studies tend to limit examination to changed trade balances, fiscal deficits — 
without looking at household impacts. Micro-studies often make strong assumptions about 
price transmission, as well as other assumptions about household response. Direct 
observations of impacts are obscured by the simultaneous rise in oil prices. While poor 
households depend directly more on food than fuel, the import bills for LDCs in oil are 2.5 
times larger than for food imports, so it is likely that the oil price shock had significant 
effects. 
Despite these qualifiers, our review of local price trends in developing countries does show 
that real prices in 2008 were substantially higher than prices in 2007, often double, 
especially around the middle of 2008. The good news is that prices generally did start to 
decline in late 2008 as international prices fell. Had higher prices persisted, the crisis could 
have turned especially severe. 
 The bad news is that price rises were surprisingly high in a large number of countries. In 
Africa, prices rose especially high, particularly for imported products principally consumed 
by urban populations, but also for some local commodities that are not widely traded 
(indeed, commodities for which international prices are not even reported). In this 
monograph we can only speculate on why African prices rose so substantially, and 
ultimately the answer remains a matter for future research. 
Concluding comments 
There are striking similarities between 2007/08 and 1973/74: oil prices, supply shocks, etc. 
In many ways the two crises had similar causes, including rising energy prices, similarly 
sized shocks to US cereal demand (from the Soviet bloc in the 1970s and from the biofuels 
industry today), low interests rates, and the devaluation of the dollar, as well as declining 
stocks and some adverse weather shocks. 
There may well be future shocks, from climate change and more variable weather, oil 
prices, surging biofuel demand. 
The most daunting aspect of the existing global food system is not only the strong 
possibility that food crises are an inherent aspect of the global food system—which is 




suffers from a huge regional imbalance in cereal production—but also that this system may 
well be hit hard by several shocks in the future. 
But our main concern is apathy: that once prices fall, interest in sustained agricultural 
development will fall away: 
The real concern is that the precipitous fall in food prices over the second half of 2008 will 
once again lead to the widespread apathy toward the agricultural sector that has prevailed 
among policymakers in both developed and developing countries. Indeed, a long history of 
neglecting agricultural investments has made it difficult for many developing countries and 
their donors to quickly scale up agricultural investments in the wake of the crisis. Despite 
these obstacles, sustained and smart investments in developing country agriculture will be 
essential if the world food system is to finally deliver what it ought to: greater food security 
and real income gains for the world’s poorest people. 
Wiggins, Steve & Sharada Keats, 2013, 
Looking back, peering forward. Food 
prices & the food price spike of 2007/08, 
Project Report, ODI Shockwatch: 
Managing Risk and Building Resilience in 
an Uncertain World, Overseas 
Development Institute 
Cereals prices Review of evidence 
available by 2013 
Examines causes, responses and impacts of food price spike. 
On causes, argues that the spike is best considered the consequence of an unusual 
configuration of events, rather than heralding some fundamental change in the workings of 
the cereals system: 
The argument here distinguishes the conditions that made possible the spike — mainly a 
slowdown in the growth of cereals production, stocks depleted to a level at which short-
term shocks could not be accommodated, rising oil prices and the associated extraordinary 
increase in the demand for US maize to be distilled to ethanol; from short term triggers of 
harvest failures and biofuel mandates that accelerated price increases; and from the very 
short term, overreactions of governments, traders and consumers whose restocking, 
export limitations and hoarding aggravated the initial price increases to produce an 
extraordinary spike. 
On responses: 
Most governments tried hard to react to higher world food prices. Low-income countries 
(LIC), however, despite the additional aid many received, struggled to make a difference. 
They had few means by which to mitigate price rises, either at the border, or on domestic 
markets. Most of the buffering of international price rises came through the natural 




those LICs distant from the sea: protection left them highly vulnerable to price volatility 
from domestic harvests. 
When it came to protecting vulnerable citizens, again LICs often faced the twin challenges 
of not having safety nets in place (in terms of both policies and institutions) that could be 
scaled up when prices rose, combined with not enough resources to provide adequate 
protection in countries where half or more of the population were in danger of 
impoverishment and hunger. 
Most tried to stimulate domestic production, yet again LICs had few means by which do so: 
distribution of seed and fertiliser were costly exercises, promising farmers higher prices was 
unthinkable for lack of funds. 
Middle-income countries, on the other hand, often had more scope for action, thanks to 
their greater administrative capacity, deeper funds to draw on, and often a smaller share of 
population to protect. With agriculture a smaller share of the economy, offering farmers 
higher prices or subsidised inputs was feasible. Having the means and acting effectively or 
efficiently, however, are not necessarily linked. 
… 
Across countries, higher food prices were commonly seen as a threat to the lives of poor 
urban households with less appreciation that poor rural households might be equally 
vulnerable. In any case, for many countries it was administratively easier to protect urban 
rather than rural households. Urban households, moreover, were better placed to protest in 
the face of price increases. Hence responses tended to show a bias to urban areas. 
Overall, most surveys report that not many vulnerable households received assistance from 
the state during the food price spike. Despite considerable public efforts, for most 
threatened households, it was their own ability to cope that mattered. 
On impacts, inevitably higher food prices implied hardship for vulnerable households, 
especially in the short run, when the ability to cope is least. Effects over the longer run may 
have less damaging, and indeed, the depth of hardship in some cases may have been less 
than feared: 
Any rise in prices of essential items such as staple foods will entail some hardship. The more 




households, or whether it has led to permanent damage. If this latter were the case, then it 
should show up in the nutrition of infants: they are usually the most vulnerable members of 
vulnerable households. Yet the statistics from national surveys conducted before and after 
the spike do not show a general trend towards damage: on the contrary, in 37 out of 52 
countries, child nutrition improved rather than worsening. 
The simple interpretation may be that for vulnerable households, the food price spike was 
not that much of a problem provided that the household lived in a fast-growing economy 
with a reasonably competent government capable of providing the public goods and 
services to ensure that growth provides wide benefits and able to protect the vulnerable. 
Those vulnerable households living in countries with slow growing economies, with 
governments barely able to fulfil their functions and unable to react effectively to the spike, 
may well have suffered. 
Report then assess the prospects for cereals prices over the medium term, concludes that 
they will be more stable with levels falling back to those seen prior to spike in real terms.  
Keats, Sharada, Steve Wiggins, & Edward 
Clay, 2011, International rapid responses 
to the global food crisis of 2007/08. Three 
years on: How relevant, effective, and 
efficient were international responses to 
food price rises across the world in 
2007/08?, Project Report, Overseas 
Development Institute  




Aid partners and multilateral agencies mounted a major response to the food price spike, 
with more than US$5 billion — were approved in 2008 and 2009 by the agencies concerned. 
Responses fell into 3 categories: 
Collecting and disseminating information internationally, to assess the crisis and its 
implications, to mobilise and coordinate responses; 
Technical advice to national governments on how to respond, particularly on identifying 
the vulnerable; 
Funds and in-kind donations to 
Stimulate agricultural production — mainly through seed and fertiliser distribution; 
Provide food aid, health and nutrition programmes — with assistance from UNICEF, WFP 
and WHO; and, 
Expand (support or in some cases implement) other safety nets. 
Review focuses on third set of responses. 
Responses to higher world food prices were conditioned by how different agencies 




exacerbating costs of food aid, undermining cash transfers, and adding extra demand for 
safety nets. They responded by securing more funding and expanding safety nets. 
Development agencies saw higher prices emerging from low production and stocks. So 
they responded by promoting an agricultural production, and in some cases taking steps to 
increase (often humanitarian) cereal reserves. Other agencies saw the crisis eating into the 
budgets of low-income countries attempting to stimulate national production or cushion 
their vulnerable populations from price rises, so they provided funds to pay for these, and in 
some cases to compensate for budget losses arising from reduced import taxes, higher fuel 
bills and the like. For governments struggling for lack of administrative capacity, they 
helped with technical and financial support. 
Were these efforts directed to the right place and people? By location, the agencies seem 
to have chosen the right countries to focus their efforts. It is not clear, however, if the 
neediest locations within countries were reached, as it is difficult to find information on the 
extent to which spatial mapping of sub-national vulnerability influenced decisions. Rural 
areas got less attention than urban in many cases. In this respect, targeting was 
misinformed. The typical expectation was that urban households would be harder hit than 
rural ones since it was assumed that the latter would not have to buy in food. In fact, many 
of the rural poor — who were often poorer than their urban counterparts — relied heavily 
on buying in food and so were hit hard. 
Socially, not enough is known about whether or not the right people within selected 
locations were reached. In some cases, reaching the neediest was too difficult at short 
notice. 
Were the responses the right ones? 
Most responses fell into two categories: stimulating production and protecting vulnerable 
people from high food prices. Broadly, these responses were appropriate, but perhaps not 
always entirely accurate. In addition to the questionable assumption that problems were 
more severe in urban areas, it was also often thought that the prime cause for concern was 
adding to the numbers in poverty, rather than the increased poverty of the already poor. 
Much of the urgency of the international response was stimulated by the estimate of an 
extra 100 million or so being added to the numbers of the hungry; rather than the 




strain on their access to food. An earlier review found that not all of the predicted impacts 
of higher food prices were entirely as expected 
How effective were these responses? Responses were delayed. Inputs were delivered but 
many arrived after the first half of 2008, when crops were planted in the Northern 
Hemisphere. Globally, most production response came from developed regions, rather 
than in developing countries. Some of these, however, did see strong response – 
particularly in West Africa and in South, South-East and East Asia. Some individual 
programmes report positive impacts on people’s food security. 
Safety nets were similarly delayed: most got going by late 2008 and early 2009, when 
prices had been high for some months. Less is known about their effectiveness. Some 
reportedly suffered from implementers’ capacity constraints, overly complex targeting, and 
insufficient attention to women. There were also not enough attempts to examine relative 
effectiveness of implementing one type of safety net compared to another. In many cases, 
school feeding programmes were the focus because, unlike more sophisticated social 
protection programmes, they already existed in many low-income countries and could be 
scaled up relatively quickly. 
A final reflection concerns the evaluation deficit. While it may still be early to ask questions 
about impacts of these responses, not all agencies made sufficient attempts to evaluate 
their response. Most reporting stops at outputs without consideration of impacts or 
outcomes. Very few evaluations of what was done are available; exceptions being for FAO’s 
TCP responses, and for some WFP and DG-ECHO programmes in place at the time of the 
food crisis. And while these studies did the best they could given limited time and data, 
they still leave some questions unanswered. 
Avian flu   •  
Liang et al, (2011) Comparative Analysis 
of National Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Plans, WHO 
Avian Flu 
Preparedness 
Desk review Analysis according to 5 ‘functional components’ of pandemic preparedness and response 
guidance: 
Planning and coordination, 
situation monitoring and assessment, 




health system response 
communication 
 More to be done on sub-national planning 
Most countries had plans 
Plans from richer countries were better/more complete, but national income was not the 
only determinant of planning quality 
Plans coming from countries with higher life expectancies and lower under-five mortality 
rates tended to have higher pandemic preparedness plan completeness values 
Ortu et al (2008), Pandemic Flu 




Desk review Thirty-five plans were identified and available from 53 African countries. Most plans are 
relatively robust in addressing detection and containment of influenza in animals but 
strategic preparedness is weak. 
communication strategies generally developed to raise awareness and promote hygiene 
measures. 
Human health care sector is ill prepared. 
The maintenance of essential services in the event of a pandemic is absent from most 
plans. 
Most plans are ‘developmental’ but lack operational clarity. 
Sambala et al (2018), Pandemic influenza 




Desk review Assessed flu pandemic plans against seven thematic areas of preparedness: 
preparation 
coordination and partnership 
risk communication 
surveillance and monitoring 
prevention and containment 
case investigation and treatment 
ethical consideration 




on average, highest scores for preparation, coordination and partnership and risk 
communication (but only 48/49%) 
lowest scores for case investigation and treatment and ethics (25% and 14% resp.) 
very few plans scored on: 
business continuity plans across the non-health sectors 
sub-national planning 
operational details (eg no of cases expected, # staff likely to be off sick) 
Cooperation with neighbouring countries 
Web reporting systems 
Plans for recruiting volunteers from local communities 
“Overall, our assessment shows that pandemic preparedness plans across the WHO African 
region are inadequate” 
In other words, “it is OK, we have a plan in place” should not be enough to reassure us. 
Breiman et al (2007), Preparedness for 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 






Desk review Despite national and state level strategies, local resources were limited and the virus spread 
widely. 
>$3 million from donors, $50 million credit from WB plus $ms from GoN – but could not get 
human, material, and financial resources rapidly to locally affected areas. 
the greatest adverse effect was in impoverished areas like rural and semi-urban Nigeria, 
affecting especially backyard and medium-scale farmers. Egg and chicken sales declined by 
>80% within 2 weeks after the announcement of the outbreak; 4 months later, sales were 
still <50% of baseline. Poultry feed sales also dropped by >80%; 80% of workers on affected 
farms and 45% on unaffected farms lost their jobs. The out- break caused an immediate 
decline in chicken consumption, even in areas where the disease was not reported. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is uniquely characterised by vast geographic areas that are difficult to 
access; uneven socio- economic development; nearly transcontinental limitations in 
epidemiologic, surveillance, and laboratory capacity; and profound infrastructure 
weaknesses relating to communications and health systems and capacity of government 




Risk: attention to avian flu diverting resources and focus from other health issues. “for 
many months, ministries of health personnel in countries throughout Africa have been 
deeply immersed in pandemic preparedness and response planning; they have been pulled 
away from routine activities, and critical programs have been put on hold.” 
Need to use avian flu resources in ways that are “in a way that is broadly applicable to 
building public health capacity in recipient nations”  
Leach and Scoones (2013), The Social and 
Political Lives of Zoonotic Disease 




Science & politics 
Analysis of 
previous pandemic 
Pandemic models are not neutral science, but are based on social, cultural, political norms 
and values that shape their development 
Addressing epidemics means understanding these social, political, cultural narratives 
For H5N1, mathematical modelling emphasised ‘control at source’ measures, when this 
means taking very difficult policy decisions (with potentially worse impacts than the 
disease itself) when the threat is only modest. Frequently, it often means making difficult 
decisions around trade-offs between economic damage and lives lost and before there is 
sufficient information for this. 
Models that took social dynamics into account (e.g. disaggregating by gender) saw disease 
spread less rapidly, with fewer cases of mortality and morbidity 
Participatory epidemic models could shed light on how exposure is highly differentiated by 
age, gender, occupation, and behaviour changes based on risk profile. 
Each modelling approach on its own is likely to misunderstand the pan/epidemic. Modelling 
must include political, social, cultural dimensions if they are to truly understand the nature 
of the disease and the epi/pandemic that it will cause and to ensure that responses are 
appropriate 
Scoones and Forster (2008) The 






International response was dominated by outbreak narrative; including construction of the 
‘other’ – dangerous places and people from where disease comes and (often) reflecting 
Western anxieties about globalisation 
Number of different responses, including the veterinary response and human flu outbreak 
approach: led to conflict over resources 
Veterinarians and socio-economists also at loggerheads: livelihoods vs disease control (i.e. 




Security responses emphasise the protection of healthy rich northern populations: keeping 
the virus out of the global north. A meaningful response needs to be global, however, as 
disease can originate anywhere. 
Nevertheless, the US rates pandemic flu as a higher risk to national security than terrorist 
attacks and assumes it to be largely an external / foreign threat – protecting “us” from 
“them”. These discourses are central to WHO response too, which has taken a health 
security approach. 
Epidemiological responses are “reinforced by a set of disciplinary cultures which value 
quantitative, disease-focused assessments over more complex analyses of social, 
economic, political and ecological dynamics” 
The ‘outbreak’ narrative and response may be appropriate and necessary in some 
circumstances, however, where diseases are entrenched and/or endemic (e.g. Ebola in 
parts of Africa), different approaches are needed: long-term prevention, managing 
endemism. Emphasising eradication pathway may be impossible. 
“Choices of what to do, where and for whom (…), inevitably frame and direct pathways of 
response. If dominated, as to date, with largely northern concerns about ‘health security’, 
then a response pathway will emerge in a particular way” 
Bazeley and Macleod (2006), Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Birds – 
Assessment of Issues and Options for 




Review of previous 
experiences 
Advice for DFID 
preparedness 
Veterinary argument for intervention: particularly infectious, difficult to control, mortality 
levels of up to 100% in some avian poultry outbreaks. Draconian measures are typically 
applied, due to economic cost to poultry farmers. 
Fears that mutation could result in a virus that spreads from humans-to-humans, causing 
between 2 and 7.4 (or more) million deaths and economic damage of US$ 1,430 billion. 
Given that this virus has not yet developed, a vaccine cannot be either, and it is unclear how 
effective existing ARVs would be. 
“… the importance of HPAI prevention and control in poultry in developing countries has 
less to do with averting pandemic flu in those particular countries and more to do with the 
global public good of reducing worldwide bio-threat” 
Ability to control avian flu is severely limited by veterinary extension services, which were 
decimated by SAPs in Africa. As a result, there is very little surveillance or diagnostic 




farmers are unlikely to report early signs of disease (while overcompensation encourages 
intentional spread of disease as has happened in Nigeria). 
Poverty dimension: geographic overlap between areas of high poverty density and high 
poultry density and outbreaks are more likely in poor areas, making transmission to 
humans more likely too. 
State capacity is most important ingredient to preventing biohazards such as avian flu and 
where DFID should be spending its money [on preparedness, essentially]. This includes 
strengthening extension to/regulation of poultry sector. 
Questions for DFID: does it want to address emergency responsiveness or longer-term 
development? Is this a human health or veterinary issue? Is it about efficiency and 
effectiveness of international institutions? Or long-term state capacity-building? 
There is sufficient research in virology, epidemiology, vaccinology (with possible exception 
of on-site diagnostics), but considerable space for DFID to add value to process of 
adaptation and adoption of scientific insights. 
DFID can add value in social, economic, and vulnerability consequences of epidemics and 
any control strategies employed – and area that is undoubtedly under-resourced. Also: 
invest in deepening public engagement. 
Invest in institutional architecture of global aid to ensure these issues are adequately dealt 
with, for example, by FAO 
Roland-Horst, Epprecht & Otte (2008), 
Adjustment of Smallholder Livestock 
Producers to External shocks: The case of 






of avian flu for 
poultry producers 
Due to their vulnerability, smallholders have developed strategies for (ex ante) risk 
management and (ex post) coping 
Need to build on these, when trying to assist smallholders, rather than trying to re-establish 
initial conditions 
Living standards - according to farmers themselves – depend on returns to livestock 
production and crop productivity 
Significant scope among poultry farmers to offset losses by expanding other forms of 
production - though varies greatly between households 
"Assuming that prices remain constant, the results obtained indicate that most farmers 




production/marketing activities by 5 percent or less, although a significant minority would 
need increases in the 5 to 10 percent range" 
Epprecht, Vinh, Otte (2007), Controlling 
Avian Flu and Protecting People’s 
Livelihoods in the Mekong Region and 
Poverty in Vietnam 





of avian flu for 
poultry producers 
Nearly all poor rural households in remoter, mountainous Vietnam depend on poultry 
Majority of poor producers, however, are concentrated in lowlands, where market 
transactions, movements of goods, livestock and people are most frequent 
Northern areas: livestock contribute 25% to household income; southern: 10% 
Poultry accounts for about a quarter of livestock income; average flock size: 16 
Main HPAI risk areas coincide with irrigated rice areas in the lowlands, with good market 
access and high poultry transactions 
Need to be aware of these factors in order to implement good policies for dealing with 
HPAI 
Rushton et al (2005), Impact of Avian 
influenza outbreaks in the poultry sectors 




Impact analysis Thailand: 1.5% reduction in GDP due to HPAI; Vietnam: 0.3-1.8% of GDP; 
Thailand: agricultural growth halved in year of outbreak (FAO estimates) 
Poultry production not significant enough to have really noticeable macroeconomic 
impacts; however, decrease in tourism sector in Thailand meant the impact was more 
significant. 
Microeconomic impact: depends when in the poultry cycle a producer loses her stock 
Adoption of control strategies is informed by perceived risk politically, socially, 
economically. Must consider public health, economics, sustainability of livelihoods, adverse 
publicity (for example for tourism industry). 
Problems with surveillance: focus only on one disease, so does not address main concern of 
farmers; need to monitor bird and product movement too; surveillance of small-scale 
production is resource intensive. Must incorporate participatory methods! 
Need to regulate cross-border poultry trade, without pushing traders into black market; 
need to consider responses/compensation schemes and to communicate these in advance 
to encourage early reporting. 
Vaccination not always a good strategy: can hide the disease and increase likelihood of 




As always: need to avoid asking small-scale producers/affected individuals to bear the costs 
of epidemiological control. 
Need for value-chain analysis to identify key areas for control of disease and its spread. 
Ear (2009), Cambodia’s Victim Zero: 
Global and National Responses to Highly 




Political analysis of 
pandemic response 
Cambodia offers prime example of impact of foreign aid on a weak state and where drive 
for tourism and public health can be at odds. 
“Already awash in donor money, Cambodia played its role on a global policy stage in both 
clamouring for its share of the Avian Flu pie and becoming an incubator for donor trial-and-
error experiments on how to achieve above all else one goal: minimising the risk of Avian 
Influenzas spread inside Cambodia and, more importantly, to reduce pandemic potential 
that could strike donor countries themselves.” 
Cambodia reveals key challenges, obstacles, and opportunities for responding to /avian flu: 
limited knowledge on effectiveness of policy options; lack of technical and financial 
management capacity in key ministries (in this case agriculture); avian flu control strategies 
must be pro-poor if they are to succeed. 
Same old story with aid: driven by interests other than recipients’ (in this case, fear of 
disease in donor countries), results in poor policy advice and myopic programming. 
Forster (2012), To Pandemic or Not? 
Reconfiguring Global Responses to 
Influenza, STEPS 
Global flu responses 
Political analysis 
Political analysis “… techno-scientific narratives constructed by bio-medical actor networks failed to 
correspond with the more variegated narratives of multifarious global publics, and so 
struggled to recruit support and maintain credibility and authority”. 
Cultural, political, and commercial forces need to be considered and harnessed for 
successful intervention. Requires a determined move to include alternative framings and 
understandings of the pandemic. 
One-size fits all responses are insufficient, often misguided. The world would be better-off 
with a pandemic response and preparedness that takes the needs of the poorest, most 
vulnerable as its starting point. Focus would then be on disease control, agricultural 





WHO criticised for its handling of H1N1, mainly because it was under influence of 
pharmaceuticals who benefited from declaration of a pandemic. A broader view of disease, 
that incorporates alternative views, would keep pharmaceuticals in check. 
“The world was waiting for a pandemic… and I think that just because people were waiting 
for this event to occur, when it did occur, everybody capitalised on it” – key informant 
quote 
Sellwood et al (2007), Bird flu: if or when? 
Planning for the next pandemic 
Preparedness 
planning 
Policy response Influenza A (like H5N1) are only flus which cause pandemics: 1917-19, 1957-58, 1968-69 
Influenza pandemic requires four conditions: new subtype must be unrelated to previous 
(pre-pandemic) predecessor/or almost entirely novel to humans; little or no immunity 
among humans; causes significant illness; must spread efficiently between people. 
Developing a vaccine: would take 4-6 months, with limits on supply for several months 
afterwards. Risk that vaccine could become a post-pandemic vaccine, rather than for use in 
the pandemic itself. 
Treatment in the interim: ARVs. Where this is not available: social distancing, but depends 
on rapid and stringent action (often in the absence of good surveillance). 
International travel restrictions are ineffective, according to modelling, as are temperature 
controls at airports. 
Chanlett-Avery et al (2006), International 
Efforts to Control the Spread of the Avian 
Influenza (H5N1) Virus: Affected 
Countries' Responses, Congressional 
Research Service 
National avian flu 
palns 
Policy analysis “… the typical national response to a confirmed outbreak of H5N1 has included 
quarantining the area of infection, culling or vaccinating exposed or at-risk poultry and wild 
birds, restricting the movement of poultry for trading purposes, testing and treating 
exposed humans, initiating public information campaigns, and seeking access to anti-viral 
medication” 
Nigeria: quarantine of affected farms and culls, led to large-scale poultry sales by farmers 
Ebola Mano River countries, 2013-2015 
Richards, P., Amara, J., Ferme, M.C., 
Kamara, P., Mokuwa, E., Sheriff, A.I., 
Suluku, R. & Voors, M. 2015 Social 
pathways for Ebola virus disease in rural 






sectional data and 
observations from 
interviews 





containment. PLoS neglected tropical 




Trust in authorities is reasonable, people believed messages on Ebola – but still relied on 
help from family, not distant authorities and health services. Local authority figures used to 
spread messages are not the ones that people believe are able to help them. 
Burial rites, known to be a big factor in spread of E, are not just ‘spiritual’ – intimately 
connected to social relations, status and kinship ties of widows, in turn link to land rights 
claims. So, cannot easily be simply abandoned. 
Social ties outside village and between villages shape how disease spreads. Must not 
assume that neighbouring villages have strongest or friendliest ties (legacy of long conflict). 
This was a barrier to a ‘local’ focus in Ebola care and control. 
People move for schooling, work, marriage, trading – carrying infection long distances to 
urban and other rural areas. Makes contact tracing impossible. People have to volunteer to 
be tested and isolated. That requires testing and isolation to be attractive options. Must not 
be seen as somewhere where you die. 
Since evacuation to centres is often not possible, people need good advice on ‘second-best 
options’: how to treat at home in ways that minimise risk of spread to everyone. 
People need to be able to create and take responsibility for their own rules (eg on burials).  
World Bank. 2015. The Socio-Economic 








By March, 40% had not worked since the beginning of the crisis. Agricultural work was 
down, waged non-agricultural waged work was up (due to seasonality). Not much change. 
Job losses were worst for women. Small traders and self-employed worst hit. 
Food security went up in urban areas, but down in rural ones. But this is hard to interpret 
given seasonal factors. 
Schools re-opened but 27% of older children did not go back. 
Gatiso, T.T., Ordaz-Németh, I,, Grimes, 
T., Lormie, M., Tweh, C., KuÈhl, H.S., et 
al. 2018. The impact of the Ebola virus 








More than half reported lower income during crisis than previous year. 
Geographical proximity of EVD outbreaks did not have impact on household income, 




production and livelihoods in Liberia. 
PLoS Negl Trop Dis 12(8) 
Livelihoods Agricultural production lower in EVD affected areas than non-affected areas. Lack of 
availability of labour and of cash for inputs. 
Kodish, S.R., Rohner, F., Beauliere, J-M., 
Daffe, M., Ag Ayoya, M., Wirth, J.P., et al. 
2018. Implications of the Ebola virus 
disease outbreak in Guinea: Qualitative 
findings to inform future health and 











Harvest losses due to reduced labour availability, together with outbreak coinciding with 
planting season. 
Household food access difficult when quarantined, as normal community sharing not 
possible. 
Fewer traders operating, restrictions on going to markets, reducing food buying/selling. 
Increased food prices, but interviewee reports of price rises much higher than official 
monitoring. 
Some resistance to targeted food deliveries due to hostility of villages. 
Kodish, S.R., Bio, F., Oemcke, R., Conteh, 
J., Beauliere, J.M., Pyne-Bailey, S., et al. 
2019. A qualitative study to understand 
how Ebola virus disease affected 
nutrition in Sierra Leone—A food value-
chain framework for improving future 













System-wide impact on the food value supply chain was similar to those typically seen in 
large-scale disasters such as earthquakes. 
Range of direct and indirect effects on agricultural production and food storage and 
processing, as well as distribution, transport, trade and retailing. 
Culturally-appropriate social and behaviour change communications were a critical 
response component for improving health, nutrition, and hygiene-related behaviours 
through community engagement. 
Before outbreak, Sierra Leone was essentially recovering from the civil war: increasingly 
strong trade of food commodities (rice, livestock), 13.5% income gains since 2001, 
proportion of underweight children had decreased from 21 to 16 percent. 
Stites, E. and Bushby, K. 2017. Livelihood 
strategies and interventions in fragile 
and conflict-affected areas: Assessing 
trends and changes from 2012 to 2016, 







Literature review Cash transfers can offer greater flexibility for livelihood support compared to food aid, 
especially during infectious disease outbreaks. Can also help overcome difficulties related 
to border closures, etc. 
USAID. 2018. Evaluation of the 






Early on, safe and dignified burial programmes did not integrated a culturally-sensitive 




Outbreak Response in West Africa 2014-
2016 
Burials (n=16,000) and 
health worker 
survey (n=288) 
Intervention came a little too late in process. 
Campbell, L. 2017a. Learning from the 
Ebola Response in cities: Population 














Population mobility within and between urban and rural areas became a key challenge for 
the humanitarian response. Attempts to control it were largely unsuccessful, despite closed 
borders. 
Partly economic (e.g. trade), but also for cultural reasons (burials, weddings) and fear 
(stigma, HR abuses). 
Top-down approaches to population movement are ineffective, need to understand forces 
driving population movement and engage communities (monitoring, tracking and 
engagement). 
Campbell, L. 2017b. Learning from the 
Ebola Response in cities: Responding in 









evidence and data 
of effects of 
quarantines during 
Ebola outbreak in 
Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone 
Quarantines can be effective, but should only be used as a last resort. Where they are used, 
humanitarians need to address needs (e.g. food and water) 
In Liberia, quarantine caused confusion and violence (West Point). Guinea adopted ‘micro-
cerclage’ approach, targeting small number of households instead. Sierra Leone used both, 
using district-level quarantines but moving to household level once transmission dynamics 
were better understood. 
Quarantines especially difficult to impose in urban areas. 
Guluma, Y. 2018. Outcome Analysis: 
Cash transfer programming response to 








66 FGD, 31 KII, 19 
trader interviews, 
plus quant data 
from monitoring 
reports 
USAID/FFP supported 120,000 hhs with cash transfers ($50/month), ag vouchers and CFW 
and also supported traders with cash - between July 2015 and December 2016 (ie beginning 
after EVD epidemic) 
Other support going to same villages (food aid, ag input support) 
Aimed at 3-6 months support in lean season 
Cash spent on all the usuals – food, investment, healthcare, schooling 
Preference for timing of transfer depended on priority – if ag, then before planting; if food, 
then lean season 
Targeting - most ‘contentious’ issue. Different agencies used different approaches. Some 




Mot transfers give to women. Different opinions about whether this empowered women or 
emasculated men. 
Some implementation issues – delays of months, problems with physical access to pick up 
money (for elderly, sick) 
Partners report quant data on change in HDDS and hunger scores – showing improvement 
between endline and baseline. But no controls!! (And by end of lean season...) 
Cash stimulated petty trade, reawakening of savings groups – but not all were sustained. 
Murray, A., Majwa, P. Roberton, T. & 
Burnham, G.. 2015. Report Of The Real 
Time Evaluation Of Ebola Control 















desk reviews, field 
visits at different 
stages of the 
project  
The epidemic is different from other disasters - instead of starting with devastation and 
building back services and livelihoods, the Ebola epidemic expanded and moved in 
uncharted ways. Needs different management paradigms for response approaches. 
Response needs strong technical support in epidemiology, to be able to anticipate and 
prepare. You have to be proactive. 
Need to make data available in real-time to all those who need it. Information systems are 
critical but under-appreciated – data on epidemic, information/data on interventions and 
their successes/failures, etc. 
Need to support livelihoods while the epidemic is ongoing, households cannot wait. 
‘Safe and dignified burials’ was critical in halting spread. Front-line volunteers need 
psychological and morale support. 
Contact tracing requires huge engagement with each individual. Done simply by officials, it 
missed most new cases emerging. 
Bandiera, O., Buehren, N., Goldstein, M., 
Rasul, I. and Smurra, A. 2018. The 
economic lives of young women in the 











In villages where there was no intervention (safe space/club for women), out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies rose and school enrolment post-crisis fell in areas badly affected by EVD. 
In villages that were not badly affected by EVD but there was no intervention, transactional 
sex increased among older women. 
Impact on agriculture: international and local trade collapsed, markets were forced to close, 




Ali, M. and Hutton, K. 2016. Evaluation of 
the DFID Ebola Emergency Response 

















DFID supported 4,441 households with quarantine food and non-food items. 
DEERF also supported small, innovative projects aimed at food distribution. E.g. 
community caretakers and labour gangs to manage farms, business support in the form of 
cash transfers. 
DuBois, M., Wake, C., Sturridge, S. and 
Bennett, C. 2015. The Ebola response in 





Desk review of 
literature and data 
from UN/WHO/WB 
WHO efforts to ensure safe burials did not pay attention to seemingly bland details, e.g. 
colour of body bags. 
Initial categorisation of Ebola as a health crisis created issues livelihoods/education ignored. 
Bowles, J., Hjort, J., Melvin, T. and 
Werker, E. 2016. Ebola, jobs and 
economic activity in Liberia, Journal of 







of panel dataset of 
firms (N=402) 
EVD caused large decrease in economic activity/jobs in all of Liberia, especially in Monrovia. 
Outside Monrovia, restaurants and food/beverage sectors shed the most jobs. 
In Monrovia, construction and restaurant sectors suffered most. 
Little association between incidence of Ebola cases and declines in economic activity. 
ACF. 2015. EVD 
Food Security 
Livelihoods 
Summary paper Main economic cost was in changed behaviour due to restrictions and fear. 
Agricultural production affected by disruption of communal working in fields. 
Agricultural income affected by limited trader access and loss of demand, affecting 
perishables in particular. 
Biggest impact was on petty traders (many of which poor) or those processing/cooking 
food. Wage labourers also hit. 
Dumas, T. 2016. Mitigating the Impact 
of the Ebola virus disease on the Most 
Vulnerable Households through an 








Beneficiaries used cash transfers to buy food, pay school fees and pay labourers in 
agricultural lands. 
Vegetable production was heavily impacted by grasshopper attacks, mainly due to late 




Intervention int eh District of 
Moyamba, Sierra Leone, ACF 
beneficiaries, key 
informants, ACF 
staff members and 
triangulated with 
secondary data 
Cash transfers can enable households to restart their livelihoods in the context of the Ebola 
outbreak. 
HEART. 2014. Helpdesk Report: Ebola 








Social learning was principal vehicle through which Ebola was tackled, but this was 
complicated by conspiracy theories and lack of confidence in government. 
Direct sensitisation required to raise awareness about Ebola. 
Need to equip local communities with material and knowledge resources to response to 
Ebola within their communities. 
UNDP. 2015. Assessing the socio-
economic impacts of Ebola virus disease 





Synthesis of three 
UNDP studies on 
economic and 
social impact of 
Ebola epidemic in 
Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone based 





Heaviest toll on active population (15-44). 
Impact on children includes lost education. 
Reduced fertility. 
Positive lessons from prompt responses in Nigeria and Senegal. Need for regional, not just 
national, response. 
Glennerster, R. and Suri, T. 2014-2016. 
The implications of the Ebola Outbreak 
on Markets, Traders, and Food Security 











Number of rice traders fell dramatically but prices remained relatively stable with high price 
outliers, especially in isolated remote communities that are not self-sufficient. 
Resilience: market traders selling from home. 
Supply chain disruptions close to borders. 
Ebola’s effect manifested itself in reduced demand and international trade rather than food 





Prices for basic foods across Sierra Leone remain at or below prices in previous years, with 
some districts where prices are substantially higher than average. 
The number of palm oil and gari flour traders declined sharply, but there was a modest 
increase in number of rice traders. 
International shipping to West Africa fell in September, but returned to 2013 levels by 
November/December. 
May 2015 
Agricultural trade has returned close to normal across Sierra Leone. 
The number of markets closed peaked in October 2014 but has since been in decline. 
Rice prices remain below their 2012 price, and even lower in cordoned areas. 
The number of traders for local and imported rice is now similar to previous years. 
February 2016 
The number of traders for both imported and domestic rice dipped pre-harvest but has 
been largely similar since. 
Number of traders for gari and palm oil has almost always been consistently lower than in 
pre-Ebola yeaers. 
Price of rice has been consistently lower (10%) than in pre-Ebola years, particularly in 
cordon districts. 
From May to July 2015, 10% of markets sampled reported to be closed. 
Adams, J., Lloyd, A. and Miller, C. 2015. 
The Oxfam Ebola Response in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone: An evaluation report 











Strong pressure to treat epidemic as medical emergency organised through top-down 
processes, rather than standard humanitarian coordination. 
Effectiveness limited by lateness of response and inability to react to changing situation. 
Need for clearer faster analysis and decision-making. 
Success in adapting existing competencies to a new situation, but existing plans (e.g. for 




In the end there was a changing focus from house-to-house work to supporting community 
structures. 
Konydndyk, J. 2019. Struggling with 
Scale: Ebola’s Lessons for the Next 










as well as series of 
high-level 
interviews 
There were delays in international response. 
There is need for advanced planning on how to change containment strategy at different 
scales of transmission. Behaviour-centred interventions are more rapidly scalable than 
medical interventions. 
Polygeia. 2016. Lessons from Ebola 
Affected Communities: Being prepared 





and literature, key 
informant 
interviews, findings 
of 5 meetings 
Lack of PPE critical for healthcare worker infections 
Insufficient supply of food to quarantined, leading to some breaking quarantine to find 
food. 
Difficulty of contact tracing due to lack of formal addresses, etc. 
Supporting communities to identify and implement behaviour change was key. 
Complex systems of local leadership and movements of people make it hard to contain. 
FAO. 2016. Impact of the Ebola virus 
disease outbreak on market chains and 













chain actors (n=30) 
Ebola primarily disrupted functioning of cross-border agricultural market chains. 
Traders scared of travelling to affected zones. 
Border restrictions, quarantines and checkpoints made trade difficult. 
Farmers faced higher costs of inputs, reduced negotiating power (with fewer traders) and 
instability of prices due to geographical/seasonal patterns. 
Consumer prices were largely unaffected, with some exceptions (e.g. isolated communities, 
border communities in Guinea). 
Resilient supply chains: sellers sold on street/at home when markets closed, consumption 
of local staples instead of imported ones, new trade routes (e.g. Mali), palm previously 
exported consumed locally, 




Consumption of animal products affected by reduced purchasing power and disrupted feed 
imports. 
Awareness-raising campaigns helped reduce consumption of bushmeat, not bans. 
Cocoa heavily disrupted due to export bans. Led to food insecurity among cocoa farmers 
reliant on bartering against rice. 
Lessons: use precautions for labour groups (PPE), safe trade corridors, information 
campaigns, keep key strategic markets open with right precautions. 
Overall effect: 12% reduction of production of staple crops, but main impact was reduced 
trading. 
Gunjal, K. and Senahoun, J. 2016. 
Assessing the impact of infectious 
disease outbreaks on agriculture and 
food security: The case of the Ebola 
virus disease outbreak in West Africa, 
Proceedings of the Seventh International 
Conference on Agricultural Statistics, 





Model estimation Impact of Ebola was mainly caused by economic damage through changes of behaviour 
rather than direct mortality/loss of labour (e.g. HIV). In that way, Ebola quite similar to 
SARS and H1N1 (and COVID?). 
Reduced farm labour due to aversion behaviours, such as quarantines, border closures, 
restrictions, fear of labour groups, lack of inputs. 
Effect on prices was very small. 
Disruption of food chains occurred due to closure of market, changed traders’ behaviour. 
Impact on maize and cassava smaller due to lower labour intensity. 
Harman, S. 2016. Ebola, gender and 
conspicuously invisible women in global 
health governance, Third World 





review of Ebola 
response 
Women played conspicuously invisible role at every point of the international response to 
the Ebola outbreak. 









Cash transfers to 97,000 households 
Seeds and tools to 14,000 
Credit to fund agricultural producers (fisheries, forestry) 





Baseline (2012) to endline (2017): food insecurity went down 30-40% across countries, 
HDDS up 14-50%, although not directly attributable to USAID interventions (?). 
Denney, L., Mallett, R. and Benson, M.S. 
2017. Service delivery and state 
capacity: findings from the Secure 





studies on state 





in Sierra Leone 
Teenage pregnancy spiked during Ebola outbreak. 
Distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ constraints. Hard constrains include availability of 
medicine, whereas soft ones include social norms, beliefs and expectations that are stacked 
against desired behavioural change. E.g. reluctance to report cases of Ebola out of fear or 
distrust in authorities (in Sierra Leone) and alternative beliefs about healing. 
Traditional healers were engaged (late) in the Ebola outbreak, and only once their role in 
the community was sufficiently recognised. 
YMCA. 2016. Ebola Emergency 










Behavioural change was needed to break chain of transmission. 
Difficulties: Liberia/Sierra Leone had not experienced Ebola before and there was mistrust 
in gov’t. 
Food security became a concern: lower intake among slum populations in Monrovia, 
inability to harvest crops. Led to unrest, particularly in West Point, Monrovia. 
YMCA employed peer educators that targeted groups in different ways: e.g. jingles for 
motorbike drivers, door-to-door for women, etc. 
Reached 82,000 people and increased trust. 
Relieved some hard constrains by providing handwashing facilities, as well as encouraging 
people to wash hands. 
Contract tracing using community members. 
Provided food support to community members and healthcare workers, as well as start-up 
capital. 
Lesson: emphasis on using young community leaders; coordinate directly with communities 




World Bank. 2015. EVD  Prioritise risk management to prevent future recurrence, restoring livelihoods and building 
community resilience (restore trade flows, tackle malnutrition, recapitalising community 
banks, addressing structural factors such as clean water, better infrastructure, etc.) 
Agricultural production growth reduced from 5.7 to 3.3% in Guinea, from 4.8 to 2.6% in 
Sierra Leone and from 3.5 to 1.3% in Liberia. Surprisingly small. 
Recommendations: work in ways that strengthen national governments (avoid parallel 
systems), community engagement to tackle low trust, nurture positive behaviours (e.g. 
reduced FGM, increased handwashing), lay foundations for improved social protection 
systems, prioritise women and youth. 
International Development Committee. 
2016. Ebola: Responses to a public 







DFID responded very late because WHO did not sound alarm quickly enough (MSF did). 
Strong cross-government working once response was activated. 
Recommendations: flexibility, especially in ability to disburse small amounts early in crisis 
when they are most cost-effective; community engagement needs to take place earlier. 
Grunewald & Maury (2020) EVD 
Epidemics 
Pandemics 
 Additional complications of dealing with pandemics in conflict zones: weak health 
institutions, mobility of population resulting from violence, access and safety of healthcare 
workers. 
Need to use local/epidemiological expertise and find ways of supporting it. 
Do not forget other health problems. 




(n=122) and trader 
survey (n=122), 20 
FGD, 65 KIIs. 
66% households had less income 
64% had increased debt 
Critical food insecurity expected in April 2014 
Border controls critical due to importance of cross-border trade, especially in rural areas. 
Half of vendors had changed their suppliers. 
Additional risk insurance for shipping pushed up prices. 
Longer transportation times leading to more spoilage of perishable products. E.g. curfews 
and checkpoints. 




Christensen, D., Dube, O., Haushofer, J., 
Siddiqi, B., Voors, M. 2020. Building 
Resilient Health Systems: Experimental 
Evidence from Sierra Leone and the 








control trial of two 
interventions in 
254 government-
run health clinics 
Low perceived quality of care can lead to low utilization of health systems. Accountability 
interventions improved utilization and health outcomes in Sierra Leone during the Ebola 
crisis. Trust in government also correlated with decision to utilize healthcare. 
Conclusion: build trust and confidence in health workers. 
HPN/ODI. 2020. Special feature: 
Responding to Ebola in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Humanitarian 





 Providing food to Ebola contacts can increase compliance with monitoring, but also 
increase people identifying themselves as contact persons. 
Financial assistance to Ebola victims recommended by MSF but not implemented as too 
complex. 
Main issue for survivors of Ebola: stigma, job loss, particular vulnerability of women and 
young people. 
WFP EVD Evaluation Food assistance was an effective complement to containment strategies in reducing 
transmission. 
Initial phase characterised by extreme WFP caution: staff did not know how to monitor 
distribution, how to use PPE, best modality to use (cash/food) 
They revised food distribution methodologies. 
Scale-up difficult because new procedures were meshed into normal operations. 







Community care centres set up too late, in November 2014. Still useful to help with 
transmission. 
Informed, motivated and empowered communities were needed rather than one-way 
communication. C4D strategy revised accordingly, engaging social scientists and medical 
anthropologists. 
Funding gaps at critical sage (Sep-Dec 2014) 
Struggled to integrate child protection services, education and other (e.g. nutrition) into 




UN coordination was a struggle. 
Li, S.-L., Ferrari, M.J., Bjørnstad, O.N., 
Runge, M.C., Fonnesbeck, C.J., Tildesley, 
M.J., Pannell, D., Shea, K. 2019 
Concurrent assessment of 
epidemiological and operational 
uncertainties for optimal outbreak 
control: Ebola as a case study. Proc. R. 







Simulated model of 
caseloads 
Determining how best to manage infectious disease outbreaks may be hindered by 
epidemiological uncertainty and operational uncertainty. Authors present approach to 
simultaneously address both sources of uncertainty and elucidate which hinders decision-
making most. 
Epidemiological effective intervention might not be optimal if its costs outweigh its 
epidemiological benefit, but under higher-budget conditions, resolution of epidemiological 
uncertainty is valuable. 
When budgets are tight, operational and epidemiological uncertainty are equally 
important, resulting in significant reduction of caseload. 
Ebola DRC 
Roberts et al. 2020. Special feature: 
Responding to Ebola in the Democratic 





Special Issue, HPG 
journal 
Despite W.A. experience: outcomes no better in DRC; fatality rates of over 60% 
Vaccine helpful only for healthcare workers 
Lessons not learned from W.A.: earning community trust, protecting health care providers, 
large percentage of infections happened in health centres, inadequate health care for other 
diseases, poor conditions in isolation centres, little respect for burial traditions, no 
psychosocial care for survivors/bereaved, little involvement of faith-based organisations, 
neglect of SRH 
Lack of community trust meant long delays between symptoms and treatment 
Social protection for infected, as well as anyone they have been in contact with, to prevent 
return to work 
Psychiatric care for survivors is essential 
Elbe, Leach & Scoones. 2013. Pandemic 
Flu Controversies: What have we 
learned? Reflections from a workshop to 




Policy analysis Very little preparedness or international cooperation, despite inevitability 
Localised narratives on pandemics are too often ignored, especially in resource-poor 
environments, where global framings and interventions dominate – often to detriment of 
effectiveness 




Political, moral, ethical, justice issues more important than medical issues when decisions 
need to be made about public health policy 
Best responses are transparent, include diverse sources/opinions, are cross-disciplinary, 
include local knowledge and expertise; importantly, they are measured and appropriate to 
risk level 
Dzingirai et al. 2017. Zoonotic diseases: 
who gets sick, and why? Explorations 




 Africa assumed to be the place where zoonotic disease will “spill over” 
Women more likely to catch zoonotic diseases: firstly because of their work in 
gardens/around the home (proximity to bats); secondly, because of caring duties 
Gender analysis important for understanding impact of zoonotic disease 
International World Vision. 2019. Ebola 




Evaluation Outbreak complicated by conflict, food insecurity, vulnerable/displaced populations 
WASH: messages around handwashing are not getting through in a situation where WASH 
facilities are completely inadequate 
Poor internal coordination and communication between organisations working in Kivu; 
insecurity/conflict led to delays in rolling out programming 
WVI one of few organisations providing psychosocial support 
Delay in funding meant delay in rolling out safety net programmes 
Rohrwerder. 2020. Secondary impacts of 
major disease outbreaks in low and 





Serious short- and long-term consequences arrive from measures to control disease – 
quarantine, travel restrictions, social distancing 
Social impacts: reduced social cohesion and trust, stigmatisation of survivors/health care 
workers, school closures, orphaned children, increased labour/disease burden on women, 
trade off between short and long-term development goals, population displacement 
Economic impacts: livelihood generation, decline in fiscal revenues, decline in growth, 
increased prices, decrease in household incomes 
Secondary health impacts: diversion of funds from routine healthcare, strain on health care 
system, decrease in medical staff, increased mental health burden 
Political and security impacts: increases political tensions, coercive responses can lead to 




Agriculture: effect mainly due to lost labour, either through disease or (more importantly) 
quarantine/social distancing measures. 
Agricultural production in Guinea: rice production was down by 20%, coffee by 50%, cocoa 
by 30%, corn by 25% 
Women are likely to be affected more: tend to work in agriculture, but also have care duties 
DRC experienced alarming rise in malnutrition in children: food was more expensive, while 
household incomes declined; harvests were lower, due to labour lost to 
sickness/quarantine; fear of bushmeat reduced protein intake; much of agricultural activity 
is undertaken communally, which was banned 
Kelly. 2020. Evidence and lessons on 
efforts to mitigate the secondary impact 
of past disease outbreaks and associated 
response and control measures, K4D, IDS 
Control measures 
Disease outbreaks 
Review  Causality between epidemics and secondary effects is bidirectional 
Responses have focused on victims of disease, neglecting other health and economic need. 
Author argues for need to take a “whole society approach that attends not only to those 
individuals directly affected by the outbreak, but also to their broader communities” 
Need anthropologists to avoid generic ideas around ‘community engagement’, ‘gender 
sensitivity’ or ‘youth’. This should reduce coercive nature of some responses, and reduce 
resistance to them. 
Kirigia et al. 2019. The monetary value of 
human lives lost through Ebola virus 
disease in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in 2019 





Statistical analysis Health expenditure per capita in DRC: USD 21 – of these 3 are government, 9 are private 
expenditure, 9 are external health providers. 
USD 74-198 (depending on estimates) would be required to achieve SDG3 
Many Ebola deaths attributed to lack of health care investment 
Average value of lives lost was International $13,801 
Total value of lives lost: approx. International $17,761,539 
Roper. 2019. What can be learnt from 
Ebola about the dangers of global health 





Field experience / 
lessons 
Treating outbreak as a threat to global health security, rather than a humanitarian crisis, 
creates mistrust as people are treated as disease vectors and guinea pigs rather than 
patients 





Social problems caused by the epidemic not addressed 
Patients mistrust/are scared of Ebola treatment centres and staff involved – cases of 
running away to prevent treatment 
Fanning. 2018. Crucial course corrections 





Field experience / 
lessons 
Further discussion of mistrust and mistakes made by international organisations 
 
Nguyen 2019. An Epidemic of Suspicion – 




Field experience / 
lessons 
"Since 2014, anthropologists have pointed out that resistance to Ebola control efforts 
reveals ongoing, legitimate concerns about the conduct of interventions, respectful 
treatment of local populations, and resource distribution" 
Tariq et al. 2019. Assessing the reporting 
delays and the effective reproduction 






Statistical Administrative reporting delays decreased from 17.4 weeks to 3.3 weeks 
R: was calculated to the 0.9 
Probably not particularly relevant, except to say that it is important to have good 
administrative systems 
Kelly et al. 2018. Beyond vaccines: 




Medical  Aggressive hydration goes some way to raising survival rates (in high income countries 
death rates are 18.5%, in DRC it was 70.8%) 
COVID-19 China 
Chen, K., Zhang, Y., Zhan, Y., Fan, S. and Si, 
W. 2020 How China can address threats 
to food and nutrition security from the 






Speculative piece on production, supply chains, processing, incomes, nutrition. 
Highlights negative impacts on poultry sector recorded to date. 
Notes opening up of ‘green channels’ for priority transport of fresh agric products. 
“On Feb. 4, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued an emergency notice calling 
on related departments to maintain order in markets and ensure ample supplies of meat, 
eggs, and milk.” 
Zhong, R. and Mozur, P. 2020 To Tame 
Coronavirus, Mao-style Social Control 
Blankets China, New York Times, 15 
Corona lockdown 
Responses 
News Describes how lockdowns have been enforced via mobilisation of civil servants, party 




February 2020 (updated 20 February 
2020) 
Wu, X., Xu, X., & Wang, X. 2020 6 lessons 
from China’s Zhejiang Province and 
Hangzhou on how countries can prevent 
and rebound from an epidemic like 





Blog Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province, reacted quickly to COVID-19 before the city had 
any confirmed cases. 
The city used big data and information technology, like QR codes, to track and stop the 
spread of the coronavirus. 
Careful planning and clear communication lessened the impact of COVID-19 compared to 
Wuhan. 
The Economist, 2020, Planters, plagued: 
COVID-19 is making it harder to grow 




Media Notes political priority of ensuring spring planting goes ahead and supplies reach farmers 
(and food reaches consumers) through fast-track ‘green channels’ 
Some impacts already being felt on meat supply because slaughterhouses cannot get 
labour. 
The Economist, 2020, The post-virus 
economy: China goes back to work, but 
not back to normal, Anonymous, 26 
March 2020 
Economic impact 
Supply & demand 
side effects 
 
Media Economic round-up of latest data and speculation about future economic growth 
Supply side: gradual return to normal, but still hampered by labour shortages as migrants 
return but subjected to 14-day quarantines. 
Demand side: exports hit by spread of CO19 elsewhere; domestic consumption still 
recovering.  
Rozelle, S., Rahimi, H., Wang, H. & Dill, E. 
2020 Lockdowns are protecting China’s 
rural families from COVID-19, but the 




Indirect impacts of 
control measures 
Lockdown 
Blog Findings from survey of >700 rural village informants across 19 counties in seven provinces 
Focussing on (1) health impacts; (2) measures to control spread; and (3) (indirect) impacts of 
control measures on employment, income, access to food, access to health care and 
children’s education. 
Headlines: lockdowns, enforced in both urban and rural areas, successful in controlling 
spread of virus, but major impacts on employment and incomes, esp for migrant workers. 
Some knock-on impacts on food access, healthcare and education. 
Li, B. and Lu, B. 2020, How China made its 





Blog Describes the range of high and low-tech measures used to enforce lockdowns in urban and 




Wang, V. (2020) China’s coronavirus 
battle is waning. Its propaganda fight is 
not, New York Times, 8 April 2020 
Politics of COVID 
reporting 
Chinese politics 
Media Highlights the internal and international politics emerging around COVID reporting & 
response 
Esp the international relations ‘tug-of-war’ China’s now engaged in – China as a munificent 
& responsible member of the global community vs China as a serial cover-up merchant 
Swine Flu Pandemic (2009) 
Scoones, I. 2009 Swine Flu: Some 
Emerging Lessons. STEPS blog. 
Politics of pandemics 
Political economy of 
agriculture 
Blog Risks, uncertainties and mortalities: media favours estimation of potential human 
mortalities, often based on dubious sources and leading to panic/speculation. Other 
extreme is keep quiet, cover-up, assure populace. Neither works and need to accept 
uncertainty in public debate to avoid inappropriate pressure on public policy. Prepare for 
surprises and respond rapidly to pandemic with high reliability professionals. These were 
missing during Swine Flu. 
Health inequalities and preparing for a pandemic: good to do a global assessment, but need 
to recognise that structural inequalities will affect outcomes of disease spread. E.g. Swine 
flu caused more deaths in Mexico than anywhere else. Could be due to complex medical 
reasons, limited access to healthcare or effectiveness of response. Poverty and inequality 
play big part in dynamics of diseases. Many countries do not have pandemic preparedness 
plan. 
Local knowledge and disease surveillance: Poor surveillance and reporting systems can 
mean an outbreak can get out of control, e.g. in Mexico, where residents complained about 
wind blowing fetid air from industrial pig farm their way, where it gets stuck because of hills 
behind village. This is where initial outbreak was reported. But company and gov’t dismissed 
such knowledge because residents were ‘not doctors’. Local understandings are vital. 
Naming, labelling and the politics of international organisations: debate about whether it 
was a human/public health crisis or an animal/food chain crisis. Vets distancing themselves 
from swine flu outbreaks, and FAO very late to investigate link between animals and pigs. 
Look towards avian flu where there was coordinated response between animal and human 
health efforts. Problem: OIE deals with international livestock/meat trade, so pressure to 
downplay disease outbreaks. 
Political economy of agriculture: strong lesson from avian influenza is that changing 




than ‘big agribusiness’/industrial techniques. Rapid growth of informal/medium-sized 
industrial poultry production. Poor animal welfare/environmental standards, often 
connected to political circles, no autonomy, etc. Need to do a PE assessment of pig industry 
in Mexico. 
Banati, D. 2011 Consumer response to 
food scandals and scares. Trends in Food 





Irish pork crisis 
Melamine 
Evidence review BSE: conflicting messages broadcasted in media and non-harmonised risk management 
decisions led to general loss of trust in authorities and the food supply chain. Fear of beef 
generated by uncertainty. A decade later, fear was still present. Can be avoided if proper 
risk analysis framework was in place including science-based hazard exposure. BSE did lead 
to improvement of traceability of food production. 
Dioxin crisis (1999): dioxin accidentally added to 500 tonnes of animal feed in Belgium, 
contaminating 2,500 poultry/pig farms. Poultry/pork consumption dropped to 69 and 
93%m, respectively. Again, lots of uncertainty and no proper risk assessment, leading to 
economic crisis (Belgian food embargoed) that was much bigger than original problem. Led 
to European Food Safety Authority being established. 
Avian flu: huge amount of money spent to eliminate disease in 2003. 467 known cases, 282 
died. Despite being localised in Indonesia/Vietnam, 66% of Europeans feared virus. Huge 
drop in uncooked poultry meat export, 20-30%. 
Irish pork crisis (2008): dioxin-contaminated feed affected 50 or livestock farms. Proper risk 
assessment allowed authorities to establish that 99.98% of national beef production was 
free from contamination. Coordination, etc. limited crisis expanding. 
Swine flu (H1N1): spread from Mexico to 208 countries. Confusing messages led to 
uncertainty and hysteria, with many fearing a repeat of Spanish flu. Pork consumption 
plummeted. 
Chinese melamine case: first detected in US and led to widespread distrust in Chinese food, 
resulting in 30-40% drop of sales and 3 billion dollars of financial damages. 
What to do to avoid negative effect of disease outbreaks? Risk analysis, contact tracing, 
such as Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed. Agencies need to provide easily 




Cohen, J. 2009. Out of Mexico? Scientists 






News item Unlike COVID, young adults most likely to be affected by swine flu, including developing 
pneumonia. Usually age bracket that is least likely to suffer respiratory illnesses. 
Longer-than-usual flu season meant that Mexican authorities only discovered swine flu 
quite late. Cases surfaced in mid-March but only realised it was something new in April. First 
US case confirmed on 14 April. 
Origin of virus still not clear: consists of ‘classical’ North American swine influenza, North 
American avian influenza and remaining third divided between human and Eurasian swine. 
Either from Mexican farm or pig transported from North America to Asia (human then 
returning to Mexico) as early cases were in communities well-known for migration. 
Canadian worker then infected pigs after travelling back from Mexico (!). 
Interesting discussion around ethics of producing vaccine: suspend seasonal flu vaccine to 
release capacity? But only have capacity to produce up to 1.4 billion vaccines a year. Not 
enough for human population. 
International Development Committee, 
2016, Ebola: Responses to a public health 





Inquiry Inquiry into WHO’s response to the swine flu showed that it was ill prepared to deal with 
the pandemic, and suggested a number of changes. WHO still chose to encourage the 
organisation to prioritise high-mortality conditions. 
Deckers, J. 2010. Could some people be 
wrong by contracting swine flu? A case 
discussion on the links between the farm 
animal sector and human disease. Journal 








Argument has been made that the conditions in which many humans keep farm animals 
facilitate the development of new viruses and their transmission within and between 
species. Humans facilitated swine flu, although there is considerable uncertainty with regard 
to the question of whether either extensive systems or intensive (concentrated) farming 
systems are more directly implicated. 
Research has shown that 60% of all known human pathogens are zoonotic and that number 
is growing (three-quarters of recently emerged human pathogens are zoonotic) due to 
intensive farming systems, among other reasons. E.g. because animals are crammed 
together, close contact with farmers, 
Complex and overlapping moral questions: e.g. concentrated animal feeding operations 




Goodwin, R., Haque, S., Neto, F. and 
Myers, L.B. 2009 Initial psychological 
responses to Influenza A, H1N1 (“Swine 








Based on questionnaire study of Malaysia (N=180) and Europe (N=148), assessing changes in 
transport usage, purchase of preparatory goods, perceived risk groups, indicators of anxiety, 
assessed estimated mortality rates for seasonal flu, effectiveness of seasonal flu vaccination, 
and changes in pork consumption 
Previous pandemics led to stockpiling of goods, the victimisation of particular population 
groups, cancellation of travel and boycotting of particular foods (e.g. pork). During SARS and 
Ebola, association of viruses with Chinese or African ‘others’ made Europeans feel relatively 
safe from infection. 
26% ‘very concerned’ about being a flu victim (42% of Malaysians, 5% Europeans) 36% 
reported reduced public transport use (48% Malaysia, 22% Europe), 39% flight cancellations 
(56% Malaysia, 17% Europe), 8% had purchased preparatory materials (e.g. face masks 8% 
Malaysia, 7% Europe), 41% Malaysia (15% Europe) were intending to do so. Groups 
considered at risk included immune compromised (87%), pig farmers (70%), elderly (57%), 
sex workers/highly sexually active (53%), and homeless (53%). In Europe, 64% greatly 
underestimated mortality rates of seasonal flu, 26% believed seasonal flu vaccination gave 
protection against swine flu, 7% reduced/stopped eating pork, 3% purchased anti-viral 
drugs. 
Almost a third of Malaysians thought homosexuals were likely to be already 
immunocompromised through infection with HIV/AIDS. 
Conclusion: initial responses to swine flu show large regional differences in anxiety, with 
Malaysians more anxious. Discussions with family/friends may reinforce anxiety. Particular 
groups are being perceived as being at greater risk, potentially leading to increased 
prejudice during pandemic. Europeans require more info about seasonal flu inoculation. 
Important: anxiety or the unrealistic belief that others are at greater risk than themselves 
(Note: relevant for COVID) can reduce our willingness to enact healthy behaviours. 
Naming of swine flu in int’l media led to immediate drop in pork demand, leading to 
hundreds and millions of dollars of losses in North America. Communication efforts on 
behalf of the pork industry helped reassure customers and markets recovered (Gietz, 2010). 





Goodwin, R., Haque, S., Hassan, S.B.S. & 
Dhanoa, A. 2011. Representations of 
swine flu: perspectives from a Malaysian 











Public responses to novel influenza viruses are often rooted in cultural representations of 
disease and risk, but little research in locations associated with outbreak. 
They interviewed 120 Malaysian pig farmers: 37% felt they were at risk of infection, two-
thirds at least somewhat concerned about being infected. The most anxious farmers 
believed particular societal out-groups (homosexual people, homeless people, sex workers) 
were at higher infection risk. 46% claimed friends had avoided them since outbreak. 
They assess findings using three theories: 
Evolutionary theory: xenophobia likely to increase, especially those who violate cultural 
norms 
Theory of social representations: manifests itself in our fear of intensive agricultural farming 
during swine flu. Not just related to fear, but can stigmatise those who are considered at 
risk of infection. 
Terror management theory: primarily concerned with how individuals try to boost their self-
esteem and cultural world views when faced with their own mortality. 
People have developed fear of Asia, where wet markets allow for contact between live 
animals and people, and where dense urban populations and perceived lack of hygiene 
allow disease to spread. 
Although agriculture can be seen as threatening, providing a distribution point for 
dangerous toxins or degrading ecological and natural foundations of life, few respondents 
directly related agriculture or farming methods to the present swine flue outbreak. 
More research in particular is needed into the potentially complex relationship between the 
general population and health care workers, a group often discriminated against during 
influenza pandemics and avoided by many of our pig farmers (Bai et al., 2004). 
Attavanich et al. 2011. The Effect of H1N1 
(Swine Flu) Media Coverage on 
Agricultural Commodity Markets. Applied 





Model based on 
media index and 
futures prices 
Media coverage related to the name “swine flu” led to negative impact on futures prices of 
lean hogs, but not on other futures prices. Lasted 4 months, leading to revenue loss of 
about $200 million. 
Initial labelling and widespread publicity regarding swine flu caused downturn in domestic 




Consumer fear of infection, and several pork-importing countries imposed bans on swine 
and pork products (Russia and China). Also had effect on feed grains. 
WHO reiterated that pork was safe to eat and renamed swine flu to 2009 H1N1 in May 
2000. But name stuck even a year later. 
Research showing that governments are very bad at expressing accurately the nature and 
scope of risk in the case of disease outbreaks: e.g. Canada BSE, US H1N1 
Significant relationship between number of deaths caused by outbreak and intensity of 
media coverage (Bomlitz and Brezis, 2008). 
Johnson, R. 2010. Potential Farm Sector 
Effects of 2009 H1N1 “Swine Flu”: 







Evidence review Pork prices dropped when swine flu outbreak first started, leading to repercussions in other 
agri markets as well (e.g. feed). Countries, including US, banned imports. This is despite 
WHO, FAO, WTO and OIE issuing joint statement that pork products are not a source of 
infection. 
27 countries, including China and Russia, had imposed trade restrictions by June 2009. 
Although H1N1 cannot be contracted through cooked or uncooked pork, it can spread from 
pigs to people and from people to pigs, raising concerns about livestock workers. CDC 
estimates 15-25% of swine farmers have been exposed to swine flu viruses at some point in 
their lives, as well as 10% of vets. 
Alberta, Canada: swine herd infected by human. Turkey flock in Chile and Virginia (US) also 
infected. 
Surveys revealed widespread misperceptions about how swine flu can be contracted (e.g. 
13% from eating pork in US; 20% of Chinese believe this as well). 
Many viewed trade bans/restrictions as politically motivated or intended to protect pork 
producers in their own countries – e.g. Russia. 
Early estimates: US pork industry would lose $400 million; US pork exports down 31-36% in 
May and June 2009. 
Reactions: USDA implemented purchase program to help boost prices: up to $250 million (in 




Singer, M. 2009 Pathogens Gone Wild? 
Medical Anthropology and the “Swine 





Evidence review Swine flu pandemic raises questions concerning the capacity of medical anthropology to 
respond usefully to such disease outbreaks and their health and social consequences. 
Lindenbaum: anxiety and vulnerability links different phenomena, not just disease 
outbreaks but terrorism, financial crash, corporate criminals, environmental change, 
intensification of agriculture, etc. 
Threat of new and renewed pathogens is significant, given rapid changes in terms of 
urbanisation, unsustainable farming practices, resistance to antibiotics, etc. 
Emergent pathogens are natural, but their appearance among humans, their health and 
social impacts are mediated by microsocial processes embedded within large-scale 
inegalitarian social structures and their environment-shaping influences. 
Medical anthropology can bring three things to swine flu pandemic: field monitoring of 
pandemic as a biosocial phenomenon; assessment of biosocial origins and ongoing social 
influences of the pandemic; research-based and culturally informed involvement in public 
health applications. 
Stigma is often amplified during disease breakouts: but this reflects prevailing axes of social 
division. In case of swine flu, media and public jumped on ‘illegal aliens’ from Mexico. 
Wallace, R.G. 2009. Breeding Influenza: 
The Political Virology of Offshore 







Journal article Looks at social origins of H5N1, but written in the year of H1N1. Integrates pandemics with 
political economies of agribusiness and global finance. Argues that southern China provides 
a reservoir of near-human-specific recombinants subject to a phase change in opportunity 
structure brought about by China’s newly liberalised economy. Influenza seems to be able 
to integrate selection pressures by human production across continental distances. 
H5N1 manifests itself in regions of the world where animal health surveillance remains 
underdeveloped or degraded by structural adjustment programs associated with int’l 
loans/neoliberal trade agreements. 
Rural landscapes of many of the poorest countries are now characterised by unregulated 
agribusiness pressed against periurban slums. Globalised poultry allows virus to explore 
various evolutionary options. 




Evidence that H5N1 outbreaks more likely to occur in large-scale commercial poultry 
operations than in backyard flocks, but they originate from smallholdings. Ability to spread 
in industrial livestock make them virulent as genetic monocultures of domestic animals 
remove immune firebreaks that usually slow down rate of transmission (Garrett and Cox, 
2008). Large sizes and densities also increase transmission, along with depressed immune 
response from being in crowded space. High throughput provides continually renewed 
supply of susceptibles, the fuel for evolution. Killing animals early also increases virulence 
since it favours pathogens that spread more quickly and reach transmission threshold 
(virulence load) earlier. Chickens processed within 40 days now… Greater the culling, the 
more pressure there is for virus to evolve virulence. 
Swine flu H1N1 is industrial in origin: genetic segments have been found to originate from 
different parts of the world. Not possible for small farmer to amass this variety. 
Livestock revolution: emerged when vertically-integrated producers started buying up 
backyard producers, leading to explosion of chicken/hog populations. Largest producer in 
Asia: CP Group, which owns poultry farms in several countries. Helps spread of virus as 
Japan’s import ban on chicken from China in 2005 shows. CP just increased exports from its 
Thailand operations instead. 
Corporate business also often has connections with politics – helps cover-up disease 
outbreaks, E.g. Thailand/CP group in 2000s. Independent producers left out of the loop and 
their livestock suffered. Strong lobby preventing implementation of measures that would 
prevent disease outbreaks. 
Costs are routinely externalised: health of workers, pollution of surrounding land and water 
(fish kill), food poisoning, etc. 
For decades a variety of influenza subtypes have been discovered emanating from southern 
China. E.g. due to warmer weather (flu all round), high population density, live bird markets, 
etc. Mass immigration to Guangdong, where 700 million chickens are located. 
Guangdong also has easy access to international trade, and is an expatriate capital. Gov’t 




Science and Technology Committee. 2009. 





Evidence review Swine flu first pandemic in 40 years – declared by WHO on 11 June 2009. 
Most cases in July mild, but more severe or fatal cases involved patients with “underlying 
health conditions” (similar to today?) 
WHO recognised UK as one of best-prepared countries in the world due to advance 
purchase agreements of pandemic-specific vaccine, stockpiling to ensure 50% of population 
are treated in ‘worst case’ scenario. 
Government planning a “whole system” test to see how various parts of system (e.g. 
primary care, ambulances, hospitals, mental health services) actually interact in practice. 
House of Lords calling for them to do so earlier. 
Also calls to set up “Flu Line” earlier and ensure it can deal with expected demand. 
DfID has also commissioned a research project (costing £3.9 million over three and a half 
years) examining risks and risk management in avian influenza, which will hopefully lead in 
the long-term to a clearer understanding of best practice in HPAI control—eVectively 
reducing risk while promoting equitable growth and poverty reduction. This research 
project is being carried out by a consortium including FAO, the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), the Royal 
Veterinary College and the University of California at Berkeley. 
Schmidt, C.W. 2009. Swine CAFOs & 
Novel H1N1 Flu: Separating Facts from 




Political economy of 
agriculture 
Op-ed One source of original swine flu outbreak are concentrated animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs) 
H1N1 also the cause of the Spanish flu, which killed 100 million people in Europe. Only 
discovered that it started in pigs long after the human pandemic ended. 
H1N1 commonly found in pigs, which typically survive/exhibit flu-like symptoms. More likely 
in CAFO environment. 
CAFOs release ammonia-laden, airborne emissions that are linked to asthma, mucous 
membrane irritation and other respiratory symptoms. The facilities have further been 
implicated in the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria and reduce quality of life 
indicators in surrounding communities. 




Strong aversion from swine producers to even test for pandemic strain because they worry 
they would have to destroy their animals and lose that income. Alberta herd was destroyed 
without compensation… Moreover, countries that report infections face trade sanctions. 
Need to combine surveillance programs with economic protection. 
CAFO workers significantly (up to 50 times) more likely to have H1N1 antibodies than 
nonexposed controls. 
Conflict of interest: most studies funded by agribusiness. 
Keenliside, J. 2016 Pandemic Influenza A 
H1N1 in Swine and Other Animals. 






Evidence review In order to be successful, future surveillance and reporting policies must include provisions 
to protect the livelihoods of farmers. 
H1N1 has been known to exist for many decades and has stayed relatively unchanged. 
Linked to the 1918 ‘Spanish flu’ and it has been postulated that this virus jumped from 
humans to swine in the USA during the pandemic. In 1998, two new triple reassortments 
appeared in swine in the USA, with human like genes, indicating viral change. Seasonal 
outbreaks occur, but since 1998 the disease has changed expression to occur year-round 
and be more pathogenic. 
Avian influenza (H5, H7 and H9) frequently circulates between water birds and domestic 
poultry, sometimes infecting mammals. 
Coinfection with two different influenza viruses could lead to reassortment and the 
emergence of a novel influenza with potential public health significance. Virus receptors 
differ between mammals and birds but swine have cell surface receptors for both avian and 
mammalian viruses. It is therefore easier for swine to contract avian flu viruses than it is for 
humans. As a result, swine are a potential ‘mixing vessel’. Pigs are often in close contact 
with poultry, ducks and humans, especially in Asia, where many new virus strains originate. 
Swine influenza virus infections in most mammals are ubiquitous and generally mild, no 
public health action is currently taken when outbreaks occur. Some countries vaccinate to 
prevent economic losses, but influenza is no reportable and is not monitored by the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE – Office International des Epizootics). In poultry, H5, H7 




humans. This leads to regulatory action such as testing, monitoring and control through 
depopulation of infected birds. 
Swine mostly exhibit mild, respiratory symptoms but no death. In birds, influenza mainly 
affects gastrointestinal system (not respiratory). In both this may lead to reduced 
productivity (i.e. growing, egg laying, etc.). But severe illness in other mammals, including 
humans. 
May 2009: H1N1 confirmed in a small swine herd in Alberta, probably infected by a barn 
worker who returned from Mexico with flu. Outbreaks lasted two weeks, mostly mild 
symptoms but some impact on growth afterwards. Further 5 herds were infected in 
Manitoba, then from July to September 2009 in Argentina, Australia, Quebec, Manitoba and 
Ireland, confirming that humans were the main vector. 
In August 2009, Chile identified H1N1 in a species other than swine at a commercial turkey 
breeding farm. Symptoms of reduced egg production and shell quality. Birds recovered and 
returned to normal in 3 weeks. Workers also affected. 
9 ferrets discovered with H1N1 in Oregon, including owners. Domesticated ferrets are 
susceptible to human influenzas because of similar viral receptors. 
Cases among dogs in China and New York, as well as among cats in Iowa, Oregon and among 
a cheetah in a wildlife park in California. Also among wildlife, including striped skunks, 
badgers, binturong, racoons, etc. 
Studies confirm that no viral RNA was detected in pork meat at days 3, 5 and 7 post 
infection from 30 pigs experimentally infected for all body parts except for lungs. There is no 
evidence that humans can contract the virus from consumption of pork. 
Responses: government-imposed movement controls on herds. Mass slaughter not seen as 
effective or warranted given the mildness of the disease and fact that humans are vector of 
disease. Owner of Alberta herd opted to have his herd destroyed due to media pressure. 
In Egypt and Norway, mass slaughter was attempted as a method of control. But efforts 




May 2009: evidence showed meat consumption to be safe. Animals could go to slaughter 
and distributed into food supply chain once they were asymptomatic. WHO stated there 
was no justification for trade restrictions. 
Vaccines widely available and updated to contain new pH1N1 strain. Routine vaccinations in 
countries where risk is high, but not where costs outweigh benefit (e.g. in rural Canada). 
Risk of cross species contamination: CDC recommends workers to wear PPE and to be 
vaccinated, and not to enter pig farms if they are sick. 
Both humans and swine can shed the virus asymptomatically: this is an issue. 
Jonas, O.B. 2013. Pandemic Risk, World 





Evidence review Coordinating approaches and communications is important 
In an emergency, things can go very wrong because of poor risk communications. For 
instance, the Egyptian government killed all 300,000 of the country’s pigs in May 2009 
without adequately compensating the owners, in a reported attempt to control the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic flu, while WHO and other health authorities had publicly announced that 
they had stopped using the erroneous term “swine flu” and that culling of the pigs would do 
nothing to diminish the H1N1 flu threat. The incorrect perception that some of the infection 
risk originates in swine resulted in substantial hardship for the poor, marginalised 
community that raises pigs in Egypt. 
Moreover, there were additional costs: the trash that the pigs once consumed accumulated 
in massive piles. Other governments also based their responses on the ‘swine’ flu misnomer. 
More than 20 countries imposed restrictions on pork imports from Mexico and the US. In 
the US alone, losses in the pork sector exceeded $1 billion in April-October 2009, although 
there was apparently no flu infection risk from pork and related products. For zoonotic 
diseases, both human and veterinary health authorities need to be involved in naming and 
characterising the disease to ensure that information is accurate and that they correctly 
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Op-ed Government target of 4% increase in farmers’ net income for 2003 will not be met. 
Notes 70-80% of farmers’ income comes from jobs in cities, but 4 million forced to return to 
rural homes because of SARS. 
Hints at SARS-related discrimination against migrant workers. 
Further handicaps: floods in Hunan Province put strain on rural economy; drought in north-
east China and Inner Mongolia drive more farmers to cities, but fewer jobs because of 
SARS.  
China Daily. 2003a. Rural income hit by 
SARS. 18 July 2003 
SARS 
Farmers’ incomes 
Op-ed At peak of SARS epidemic, farmers’ cash income drops 3% on average (my note: may not 
include off-farm income?) 
Fewer farmers returning to work in cities – impact on incomes. 
Restrictions on selling overseas noted, owing to "technical barriers for Chinese produced 
agricultural products" 
China Daily. 2003b. Commentary: 





Op-ed Urban economies quick to recover despite being hardest hit by epidemic 
Rural economies far less developed, much harder hit, slower to recover.  
China Daily. 2004. Rural Income Rises 
but Growth Slow. 26 January 2004  
SARS 
Economic impact 
Op-ed Pick up in agricultural economy one year after SARS, but long-term effects felt: growth 
much slower than previously projected. 
Cause for concern for government: fear that slow rural growth could undermine social 
stability (growing rural-urban gaps). 
Hanna & Huang. 2004. The Impact of 
SARS on Asian Economies. Asian 




Predictive model Predicted loss of 1.5% GDP to Chinese economy, actual loss of 0.5%. 
The economic impact of the disease magnified in poor countries and regions, with poor 




Monaghan, K.J. 2004. SARS: DOWN 
BUT STILL A THREAT. In: Learning 
from SARS: Preparing for the Next 
Disease Outbreak: Workshop 






Draws attention to the risk posed by and to China's rural migrant labour population (c180 
million people) 
Co-morbidities (ie HIV, TB) and malnourishment as a factor increasing case fatality and 
thus local economic disruption. 
Impact of loss of key workers either through illness or death magnified in population 
hovering around poverty line. 
Rawski, G. 2005. SARS and China’s 
Economy. Chapter 5 in: A. Kleinman 
and J. Watson SARS in China: Prelude 






Predictive model Short-term impact on Chinese economy, analysis and longer-term predictions. 
Supposes link between breakdown in transport sector demobilising rural migrant workers 
and a decrease in Agricultural output 
Though no data available ot prove link, given experience with COVID-19, likely. 
Disappearance of jobs for rural migrant labourers in cities put pressure on farmers income 
(losing supplementary budget), which was already in decline. 
Sleigh et al. 2006. SARS and China’s 
Rural Migrant Labour: Roots of a 
Governance Crisis. Chapter 20 in: 
Population Dynamics and Infectious 
Disease in Asia. World Scientific 
Publishing. 
 
  SARS mainly impacted urban centres (Beijing/Hong Kong/Guangzhou), but rural migrant 
labourers singled out as potential vector for disease between urban and rural locations. 
Major issue that labourers not seasonal but travel year-round – continual flux. Concerns 
migrants could contract disease in cities, travel back to rural homes and put local 
population at risk 
Rural areas esp vulnerable - lack health care resources & infrastructure. 
Brahmbatt, M. 2008. On SARS Type 
Economic Effects During Infectious 






Evidence review Economic disruption stemmed largely from panic rather than rate of infection or fatality. 
Widespread misinformation caused more panic buying and stockpiling of drugs. 




Though acknowledges that this is difficult when official knowledge is limited by ability of 
public health infrastructure to detect cases - more common in rural areas of developing 
economies. 
Recommends strengthening surveillance capabilities of public health infrastructure. 
Beutels, N. and Jia et al. 2009. The 
Economic Impact of SARS in Beijing, 




Journal article Does not explicitly link adverse effects on rural economy, focuses on commercial sector, 
tourism and public transport. 
Public transport increases difficulty of rural migrant workers to obtain jobs in cities? (see 
below) 
Li, Y.H. 2016. Healthcare Reform in 
Mainland China: The relationship of 
healthcare reform and economic 
development in Chinese rural and 






Thesis Increasing disparity between urban and rural economic development in China early 21st 
century, widening gulf between health care provision exposed by 2003 SARS epidemic. 
Social disparity between urban/rural populations key factor in poor healthcare delivery in 
latter. 
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